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Scholars often suggest that terrorism – “the threatened or actual use of illegal 
force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through 
fear, coercion or intimidation” (LaFree & Dugan, 2007, 184) – is a battle of 
legitimacy.  As the most ubiquitous representatives of the government’s coercive 
force, the police should be most susceptible to terrorism stemming from perceptions 
of illegitimacy.  Police are attractive symbolic and strategic targets, and they were 
victimized in over 12% of terrorist attacks worldwide since 1970.  However, 
empirical research assessing the influence of legitimacy on terrorist attacks, generally, 
and scholarly attention to terrorist attacks on police are scant.  The purpose of this 
dissertation is to examine the influence of state and police legitimacy and alternative 
explanations on the proportion of all and only fatal terrorist attacks on police in 82 
countries between 1999 and 2008.  Data were drawn from several sources, including 
the Global Terrorism Database and the World Values Survey.  Surprisingly, results of 
  
Tobit analyses indicate that police legitimacy, measured by the percentage of the 
population who have at least some confidence in police, is not significantly related to 
the proportion of all terrorist attacks on police or the proportion of fatal terrorist 
attacks on police.  State legitimacy was measured by four indicators; only the 
percentage of the population who would never protest reached significance, lending 
limited support for this hypothesis.  Greater societal schism, the presence of a foreign 
military and greater economic inequality were consistently significant predictors of 
higher proportions of terrorist attacks on police.  Some measures of violence within a 
country also were influential, but they were not consistent across models or with 
expectations.  The results of the Tobit analyses were confirmed with Negative 
Binomial Regression Models using the number of all and only fatal terrorist attacks 
targeting police as the outcome. 
While these results suggest alternative explanations for terrorist attacks 
targeting police, discounting legitimacy as an explanation for such attacks or 
terrorism, generally, is premature.  Policy implications and avenues for future 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
On January 4, 1999, reported Islamic militants fired four missiles at a police complex 
in Pattan, India. One police officer and his wife died as a result of the attack. The 
family's five-year-old child was seriously injured… (National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Global Terrorism Database, 2010) 
January 1, 2005: Approximately 150 members of the Etnocacerista Movement 
attacked and took over the police station in Andahuaylas, Peru. The perpetrators 
killed four police officers and took 10 others hostage in the armed intrusion… 
(National Consortium: Global Terrorism Database, 2010) 
January 10, 1999: Eibar, Spain – A Civil Guard policeman was on guard duty when 
he confronted two individuals who threw a petrol bomb at him… (National 
Consortium: Global Terrorism Database, 2010) 
Immediately after the South Tower collapsed, many NYPD radio frequencies became 
overwhelmed with transmissions relating to injured, trapped or missing officers.  As a 
result, NYPD radio communications became strained on most channels.… (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 309) 
Police make attractive targets for some terrorists because they are 
representatives of the government’s coercive authority, making them accessible 
symbolic targets.  Some terrorist groups in the United States even have “hit lists” 
targeting police officers (Freilich & Chermak, 2009) because police are in a 
“brotherhood with the enemy government” (Miller, 2010).  Also, as first responders 
to emergencies, police are tactical or strategic targets for terrorist groups.  By 
overwhelming or incapacitating law enforcement, they become ineffective in 
resolving a terrorist attack, making the incident much bigger and more fatal.  Indeed, 
The Police Chief called attention to terrorist attacks on police: 
Terrorists target police – both directly and indirectly – because terror 
groups view the police officers as instrumentalities of the government 




enforcement is both a tactical and strategic target of terrorists.  The 
police officers’ role in combating terrorism is critical, as they, too, are 
victims of such violence as well as the protectors of others. 
(Alexander, 2007, ¶2) 
Finally, police are often secondary targets because they guard other primary targets 
(like businesses or government facilities).  For example, the New York City Police 
Department reported 23 officers killed in the line of duty responding to the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks (NYPD 9/11 Memorial website, undated) – even though the 
police were not directly targeted in these attacks. 
Like other forms of violence (e.g., murder) directed toward law enforcement, 
terrorist attacks on police are relatively rare, but terrorist victimization of police is 
more common than one might expect.  One of the most comprehensive terrorism 
databases is the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which may provide insight to the 
frequency of attacks on police.  The GTD is an incident-level database tracking 
terrorist attacks worldwide since 1970, recording events of “the threatened or actual 
use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious or social 
goal through fear, coercion or intimidation” (LaFree & Dugan, 2007, 184).  
According to the GTD, over 12% of terrorist attacks worldwide targeted police; 
police have been the victims in over 10,000 terrorist incidents since 1970 (National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2010).  However, 
empirical studies of terrorist attacks on police are lacking, which “is surprising 
considering the large threat that terrorism poses, especially to law enforcement” 




While police face a unique threat from terrorist groups, we know little about 
their role as targets because empirical studies linking policing to terrorism generally 
focus on policing strategies to combat terrorism (e.g., Deflem, 2006) or on 
preparedness for a terrorist attack and organizational change in response to terrorism 
(e.g., Marks & Sun, 2007), but not on police as targets of terrorist attacks (but see 
Deflem, 2011; Deflem & Sutphin, 2006).  Further, violence against police, generally, 
is studied far less than violence by police. 
Importance of Studying Terrorist Attacks on Police 
Studying terrorist attacks on police is important for theoretical development, 
for policy development and for public protection.  First, a good theory should have a 
broad scope, explaining as much of a phenomenon as possible (Akers & Sellers, 
2008); any theory attempting to explain terrorism should also be able to explain 
terrorist attacks on police. 
Second, without the benefit of empirical research, policy on police response to 
terrorism and police safety in terrorist attacks will be based on fear or speculation 
rather than evidence (see, e.g., Lum et al., 2006, regarding the lack of evidence on 
counterterrorism policies, generally, and how such policies may be cost-ineffective).  
Fear for officer safety may impact police decisions when responding to terrorist 
incidents and this may result in greater-than-necessary use of force, which may 
undermine public trust,1 unintentionally encouraging retaliation or other negative 
outcomes. 
                                                 
1 White and colleagues (2008) show that police actions during terrorist events may be related to trust in 




Finally, as the most accessible symbols of government authority, police are 
attractive targets of terrorists; as the first line of defense against terrorist attacks in 
general, understanding how police victimization might incapacitate emergency 
response is important to adequately protect the public.  Should terrorists incapacitate 
the first line of defense, there is no “Plan B”.  So, protecting the protectors or at least 
helping the protectors protect themselves is crucial for the safety of the public.  As 
demonstrated by the 9/11 Commission Report excerpt above, a significant terrorist 
attack can damage police communication systems and wound those tasked with 
helping victims and preventing further victimization – and chaos can ensue.  When 
that happens, terrorists win. 
Explaining Terrorist Attacks on Police 
Several scholars have noted the significance of legitimacy for inhibiting 
violence – especially political violence (e.g., Gurr, 1970).  Terrorism and other 
political violence, in fact, may be reduced to a battle over legitimacy between a 
government and its opponents, especially considering one of the defining 
characteristics of terrorism is a grievance (see LaFree & Ackerman, 2009).  Cronin 
(2009) explains that “terrorist campaigns succeed when groups can convince more 
powerful actors of the legitimacy of their cause…” (p. 92). 
History is ripe with examples of illegitimacy leading to increased terrorist 
attacks.  Police illegitimately using excessive force – or allowing such force – can 
create a violent backlash, which was the case during the second intifada of the Israeli-




The uprising began [in late September of 2000] with widespread rioting 
among Israeli Arabs, blocking streets, looting stores, and assaulting Jewish 
Israeli citizens.  The police opened fire, killing 12 Israeli Arabs and one 
Palestinian.  When two Israeli reservists entered the Palestinian city of 
Ramallah, they were arrested by the Palestinian Authority police.  A mob 
rushed the police station, then brutally beat the two soldiers to death, throwing 
their mutilated corpses onto the street…. The Israelis responded with air 
strikes by helicopter gunships, pummeling the police station into rubble…. A 
major campaign of suicide attacks and targeted killings was well under way 
by the next summer. (pp. 54-55) 
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam formed in Sri Lanka in response to police 
illegitimacy – police killed civilians at the World Tamil Conference – and have 
specifically targeted police, like in 1990, when they murdered more than 600 officers 
(Cronin, 2009). 
Legitimacy is important for voluntary citizen obedience to government 
authority and citizen support of the government’s rule.  Legitimacy leads to many 
desirable outcomes, including citizens’ voluntary obedience to the law (i.e., reduced 
crime), citizen support for and cooperation with authorities, citizen willingness to 
follow police directives, and support for empowering authorities.  Conversely, 
illegitimacy leads to many negative consequences, including retaliation against 
police, possibly serving to de-legitimize a government by attacking its representatives 




While scholars have suggested the influence of legitimacy on terrorism (e.g., 
Chalk, 1998; Gurr, 1970), rigorous empirical tests are few and far between.  One 
reason for the scant empirical work on legitimacy and terrorism may be due to the 
difficulty operationalizing this concept.  The next chapter addresses the ambiguous 
definition of legitimacy and the desirable outcomes produced by legitimacy.  In 
addition to legitimacy, there are several other logical reasons for terrorism and, 
specifically, attacks on police.  To determine what these alternative explanations may 
be, attacks on police are qualitatively explored in Chapter 3. 
Specifically, in Chapter 3 I review the scope of terrorist attacks against the 
police worldwide, 1999-2008.  The nature of terrorist attacks on police is examined in 
detail for the top ranking countries – those most heavily hit by high frequencies and 
proportions of terrorist attacks directed toward police.  These countries are compared 
with countries having a low proportion of attacks against police.  This approach 
suggests several plausible explanations for terrorist attacks on police, which are 
supported by the literature on general terrorism. 
Societal schism based on ethnic, religious or racial differences may generate a 
permanent struggle, leading to attacks on representatives of the government’s 
authority.  There is evidence that the presence of a foreign military – especially one of 
a different religion – increases terrorism (specifically suicide terrorism; Pape, 2006).  
Terrorist attacks against police may depend on attacks by police against terrorists 
(Chalk, 1998; LaFree, 2007).  Police accessibility may generate opportunity to target 




possible explanations of terrorist attacks against police.  Additionally, the specific 
hypotheses to be tested are summarized in Chapter 4. 
I then move into systematic tests of low levels of both police and state 
legitimacy – as well as each of the other explanations listed above – as explanations 
for high proportions of fatal and all terrorist attacks targeting police between 1999 
and 2008, using a sample of 82 countries and drawing data from several sources 
(including the World Values Survey and the Global Terrorism Database).  Using 
proportions is preferable to other measures like frequencies because proportions 
account for attacks on police that may be artificially inflated due to extremely high 
counts of general terrorist attacks in a country or artificially deflated due to extremely 
low counts of general terrorism.  That is, countries with high or low frequencies of 
general terrorist attacks likely also will be high or low in attacks targeting police, 
while proportions of attacks targeting police may be above or below average.  
Chapter 5 expands on this rationale, describes the data sources used, the variables 
included and how missing data is handled and discusses the plans for analyses.  The 
results are presented in Chapter 6, and Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation with a 




Chapter 2: Legitimacy 
Due to the difficulty in operationalizing legitimacy (LaFree, 1998), many 
scholars have shied away from empirically examining its predictive value.  Studies of 
police legitimacy have operationalized or referred to this concept as trust (DeBelieck, 
2006; Goldsmith, 2005; Hawdon et al., 2003; Reisig et al., 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 
2003b; Tankebe, 2009; but see Hawdon, 2008), obligation to obey the law (Reisig et 
al., 2007; Reisig & Lloyd, 2009; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003b; Tankebe, 2009), affective 
feelings toward the police (Hinds, 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003b), and confidence in 
police (Bennett et al., 2009; Hinds, 2007; Jang et al., 2010; see also Reisig & Lloyd, 
2009).  In short, there is “no simple path toward police legitimacy” (Herbert, 2006, p. 
497). 
Because police are representatives of the government’s authority, they also 
draw legitimacy from the state.2  Herbert (2006) nicely summarized the relationship 
between the state, the police and the public: “As the most visible reminder of the 
state’s coercive power, the police represent both the majesty and potential tyranny of 
state authority.  This coercive power means that, for many citizens, the police warrant 
suspicion” (p. 481).  Echoing these thoughts, Goldsmith (2005) wrote “in societies in 
which police are deployed to bolster the political authority of the regime, police will 
often be used under the guise of the law against political opponents and ethnic 
minorities” (p. 453).  Illegitimate state laws, in turn, create public impressions of 
illegitimate police, and there is some empirical support for this.  Ivkovic (2008) found 
                                                 
2 The term “state” as used here refers to a country or nation.  Webster’s dictionary defines a state as “a 
politically organized body of people usu[ally] occupying a definite territory [especially] one that is 




that better governance leads to greater confidence in police, while citizens in 
countries with low quality governments have lower confidence in their police.  
Scholars have argued that legitimacy of institutions impacts citizens’ perceptions of 
the institutions’ procedural fairness, in a sense, substituting the “missing information” 
of limited knowledge about an institution’s procedures based on attitudes of 
legitimacy about that institution (Gibson, 1989, 1991; Mondak, 1993).  Accordingly, 
state legitimacy is important to consider when assessing police legitimacy, as police, 
by definition, enforce the laws designed by the state. 
What is Legitimacy? 
As “legitimacy” has evolved throughout history, its definition, too, has had 
several incarnations.  Sternberger (1968) describes the etymology of state legitimacy, 
showing three main advancements.  The earliest was the Roman legitimus, meaning 
“lawful, according to law” (Sternberger, 1968, p. 245).  In medieval times, legitimus 
referred to conforming to custom or customary procedure.  Finally, in 1338, popular 
consent became part of the definition of legitimacy.  While contemporary scholars 
debate about the meaning and measure of legitimacy, these three topical areas 
dominate the literature.  Summarizing this literature, Beetham (1991, 1993) redefined 
these categories as views of legality (lawful or according to law), views of justification 
(conforming to customary procedure) and acts of consent (citizens actively accepting 
the authority of the government). 
Views of legality is Weber’s classical view of legitimacy: the predictable rules 
and laws that the government follows (Gilley, 2009).  Here, people know what to 




responsible for the implementation of public policies are run and guided by the 
principles of impartiality and fairness” (Rothstein & Stolle, 2001, p. 7, as cited in 
Ivkovic, 2008).  Levi and colleagues (2009) “find that citizens everywhere are 
capable of determining whether government is meeting its obligations to them, and 
they are likely to withdraw their deference and compliance if it is not” (p. 370-371).  
Adopting this element, some scholars have operationalized legitimacy as confidence 
in the government, its representatives, or civil servants (Gilley, 2006, 2009).  The 
absence of government corruption also may be an indicator of this element of 
legitimacy, showing that government officials tend to follow the rules. (See Figure 1.) 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
However, this traditional element of legitimacy has been criticized for 
ignoring morality (Beetham, 1991, 1993; Breitmeier, 2008).  Breitmeier (2008) 
argues “A conception of legitimacy which ignores the weight of morality takes the 
risk to justify authoritarian political power as legitimate then if the people are 
convinced of the adequacy of immoral power” (p. 19).  This leads to the next 
component of state legitimacy. 
Under the views of justification element, citizens believe that the state reflects 
a shared moral consensus.  This component also is referred to as “congruence” in 
Norway or “vertical social contract” by political philosophers (Gilley, 2009).  
Kennedy (1998) reminds us that the difference between terrorism and the legitimate 
actions of a sovereign state is the moral authority of the government in pursuit of its 
national interests.  When citizens perceive that moral authority to be weakened 




the case of the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 
City (Kennedy, 1998).  The state failing to adopt the values of citizen groups can be 
evidenced by mass emigration of particular groups, the number of political prisoners 
(Gilley, 2006, 2009), genocide, or political discrimination of minority groups.  When 
these are low, views of justification are high.  (See Figure 1.) 
The third component of state legitimacy is acts of consent – conscious citizen 
actions, obeying the government.  Here, citizens actively recognize the government’s 
authority through activities like voting, voluntarily joining the military, paying taxes, 
deferring to police or reporting crimes to police (Gilley, 2009).  (See Figure 1.)  
Rothstein and Stolle (2001) argue  
it makes no sense to pay your taxes if you think that the tax authorities are 
discriminating against you or are heavily corrupt.  You would not take your 
dispute to a court if you did not trust the judge to be impartial and to follow 
the universal rules guaranteeing equality before the law. (p. 10, as cited in 
Ivkovic, 2008) 
In other words, when the state is “legitimate”, people are more likely to voluntarily 
consent to its rules.  Consent may be based on whether the government is following 
clearly established rules or is respecting the shared belief system of the public, 
demonstrating that each of these three elements may depend on one of the other 
elements (Beetham, 1993).  Accordingly, any complete measure of state legitimacy 
should recognize all three elements dominating the literature. 
While scholars generally focus on one or more of these elements when 




water.  One exception is Gilley (2006, 2009), who created a composite measure of 
legitimacy using a cross-sectional sample of 72 countries, representing 83% of the 
world’s population.  He computed a legitimacy score (ranging from 0-10) for each 
country and ranked countries according to their legitimacy scores.  The legitimacy 
score incorporated both attitudinal and behavioral measures representing the three 
sub-types of legitimacy described above (views of legality, views of justification and 
acts of consent).  Gilley finds that Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and Canada 
rank highest (with the United States ranking 8th – just behind Sweden) and the 
Dominican Republic, Armenia, Pakistan and Russia ranked last of the 72 countries 
included in his study.  On average, countries in the West and Asia enjoy higher 
legitimacy scores than states in Latin America and Eastern Europe, which one might 
expect given that countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe are commonly 
viewed as less stable (e.g., the dissolutions of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and 
Yugoslavia) than those in the Western or Asian regions.  So, Gilley’s legitimacy 
measure is valid on its face.  Additionally, his convergent and discriminant validity 
tests confirm his conceptualization of legitimacy.  For example, good governance 
(measured by the World Bank Governance Indicators) and civil liberties (drawn from 
Freedom House) were highly correlated with the legitimacy measure, while 
population size was not (Gilley, 2006).  Further, the legitimacy score had a high 
positive correlation with political stability (drawn from the World Bank), considered 
an outcome of legitimate states (Gilley, 2006). 
While incorporating these three elements is only one – and perhaps the most 




terrorism and, specifically, terrorist attacks on police has yet to be tested.  Assessing 
the impact of legitimacy on terrorism is important because the literature suggests 
there may be a link between legitimacy and terrorism.  Gurr (1970) hypothesized that 
“people who regard their regimes as legitimate will regard political violence as 
unjustified…” (p. 186).  This may be the case, given the many positive results of 
legitimacy, discussed in the next section. 
Causes and Consequences of Legitimacy 
Legitimacy has several desirable outcomes, including citizen collaboration 
and cooperation with the authorities and support for empowering the authorities, as 
well as citizen compliance with the law and consent to authority decisions.  The 
outcomes of police legitimacy often are discussed in the framework of procedural 
justice and defiance, which are briefly reviewed first. 
Procedural justice and defiance 
Procedural justice is citizen perception of the fair and consistent process by 
which criminal justice sanctions are applied (Tyler, 2006).  Procedural justice 
originated with Thibaut and Walker’s (1975, 1978) findings that while a desired 
outcome certainly is important to people, the process by which the outcome is 
generated is more important than the outcome itself because people believe that fair 
procedures generate fair outcomes.  As Colbert, Paternoster and Bushway (2002) 
explain, “Fair treatment shapes [citizens’] view that authorities are acting not just 




Integrating Tyler’s work on procedural justice and the literature on shaming, 
Sherman’s (1993) defiance theory describes public defiance against an unfair 
sanctioning system.  Sherman defines defiance as “the net increase in the prevalence, 
incidence, or seriousness of future offending against a sanctioning community caused 
by a proud, shameless reaction to the administration of a criminal justice sanction” (p. 
459).  According to Sherman’s (1993) theory, defiance occurs under four necessary 
conditions, all of which must be met: 
1. The offender defines a criminal sanction as unfair. 
2. The offender is poorly bonded to or alienated from the sanctioning 
agent or the community the agent represents. 
3. The offender defines the sanction as stigmatizing and rejecting a 
person, not a lawbreaking act. 
4. The offender denies or refuses to acknowledge the shame the sanction 
has actually caused him to suffer. (p. 460)3 
Importantly, Sherman’s defiance theory recognizes that people may respond to 
sanctions and sanctioning agents differently, and this difference is due, in part, to 
perceptions of legitimacy or fairness. 
Procedural justice and defiance are especially relevant here, as they explain 
why legitimacy may influence terrorist attacks on police.  According to Tyler (1990), 
obedience to the law occurs when authorities are viewed as legitimate, which is 
influenced by treating people with dignity and respect, thereby certifying their full 
                                                 




membership as citizens of the state; this is the impetus for procedural fairness.4  
Compliance with the law is based on legitimacy (see Figure 2): laws must be 
perceived as legitimate for compliance to occur and that perception is based, in part, 
on whether people are treated fairly in a procedural sense by authorities (Tyler, 1990, 
2006).  Conversely, if laws – and the government that creates them and the authorities 
who enforce them – are perceived as unfair and illegitimate, people are less likely to 
comply or cooperate.  In other words, people are more likely to engage in or support 
crime and, specifically, terrorism in states with less legitimacy; accordingly, terrorist 
groups have more constituency support in less legitimate states.  On the other hand, 
high legitimacy leads to (1) citizen collaboration and cooperation with authorities and 
support for police; and (2) voluntary willingness to obey the law and consent to police 
decisions.  The evidence supporting each outcome is reviewed next. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE. 
Desirable outcomes of legitimacy 
Collaboration, cooperation and support.  Legitimacy leads to citizen 
collaboration and cooperation with the police, as well as support for empowering 
police.  Police legitimacy is important for police-community cooperation and 
collaboration, and the police cannot effectively combat crime without cooperation 
                                                 
4 For more about procedural justice theory, see Tyler (1990) for a discussion of the six components of 
procedural justice, Tyler and Lind (1992) for the three relational factors, and Blader and Tyler (2003) 
for the four-component model of procedural justice.  One of the key components of procedural justice 
theory is “voice”, which increases the perception of fairness (Tyler, 1990).  When people have the 
opportunity to tell their side of the story, they feel like valued members of the group and feel they have 
been treated fairly, regardless of the favorability of the outcome. (See Colbert and colleagues (2001) 
for empirical evidence of the importance of voice at the bail stage of criminal justice proceedings.) 
Voice may be especially important to the study of terrorism, given the “grievance” that many terrorist 
groups have – or perceive to have.  In states with low legitimacy, the mechanism at work may be that 
terrorists believe they do not have voice in any government or religious process, which is perceived as 
unfair or illegitimate, and encourages terrorist attacks on those who deny voice and are unfair (i.e., the 




from the public as crime reporters and witnesses (Goldsmith, 2005).  Additionally, 
the impact of perceptions of legitimacy on public support cannot be understated 
because terrorist groups, as organizations (Crenshaw, 2001; Dugan & Gibbs, 2008), 
are potentially competing with the state for support from the same public 
constituency.  McCauley (2006) summarizes: 
…terrorists depend upon their civilian base of sympathizers and supporters.  
The terrorist apex cannot survive long without cover, information, money, 
supplies, expertise, and, especially, recruits from lower in the pyramid.  
…terrorists cannot be beaten so long as they can disappear into and recruit 
from the pyramid that supports them. (p. 250) 
When the public believes the government is legitimate, citizens support the 
state and its representatives – not terrorists.  Terrorist attacks on police, as 
representatives of a legitimate government, are viewed by the public as unjust, and 
the public will abhor the terrorist group; in cases of higher state legitimacy, the lack 
of public support for terrorist attacks against government representatives provides 
little incentive (unless, of course, such terrorist groups are disinterested in an earthly 
constituency).  For example, this lack of support may have led to the downfall of the 
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), as they lost the 
legitimacy awarded to them by their constituents after a botched bombing at the Orly 
Airport in 1983 that killed many innocent civilians, followed by targeting fellow 
Armenians and extorting constituents (Dugan et al., 2008). 
Alternatively, when the public believes the government is illegitimate, citizens 




members of a society begin to doubt the fairness of their political institutions, even if 
they do not themselves violate laws, they become less enthusiastic agents for the 
social control of others” (LaFree, 1998, p. 80).  Terrorist attacks on police in this 
instance are viewed as just, terrorist groups are viewed as heroes for attacking the 
“villainous” police, and terrorist groups have a larger pool of supporters from which 
to recruit. 
There is mixed empirical evidence of the relationship between perceptions of 
legitimacy and support for authorities.  Analyzing data collected from a self-report 
survey of registered voters in New York City, Sunshine and Tyler (2003a) found that 
perceptions of procedural justice increased respondents’ feelings of moral solidarity 
with authorities; respondents who felt greater moral solidarity with authorities 
reported a greater willingness to cooperate with the police, empower the police and 
comply with the law.  Similarly, Reisig and colleagues (2007) found in a nationwide 
telephone survey of US adults that both legitimacy and distributive justice (fairness of 
outcome allocation) significantly influenced respondents’ reported cooperation with 
police.  Additionally, Levi and colleagues (2009) found respondents’ perception that 
the government treats citizens fairly and treats members of their own ethnic group 
fairly increases the probability that respondents accept police authority.  Using 2005 
Afrobarometer survey data, Levi and colleagues (2009) found that the administrative 
competence of the government (measured as the belief that the government will 
enforce criminal law, even among top officials, and the belief that the police are not 
corrupt) and procedural justice (beliefs that the government fairly treats citizens, as 




would report accepting governmental authority (i.e., authority of the police, the court 
and the tax department). 
However, Tankebe (2009) found that when taking into account citizens’ 
perceptions of police trustworthiness, procedural fairness no longer impacted 
cooperation with police in Ghana.  Moreover, when instrumental factors were 
included in the model, police effectiveness was the only significant predictor of 
willingness to cooperate with the police – procedural fairness and trustworthiness of 
police no longer reached significance.  Tankebe explained that procedural fairness 
may not be related to cooperation with police in the Ghanaian context since 
“Primordial norms… require police officers at times to prize kinship, ethnic and other 
considerations … more than adherence to the spirit and letter of police rules that 
emphasize universalistic criteria of impartiality in dealing with citizens” (2009, p. 
1282). 
Similarly, the measure of police legitimacy used by Reisig and Lloyd (2009) – 
two items assessing obligation to obey police, which are outcomes of police 
legitimacy – did not significantly predict Jamaican adolescents’ willingness to 
cooperate with the police.  But, this may be due to the legitimacy measure itself, as 
perceptions of procedural fairness significantly impacted obligation to obey the law 
(the legitimacy measure) and perceptions of procedural fairness also led to 
willingness to cooperate with the police.  Importantly, Reisig and Lloyd (2009) 
highlight the potential importance of government legitimacy on suspected outcomes 
from this process-based literature, and this is especially crucial when examining 




countries experiencing a high proportion of terrorist attacks against police.  Perhaps 
more important than cooperation and support, another suspected outcome of 
legitimacy is voluntary obedience to the law. 
Compliance with the law and consent to decisions.  Following a Weberian 
tradition, most writers agree that legitimacy encourages a voluntary willingness of the 
public to obey government directives because citizens believe this authority ought to 
be obeyed (LaFree, 1998; Sherman, 1998; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003b, p. 514; Weber, 
1984; see also Tyler & Huo, 2002, p. xiv).  Legitimacy induces a sense of obligation 
to defer to government rules and regulations, bolstering obedience to the law (Levi et 
al., 2009; Tyler 1990, 2006) and to authorities.  Alternatively, when confidence in the 
system is low, the stigma associated with formal social control is reduced (Hirschfield 
& Piquero, 2010).  Voluntary citizen compliance with the law is crucial to an orderly 
society, as the alternative means that such behavior must be coerced – usually at great 
cost.  In short, political legitimacy decreases citizen motivation to engage in deviance 
and increases the effectiveness of social control (LaFree, 1998). 
Motivation to voluntarily comply with the law is different from deterrence 
(obeying the law due to fear of punishment) (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003b).  Indeed, 
Freeman and colleagues (2006) found in a survey of Australian driving while 
intoxicated recidivists that those participants who reported lower government 
legitimacy related to drinking and driving interventions were more likely to report 
intentions to drive intoxicated in the future.  This finding was more robust than 




test the deterrence doctrine.  In other words, legitimacy may have a greater impact on 
compliance than does deterrence (see also Murphy, 2004). 
Empirical evidence supports the influence of legitimacy in decreasing crime 
(LaFree, 1998).  Studying a sample of 586 New Yorkers in the spring and summer of 
2001 (before the terrorist attacks on 9/11), Sunshine and Tyler (2003b) found 
respondents’ perceptions of police legitimacy (19 Likert-response items asking about 
perceived obligation to obey police, trust in police and emotions about police) 
directly influenced their reported compliance with the law (e.g., legally parking and 
disposing of trash, not purchasing stolen goods, refraining from shoplifting, not using 
drugs).5  Similarly, results from a United States nationwide telephone survey of 432 
adults indicated that legitimacy (as measured by reported trust in the police) was 
more important to citizen compliance than perceptions of distributive fairness (Reisig 
et al., 2007).6  LaFree (1998), too, found that legitimacy of institutions in the United 
States and US crime rates were inversely related. 
Summary 
While legitimacy produces many desired outcomes, public perceptions of 
illegitimacy have negative outcomes – perceptions of illegitimacy have the power to 
restructure government institutions and practices.  For example, the community 
policing movement – which arguably changed the structure and practices of police 
                                                 
5 There may be some overlap with the legitimacy measure and outcomes in this study, as the 
legitimacy measure includes the respondents’ perceived obligation to obey authorities and the outcome 
measure is compliance with the law. 
6 Reisig and colleagues (2007) rigorously examined the measurement of procedural justice, distributive 
fairness and legitimacy scales typically used in the “Tylerian literature” (Tankebe, 2009).  While in 
many previous studies police legitimacy is comprised of two scales – obligation to obey and trust in 
the police – Reisig and colleagues found only trust in the police, not obligation to obey items, 





agencies in the United States and created new government agencies – stemmed from 
a “legitimacy crisis” in policing, arising in the tumultuous 1960s and 1970s (Hawdon, 
Ryan & Griffin, 2003; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003b).  However, Herbert (2006) reminds 
us 
The quest for police legitimacy will be forever ongoing because the coercive 
power that officers possess will never be symbolically understood in like 
fashion across the populace.  When an exercise of police power comforts one 
group of citizens, it may simultaneously alienate another. (p. 484) 
Indeed, police can be viewed as heroes or villains, depending on how their 
constituents perceive police and state legitimacy.  The next section applies this 
distinction to terrorism. 
Heroes or Villains?  Connection between Legitimacy and Terrorism 
Many scholars suggest legitimacy plays a central role in terrorism (e.g., 
Crenshaw, 1981; Cronin, 2009; Gurr, 1970).  “When individuals do not believe that a 
state’s laws are binding or legitimate, they will be less likely to orient their actions in 
accordance with these laws, and conflict may ensue” (Cook, 2003, p. 112).  So, 
legitimacy is a motivation for violence against the state.  Terrorists simultaneously 
attempt to increase their own legitimacy while decreasing the legitimacy of the state 
(Cook, 2003).  Terrorist organizations with high legitimacy can use it to recruit and to 
generate sympathy for their cause.  According to Cronin (2009), because they are in 
the weaker position, “terrorist violence seeks to challenge the state on two levels: 




harm; and internationally, by undermining traditional notions of national sovereignty” 
(p. 116). 
However, few have empirically tested this assumption, perhaps due to the 
vague definition of legitimacy and its ambiguous measurement.  Cook (2003) 
summarizes the empirical issues between legitimacy and terrorism: 
Since it is a normative concept, legitimacy … confronts analysts with moral 
and political issues that defy social scientific measurement. (pp. 109-110) 
…[A]ttempts have been made to define legitimacy in some of the 
philosophical literature.  Yet, where definitions have been advanced, 
philosophers seldom address the problem of terrorism.  Conversely, when 
terrorism is examined by philosophers, they seldom deal with the issue of 
legitimacy. (p. 111) 
Despite this challenge, there is some empirical evidence linking terrorism with 
legitimacy.  For example, in a content analysis of the speeches and writings of 22 
twentieth century revolutionary leaders, Martin and colleagues (1990) found 
legitimacy played an important role in justifying violence.  Additionally, Hussain 
(2010) found support for Sherman’s defiance theory, indicating legitimacy plays a 
role in terrorism – at least in Pakistan. 
Gurr (1970) defined illegitimacy “in terms of the extent people regard their 
regimes as improper and deserving of opposition”; in other words, “the polar opposite 
of legitimacy” (p. 186).  When the state or its representatives (i.e., the police) are 
viewed as illegitimate and deserving of opposition, terrorist violence against these 




Legitimacy and terrorist attacks on police 
The dynamic relationship between the police and terrorism, generally, is 
complicated.  Just as terrorists can be viewed as heroes (“freedom fighters”) or 
villains, so can their opponents: the police.  For example, in the United States after 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, police were seen by the public as heroes, as 
they and firefighters were first responders helping victims; some of these first 
responder heroes were collateral damage when the towers of the World Trade Center 
fell, while those responsible for these terrorist attacks were considered the villains by 
the American public.  Citizen evaluations of police are related to general terrorism 
and terrorist threats, as the police are the front line in the response to terrorism.  
Specifically, general terrorism and threats of terrorism may increase police 
legitimacy, even if only for a short period of time – this is referred to as the “rally 
effect” (Jonathan, 2010). 
On the other hand, when the government responds to terrorism by creating a 
repressive police state, police may be viewed by the public as villains and police 
legitimacy may be reduced through this “high policing” (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; 
Brodeur, 2007).  Crenshaw (1981) explains the “action-reaction syndrome” that gives 
rise to terrorist retaliation against the government’s excessive force to “squash 
dissent” (p. 385; see also Cronin, 2009, and Stewart et al., 2008): in short, when 
members of the public attempt to voice their opinions and are violently repressed by 
the government’s authorities (i.e., the police), the public may react violently and the 
government and its representatives will lose legitimacy.  This relationship is 




which terrorist violence is a form) at the precinct-level in New York City, Kane 
(2005) finds that over-policing of violent crime increased violent crime, but only in 
precincts where structural disadvantage was high.  Kane (2005) also notes the 
reciprocal relationship between violent crime and legitimacy: “police legitimacy may 
influence violent crime, but violent crime may also influence patterns of police 
responsiveness either in terms of under policing… or over policing” (p. 487). 
Police are lawfully equipped and trained to use force and to restrict citizens’ 
freedoms; when citizens perceive that this authority is applied illegitimately, they 
may retaliate against the police (Goldsmith, 2005; Martin et al., 2009; Sherman, 
1993).  This may be especially true when the government becomes more restrictive in 
the aftermath of a terrorist incident.  Increasing police presence (“high policing”, 
Bayley & Weisburd, 2009) may be viewed as increased government force and 
limiting people’s freedoms – in short, more repressive, and repressiveness has been 
empirically linked to general terrorism (Piazza, 2006).  Such excessive use of force – 
particularly if it is not expected or out of the ordinary – especially in reaction to a 
protest or other attempt for reform may provoke terrorist retaliation (Crenshaw, 1981; 
Piazza, 2006). 
Not only do repressive police tactics encourage retaliation, but they also may 
generate sympathy for terrorist groups or causes (Atran, 2003; Crenshaw, 2001; 
Cronin, 2009).  LaFree (2007) explains: “To the extent that government-based 
counter-terrorist strategies outrage participants or energize a base of potential 
supporters, such strategies may increase the likelihood of further terrorist strikes” (p. 




for success (Cronin, 2009).  In Chalk’s (1998) case study of Peru, increasing police 
investigative and arrest powers by suspending the constitution decreased popular 
support for the regime.  In Spain, police recruitment for “anti-terrorist death squads” 
targeting the Basque separatist group Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna (ETA) – bypassing the 
legal system altogether – led to public support for the terrorists, legitimizing their 
cause (Chalk, 1998).  As Chalk (1998) observed:  
[When] the counter-measures initiated by … supposedly liberal democratic 
parliamentary entities represented a severe departure from accepted 
constitutional principles of authority and law and order — [they come] 
dangerously close to transplanting, as Hacker and Wardlaw put it, insurgent 
terror from “below” with bureaucratised, institutionalised terror from “above”. 
(p. 377) 
At the very least, cooperation with and support for the police are diminished 
when police are viewed as illegitimate.  When people are alienated – especially 
disadvantaged or already marginalized populations – informal methods of social 
control become more popular than turning to the police for help (Kane, 2005).  This, 
in turn, may lead to increased support for terrorist groups, especially if they can serve 
as an informal organization of social control, or if they promise to fight for change for 
these alienated people.  Terrorism generally is intended for an audience – whether to 
create fear in the “enemy” audience or to impress or garner sympathy in a 
constituency (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Crenshaw, 1981, 2000), and potential 
constituents are those like-minded others who share in a common goal or opinion – 




organization, terrorist groups will perish without it or without the potential for new 
recruits (Crenshaw, 1981; Dugan & Gibbs, 2008; McCauley, 2006).  Related, terrorist 
groups may attempt to gain constituency support by competing with a government 
that is perceived to be illegitimate.  Terrorist groups may provide – or claim to 
provide – services to the public better than the government.  For example, Hamas 
invests about half of its income on social programs like schools, orphanages and 
sports clubs to build recruitment pools (Cragin & Daly, 2004; Kushner, 1998); 
Hezbollah does this, as well.  Particularly, the terrorist group may argue that they are 
better able to protect the public than the government.  For instance, when police were 
viewed as corrupt and inefficient, there was a movement by the citizens of Guerrero, 
Mexico to police themselves (Johnson, 2008).  Indeed, Kane (2005) writes: 
the procedural justice literature… largely argues that when members of 
marginalized societal subgroups perceive mistreatment by legal authorities in 
violation of rule of law and procedural justice standards, they will often cease 
cooperation with authorities and defer to subgroup affiliations in the 
resolution of conflict…. (p. 475) 
This reciprocal relationship is likely between terrorism and legitimacy – 
especially terrorist attacks on police and police legitimacy.  In times of a perceived 
threat of terrorist attacks, the public supports more stringent counter-terrorism 
policies (Huddy, Feldman, Taber & Lahav, 2005).  This may impact the transparency 
and accountability of policing systems because law and order may become more 
important to police agencies than public relations (Jonathan & Weisburd, 2010), 




citizens during times of terrorism, the importance of legitimacy is no less critical 
(Jonathan & Weisburd, 2010).  As police legitimacy declines, attacks on police are 
less likely to be discouraged from the public and the police policies resulting from the 
terrorist attacks are likely to further affect legitimacy.  In other words, police 
legitimacy is affected by terrorist attacks, just as terrorist attacks on police are 
affected by police legitimacy.  Indeed, the relationship between police legitimacy and 
terrorism is complicated. 
Nevertheless, the literature suggests low legitimacy is likely to increase 
terrorist attacks on police.  Terrorist groups may want to attack a perceived 
illegitimate government or its military, but these are often impractical targets (perhaps 
such targets are too difficult to attack or would not garner the attention sought by 
terrorist groups), so attacks on police may be “spillover” effects (Sandler & Lapan, 
1988) because police are more easily accessible than military or government targets 
and still symbolize the government (Baumann, 2009).  Police represent the authority 
of the government and, as such, attacking police is akin to attacking the state and may 
serve to de-legitimize a government because the protectors appear to be unable to 
protect themselves, much less the citizens (Rorie, 2008).  Strategically, terrorist 
groups may try to sabotage the legitimacy of the government or its representatives 
(Cronin, 2009; LaFree & Dugan, 2004) – specifically, the police – to maintain and 
expand their constituency and recruitment pool (Crenshaw, 1981; LaFree & Dugan, 
2009; McCauley, 2006), given that most terrorist activity is intended to receive 
attention from some audience (Crenshaw, 1981, 2000).  Terrorist attacks may attempt 




police agencies tend to pay more attention to law and order in lieu of individual rights 
during times of terrorism (McCauley, 2006); terrorist groups may want to mobilize 
the marginalized or disenfranchised public by showing an audience the “true nature” 
of a government with which these terrorist groups disagree (Forst, 2007).  For 
example, in the 1940s, the Irgun Zvai Le’umi (National Military Organization or 
Irgun) attacked symbols of British authority in Palestine – specifically police officers 
and stations – in an attempt “to make the territory ungovernable, raise the costs of 
control, and undermine Britain’s authority in the region” (Cronin, 2009, p. 84).  At 
the very least, terrorist groups may benefit from “a propaganda gain that demonstrates 
the government’s weakness” (Crenshaw, 2001, p. 14). 
Summary 
There are several ways illegitimacy leads to terrorist attacks against police.  
First, illegitimacy generates motivation for terrorist groups, rationalizing their 
behavior.  One of the main justifications for terrorist violence is “the regime’s 
illegitimacy and violence, to which terrorism is the only available response” 
(Crenshaw, 1981, p. 395).  Second, illegitimacy can serve as a recruitment tool, as 
terrorist groups can mobilize or gain popular support of their constituency by taking 
advantage of an illegitimate government.  Third, illegitimacy or perceived unfairness 
may prompt retaliation against police in the form of violence.  Indeed, in Sri Lanka, 
the police observed and even took part in the July 1983 anti-Tamil riots, providing the 
impetus for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to band together in 
response (Arena & Arrigo, 2005; Cronin, 2009).  Looking at data from the Global 




1983; afterward, there was a spike in all terrorist incidents from two incidents in 1982 
(the highest count of terrorist incidents before 1983 was three in 1979) to 80 in 1984 
to a high of 510 in 1989.7  Notably, terrorist attacks against police were a sizable 
proportion of the incidents following the 1983 anti-Tamil riots, reaching about one-
quarter of all terrorist targets in 1984 and 1985.8 
Finally, attacks on police in illegitimate states may be to preserve the 
terrorists’ safe haven or may be a target of locality convenience.  In addition to 
spawning motivation for terrorism and permitting (perhaps only tacitly) recruitment 
to terrorist organizations, one main outcome of illegitimacy is that the public does not 
feel an obligation to obey the laws of the state.  This implies that a state must use 
mechanisms other than the voluntary obedience of its citizens (like coercive force) in 
order to maintain social control.  Coercive force, with its necessary surveillance and 
manpower to ensure public obedience, is expensive and, spread too thinly, leaves 
much uncovered; even in states where most people voluntarily obey the law most of 
the time, state agents simply cannot monitor every citizen at all times.  Even the 
threat of state sanction is not very effective, as demonstrated by the deterrence 
literature (see Chiricos & Waldo, 1970; Geerken & Gove, 1975; Nagin, 1978; 
Paternoster, 1987; Piquero & Pogarsky, 2002; Pratt et al., 2006; but see Nagin, 1998; 
Nagin & Paternoster, 1994), especially when the certainty or likelihood of 
                                                 
7 The GTD reports relatively fewer terrorist incidents in Sri Lanka in recent years.  Fewer than 100 
terrorist incidents have been recorded since 1997. 
8 The specific counts in surrounding years are important to point out: police accounted for two of three 
total terrorist attacks in 1979, neither of the two terrorist incidents in 1981, and one of the two recorded 
terrorist incidents in 1982 (the GTD shows no other terrorist incidents in other years before 1982.)  In 
1983, police were targeted in one of eight terrorist incidents, 22 of 80 terrorist incidents in 1984, 25 of 
109 terrorist incidents in 1985, 23 of 140 terrorist attacks in 1986, 16 of 119 terrorist attacks in 1987, 





punishment is minimal (Paternoster et al., 1985; Tittle, 1969).  This gap in state 
surveillance creates opportunity for terrorist groups to operate with impunity.  In 
other words, less legitimate governments may be less able to provide efficient social 
control within the state, establishing a safe haven for terrorist groups.  The need for 
illegitimate governments to use coercive force to maintain social control also feeds 
back into terrorist motivation and recruitment.  In addition to creating the opportunity 
for terrorist groups to exist, illegitimate governments may react to terrorist attacks 
with repressive force, providing terrorist groups with more justification for their cause 
and generating sympathy among potential supporters, increasing recruitment and 
mobilization (Cronin, 2009). For these reasons, I suspect that the proportion of 
terrorist attacks on police is higher in states where the government and its 
representatives – namely, the police – are perceived as illegitimate. 
Given the little empirical research including legitimacy, prior research focuses 
on other causes of general terrorism and these alternative explanations suggest that 
other factors contribute to the perpetration of terrorist attacks against the police.  If 
these other factors also are related to legitimacy, my failure to test for them could lead 
to erroneous conclusions.  To explore what may be driving terrorist attacks against 
the police, the next chapter reviews the countries with the highest counts and 
proportions of attacks on police and compares these countries to those with low 
counts and proportions of attacks on police.  Examining these cases will guide 






Chapter 3: Applicability of Legitimacy to the Problem of 
Terrorist Attacks against Police 
A problem in need of scholastic attention is terrorist attacks against police.  
According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), police have been targeted by 
terrorist groups in over 10,000 incidents between 1970 and 2008, comprising more 
than 12% of terrorism targets. Yet we know little to inform policy or theory because 
scholarly work on policing and terrorism typically focuses on countering terrorism 
(Borum & Tilby, 2005; Carter & Carter, 2009; Clarke & Newman, 2007; Deflem, 
2006; Innes, 2006; Lum et al., 2006; McGarrell et al., 2007; Weisburd, Feucht, 
Hakimi, Mock, & Perry, 2009; Weisburd, Jonathan & Perry, 2009), whether the 
police instead of the military should combat terrorism (Perliger et al., 2009), police 
preparedness and training (Chermak et al., 2009; Pelfrey, 2007), consequences of 
police responses to terrorism (Brodeur, 2007; Loader, 2006; Weisburd et al., 2010), 
organizational change (Nussbaum, 2007), police attitudes about terrorism (Freilich et 
al., 2009), or public attitudes toward the police (Jonathan, 2010), but rarely on police 
as victims of terrorism (but see Deflem, 2011; Deflem & Sutphin, 2006). Perhaps one 
reason why police victimization by terrorist groups is rarely studied is the 
disagreement about whether attacks on police should be considered terrorism. 
At the heart of this debate is whether such attacks occur outside the precepts 
of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which guides armed conflicts.  IHL 
suggests civilian casualties should be avoided during armed conflict, which should be 




civilians and non-combatants typically are targeted (Forst, 2009; Hoffman, 2006; 
Jenkins, 1980).  Attacks on police should be considered terrorism where police are 
civilians and, as such, non-combatants.  Western countries, like the United States, 
have police agencies that are separate and distinct from the military; in these 
countries, attacks on police clearly are attacks on civilians and are in violation of IHL. 
Some may argue attacks on police should not be considered terrorism because 
police are not civilians: Police are part of the body of government, and in some 
(usually more autocratic) countries police are part of the military.  For example, the 
Royal Bahrain Police and the military “are one and the same” (Miller, 2006, p. 67).  
There, attacks on the police, who are part of the same body as the military, may be 
considered attacks against combatants and may not violate the precepts of 
International Humanitarian Law.  However, military agencies are considered non-
combatants during times of peace and when they are not on-duty (Hull, 2001; 
National Counterterrorism Center, 2009) – in other words, when they are not actively 
involved in conflict; the same applies to police, even when they are part of a military 
body. 
Complicating the issue of determining whether police are a civilian body, 
many countries have multiple policing agencies.  In Venezuela, for example, 
Dirección de los Servicios de Inteligencia y Prevención (Directorate of Intelligence 
and Prevention Services or DISIP) and Cuerpo Técnico de Policía Judicial (Judicial 
Technical Police, renamed the National Directorate of Criminal Investigation or 
CICPC) are the two main national investigative agencies, housed under the Ministry 




Policía Nacional Bolivariana (CPNB or National Police), responsible for transit 
systems, was established in 2009 (Policía Nacional Estará, n.d.).  Venezuela also has 
state and municipal level police forces (Birkbeck, 2006).  In addition to these civilian 
policing agencies, Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación (FAC or National Guard or 
Armed Forces of Cooperation) is part of the military, housed under the Ministry of 
Defense (Birkbeck, 2006; Policía Nacional Estará, n.d.).  With arrest powers, FAC is 
responsible for internal security, border protection, and Venezuela’s highway system, 
functioning as a federal police force (Birkbeck, 2006; Policía Nacional Estará, n.d.).  
Similarly, the Turkish National Police, a civilian force, is responsible for policing 
urban areas, while the paramilitary Jandarma Genel Komutanlığı (the Gendarmerie) 
operate in conjunction with the military to secure rural areas, which comprise about 
90% of Turkey (Library of Congress, 1995, 2008b).  While the Gendarmerie is part of 
the armed forces, it is housed under the Ministry of Interior during peacetime (Aydin, 
2006).  Supplementing the Gendarmerie, the Jandarma (the village guards) were 
created in 1985 to serve as local militias, mainly in southeastern Turkey (Library of 
Congress, 2008b).  Additionally, these agencies change over time, some becoming 
civilianized and others becoming paramilitary or part of the military.  For example, 
the People’s Police of Albania, created in 1945, initially was housed under the 
Ministry of Interior, but became part of the Armed Forces in April of 1991 (Shkembi, 
2006).  Since November 1999, the People’s Police has been separate from the 
military (Shkembi, 2006). 
A further difficulty resolving the issue of police combatant status in terrorist 




Database (GTD), used in this research, does a remarkable job of separating cases 
where police were targeted; however, many of the news sources from which the data 
are drawn often only identify the “police” were victims, neglecting to specify the 
particular agency. 
To compensate for this challenge in determining combatant status, I define 
police as civilian in countries where they are not part of the military forces and non-
combatants, when they are part of the military forces, during times of peace.  The 
nature and extent of terrorist attacks around the world, as reported by the GTD, is 
summarized in the next section.  Although the GTD reports information on terrorist 
attacks since 1970, the discussion is focused on the ten year period between 1999 and 
2008 because the GTD has more detailed information on each incident during this 
time period, offering more clues on the police agency targeted; in other words, 
determining whether the agency targeted was noncombatant is more ambiguous in 
years before this time period.9 
Looking at Terrorist Attacks on Police 
The GTD defines terrorism as “intentional act of violence or threat of violence 
by a non-state actor” (National Consortium, n.d., ¶10).  Two of three additional 
criteria must be present to be included into the GTD: 
1. The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or 
social goal;  
                                                 
9 While detailed data are available after 1997, the ten year period of 1999-2008 was selected to mirror 




2. The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or 
convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than 
the immediate victims; and  
3. The violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law 
(National Consortium, n.d., ¶11). 
Of the 19,337 worldwide terrorist incidents between 1999 and 2008, the GTD reports 
2,816 incidents (14.6%) in which the police were targeted.10  The GTD adopts a 
broad definition of police, including prisons and private security.  Because the focus 
here is on the branch of the government responsible for law enforcement (federal, 
state and or local police agencies and officers), 78 cases involving non-police targets 
were removed.11  Further, after reviewing the cases classified as military by the GTD, 
89 attacks were determined to be targeting civilian police or gendarmes and, 
consequently, included.  Accordingly, 2,827 cases of terrorist attacks against police 
were used in the descriptions to follow in this chapter. 
The distribution of terrorist attacks against police per country is depicted in 
Figure 3.  Half of the countries included in the GTD had no terrorist attacks against 
the police, and more than one-third (36.5%) had between one and five attacks on 
police between 1999 and 2008. On the other hand, a few countries experienced a 
great deal of such attacks.  The number of terrorist attacks on police by country is 
                                                 
10 There are three target fields available in the GTD.  Police were considered targeted if they were 
listed in any of the target fields. 
11 Of the excluded cases: five cases involved civilian targets with no mention of the police; the coast 
guard was targeted in one case; 21 cases targeted the military; six cases involved civilian security (e.g., 
village guards); five cases targeted intelligence officials; prisons or jails were targeted in seven cases; 
25 cases involved private security; one attack victimized a civilian translator working with the police; 
three cases targeted police informants; in three cases, politicians (e.g., Director of Ministry of Trade) 
were targeted, with no mention of police bodyguards – in other words, the politicians seemed to be 




listed in Table 1, sorted by the total number of attacks against the police.  Not 
surprisingly given the turbulence in the country, Iraq accounted for over one-quarter 
(26.4%) of the worldwide terrorist attacks against police, with 746 attacks in the 10-
year period under study.  India (361 incidents targeting police) and Afghanistan (315 
incidents targeting police) each comprised over 10% of all terrorist attacks against 
police during this time period.  On the other hand, several countries, including 
Argentina, Armenia, Canada, and Ecuador did not experience any terrorist attacks 
targeted toward police between 1999 and 2008. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE. 
Countries high in terrorist attacks on police: Iraq and India 
Over one-third of terrorist attacks on police occurred in two countries: Iraq 
and India.  Iraq has long had deep-seated ethnic tension between Sunnis, Shiites and 
Kurds, but this tension was mitigated (sometimes forcibly) by dictator Saddam 
Hussein.  After non-compliance with the UN Security Council, which mandated UN 
verification inspections that weapons of mass destruction were destroyed, Hussein 
was forcibly removed from power in the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.  Since that 
time, Iraq has held elections and adopted a constitution, despite renewed ethnic and 
religious friction (Deflem & Sutphin, 2006); US forces remain to provide security and 
training to Iraqi security forces. 
During his reign, Hussein used a secret police force to eliminate dissidents; 
additionally, policing agencies were not entirely separate from the military (Deflem & 




overthrow of Hussein.  Initially, police were accused of remaining loyal to militia 
groups and the former regime (Deflem & Sutphin, 2006), requiring a substantial 
vetting process and additional training.  Today, Iraqi police are trained on “modern, 
democratically based policing methods” (Sweet, 2006b, p. 397) and are divided into 
federal and local agencies, both housed within the Ministry of Interior (Deflem & 
Sutphin, 2006).  The Federal Police (FP – formerly the Iraqi National Police or INP) 
are a bridge between the civilian police and the military; as a paramilitary agency, 
they serve counter-insurgency functions (Deflem & Sutphin, 2006).  The Iraqi Police 
Service (IPS) is responsible for protecting and serving Iraqi citizens.  While a 
separate counterterrorism agency (Iraqi National Counter Terrorism Forces, part of 
the Iraqi Special Forces) exists, both the INP and IPS often find themselves on the 
front lines of counterterrorist and counterinsurgency activities (Sweet, 2006b).  
Unfortunately, corruption remains rampant, there is a lack of communication and 
authority within and between agencies, and many officers lack commitment to the 
position (Deflem & Sutphin, 2006; Sweet, 2006b). 
Terrorist attacks on police increased beginning in 2003 with 7 attacks (no 
terrorist attacks on police were recorded by the GTD prior to 2003), peaking at 279 in 
2007 and decreasing to 100 incidents in 2008.  Almost all (98.9%) of the attacks were 
“successful”, defined as having some tangible effects of the attack, even if the 
terrorists’ larger ideological objectives were not met (CETIS, 2007).  Over one 
quarter (26.8%) of the attacks on the police was suicide attacks.  The attack mode of 
choice was bombings or explosions (66.2%), followed by armed assaults (24.4%).  




a checkpoint (9.7%); they also were attacked at their homes (6.3%), while commuting 
to work (1.6%), or kidnapped (1.2%). 
In most (91.4%) cases, the terrorist group is not known; however, al-Qaeda in 
Iraq claimed responsibility for 4.2% of the terrorist attacks against police – almost 
half of the claimed incidents.  For example, in August 2007, al-Qaeda in Iraq 
launched a coordinated attack on several police checkpoints and police headquarters 
in Samarra, a town north of Baghdad (Associated Press, 2007).  Dozens of al-Qaeda 
fighters drove into the city at dusk, then split into several groups, simultaneously 
attacking the police targets (Associated Press, 2007).  Some news reports indicate that 
as they lose support from other terrorist groups, al-Qaeda is pressured to attack to 
disrupt the cooperation between Iraq and foreign militaries (Gamel, 2007) to 
demonstrate they lead the charge against foreign presence.  In another al-Qaeda-
affiliated attack in March 2007, 14 Iraqi police officers were kidnapped in a province 
near Baghdad on their commute home from work; they were later found slain.  A 
Sunni group associated with al-Qaeda stated this attack on the predominantly Shiite 
police force was in response to the alleged police rape of a Sunni woman – an 
incident in which police were found innocent (Reid, 2007).  While these examples 
suggest terrorist attacks on police in Iraq seem to be driven by retaliation for police 
actions or cooperation with foreign military forces, Deflem and Sutphin (2006) 
conclude that insurgents are primarily responsible for targeting police and they attack 
police to thwart stability and prevent normalization in Iraq.  At its core, though, the 




While Iraq has the highest number of terrorist attacks against police, India 
ranked second with 361 incidents targeting police between 1999 and 2008.  Under 
British rule during part of the 19th and 20th centuries, India achieved independence 
through non-violent resistance, led by Mohandas Ghandi.  Since that time, there were 
a series of wars resulting in the division of India into the separate countries of India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011c).  However, tensions 
still are present, as indicated by the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, supposedly led 
by Pakistani terrorists (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011c). 
Indian police have a civilian structure, heavily influenced by the British model 
(Das & Palmiotto, 2005; Hakeem, 2008; Sen, 2006).  Although large cities (e.g., New 
Delhi) have municipal forces and federal policing agencies (i.e., the Central Bureau 
of Investigation) exist, day-to-day policing largely is the responsibility of the states 
(Das & Palmiotto, 2005; Hakeem, 2008; Sen, 2006).  The state police force is divided 
into civil and armed police.  The civil police are responsible for enforcement of the 
law and maintenance of order in India; they are uniformed but unarmed – although 
“[t]hey may carry a short bamboo staff called a lathi” (Hakeem, 2008, p. 173, 
emphasis in original).  The Armed Police Battalions, on the other hand, are unlike the 
gendarmeries found in countries such as France, Italy or Spain in that they do not 
engage in typical police activities (Das & Palmiotto, 2005).  On the contrary, India’s 
armed police are used in times of emergency or for special operations – they do not 
respond to calls from citizens like the unarmed civil police (Das & Palmiotto, 2005; 
Hakeem, 2008).  In general, the police in India are perceived “to be highly corrupt, 




Terrorist attacks against Indian police are spread relatively evenly between 
1999 and 2008, although 2008 saw the highest attacks on police (17.2%).  Attacks on 
police were somewhat higher during May (10.8%), June (10.8%) and August (13.0%) 
than other months during the year.  Similar to Iraq, most attacks (93.6%) were 
successful, perhaps because the most common attack types were bombings/explosions 
(51.2%) and armed assaults (39.3%).  Unlike Iraq, few (1.1%) were suicide attacks.  
Police were most often attacked on patrol (15.5%), at the station (15.0%), at a post 
(6.6%) or at camp (5.0%).  Sometimes, police were attacked while at home (2.5%) or 
kidnapped (2.5%).  While the perpetrators are unknown in almost half (44.3%) of the 
attacks and many terrorist groups admit targeting police, three groups primarily 
claimed responsibility for attacks on police: Communist Party of India (Maoist) 
(10.5%) and People’s War Group (6.4%), who joined together in 2004 as the 
Communist Party of India (Maoist) (see GlobalSecurity.org, n.d.); United Liberation 
Front of Assam (7.5%); and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT; 5.5%), a group with possible 
links to al-Qaeda (Bajoria, 2010). 
Terrorism in India seems to stem from disputed territory with Pakistan, like 
Kashmir, and from a Maoist insurgency (known as the Naxalites) against perceived 
unjust, exploitive practices of the federal government (Hakeem, 2008).  These reasons 
seem to translate to attacks specifically on police, as well.  Over half (52.5%) of 
terrorist attacks on police in India between 1999 and 2008 are located in the Indian 
state of Jammu and Kashmir.  LeT, a Pakistani-based Islamic group allegedly 
responsible for the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, fights in the region not only for 




Similarly, Hizbul Mujahideen, another separatist group, claimed a fatal 2007 
landmine attack against a police minibus, reportedly as part of an effort to make 
Kashmir an independent Muslim state (“Landmine blast kills three policemen”, 
2007). 
Terrorist groups also attack police in India because they are agents of an often 
unpopular government; attacks are backlash to brutal state responses to terrorist 
groups.  On its blog, the Communist Party of India (Maoist) suggests police are 
repressive agents of a corrupt ruling class, nothing more than “armed goons” who 
attack innocent people (Communist Party of India (Maoist) Central Committee, 
2007).  The Communist Party of India (Maoist) claims they are fighting for India’s 
poor, promoting a communist state; they seem to target police specifically because 
they believe the police are collaborating with the wealthy elite (“Bomb blast kills 
Indian police”, 2005), in response to tyrannical policies by the state against terrorist 
groups (Kumar, 2010; “Maoists kill 75 policemen”, 2010), and to collect weapons 
(BBC News, 2011b).  For example, in October 2005 police received a tip, expecting 
to find evidence documenting Maoist activities; arriving at the location, they were 
ambushed by this group, who had planted a bomb instead (“Bomb blast kills Indian 
police”, 2005).  The news reported this group specifically targets police for 
“colluding with rich landlords” (“Bomb blast kills Indian police”, 2005, ¶7). 
As indicated earlier, Iraq and India have the highest number of terrorist 
attacks against the police.  However, both countries also have the highest number of 
terrorist attacks against any target.  As such, the high number of attacks against the 




this, the next section examines the countries with the highest proportion of terrorist 
attacks that target police.  Proportions will highlight the problem of terrorist attacks 
against the police by isolating the countries with a great deal of such attacks instead 
of those countries that may be artificially high because they have high numbers of 
terrorist attacks against all targets. 
A different story through proportions 
Proportions of terrorist attacks targeted against police tell a slightly different 
story than counts of such attacks, as proportions account for the total number of 
terrorist attacks in a country.  Figure 4 shows the distribution of the proportion of 
terrorist attacks against police per country between 1999 and 2008.  Similar to the 
description above, half of the countries had no terrorist attacks against the police; 
police were victimized in one-tenth of the terrorist attacks in another quarter of the 
countries included in the GTD.  Only one country (Western Sahara) had a proportion 
greater than 0.5, and it only had one terrorist attack of the 10-year period, an attack 
that targeted the police. 
The proportion of terrorist attacks against police per country also is presented 
in Table 1 and depicted geographically in Figure 5.  The countries with the highest 
proportions are those countries with the fewest total terrorist attacks.  Aside from 
Western Sahara, the countries with the highest proportions (0.50) are Kazakhstan, 
Papua New Guinea and Tunisia.  Half of the two terrorist attacks in Kazakhstan and 
Papua New Guinea and half of the four attacks in Tunisia targeted police.  On the 
other hand, some countries with few overall terrorist attacks had no incidents 




against police.  Likewise, Venezuela had 24 total attacks, Cambodia had 15 total 
attacks and Ukraine had 12 total attacks, but none of these terrorist incidents were 
directed toward police.  This demonstrates that while proportions are informative, 
countries with relatively few terrorist attacks might not accurately capture the true 
proportion had those countries had more attacks. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE. 
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE. 
Several countries had a sizable amount of total terrorist attacks, some of 
which were aimed at police.  The GTD reports 196 terrorist attacks on the United 
States, with one attack on police (about one-half of one percent of all attacks), who, 
as first responders, seemed to be collateral casualties when a bomb exploded at an 
Oregon bank in December 2008.12  Only about two percent of Israel’s 505, Uganda’s 
132 and Lebanon’s 170 total terrorist attacks targeted police.  Police were targets in 
almost one-fifth of the terrorist attacks in Iraq (with 4,021 total attacks), India (1,862 
total attacks) and Algeria (436 total attacks).  One-quarter of the 825 terrorist attacks 
in Russia were directed against police. 
To begin to address why police comprise a considerable proportion of attacks 
in some countries but not others, countries with a larger number of total terrorist 
attacks are examined, as countries with few total terrorist attacks (thus, arguably not 
involved in heavy conflict) may lead to a disproportionate explanation of terrorist 
attacks on police.  I consider five terrorist attacks per year to be a large number, 
                                                 
12 The GTD does not include police as a target of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the 
United States, as they were not directly targeted.  As first responders, police can be secondary targets 
of terrorist attacks, even if they are not mentioned in the target field of the GTD.  That said, the 9/11 
attacks were not typical terrorist attacks; while hundreds of people were injured or killed, the 




totaling 50 total attacks during the time period under study.  Accordingly, the nature 
of the conflict in countries with 50 or more total terrorist attacks between 1999-2008 
with a large (0.20 or higher) proportion of attacks against police is briefly addressed 
in the next section. 
Terrorist Attacks on Police in “Heavily-Hit” Countries 
Table 2 summarizes key characteristics of the countries with a large 
proportion of terrorist attacks against police.  Macedonia, Georgia, Russia, 
Afghanistan and Algeria make up the top five heavily hit countries – those countries 
with at least 50 total terrorist attacks and 20% targeting police.  Each country is 
addressed below. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. 
Macedonia 
Macedonia has the highest proportion of terrorist attacks directed against 
police.  Of the 87 total attacks in Macedonia, 39.1% target police, and these attacks 
seem to stem from conflict with ethnic Albanians (Rubin, 2001).  As background, 
Macedonia was part of the former Yugoslavia, achieving its independence September 
8, 1991.  At the last census in 2002, the majority (64.2%) of the population is ethnic 
Macedonian, but about one-third are ethnic minorities, predominantly (25.2%) 
Albanians (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011e).  Tensions between the ethnic 
Albanian minority and the dominant Macedonians have existed since Macedonian 
independence, when the Albanian minority unsuccessfully sought their own 
independent territory (BBC News, 2011a).  With the Balkan Wars in the mid to late 




Albanian insurgencies for rights and autonomy in Macedonia began.  NATO became 
militarily involved in 2001 with the goal of disarming the Albanian rebels (NATO, 
2004; Rubin, 2001); the European Union followed in 2003, providing training and 
support to the Macedonia police (European Union at United Nations, 2003; NATO, 
2004). 
The Macedonian police are a national civil force, housed under the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs (Stojanovski & Klajdžiev, 2006).  The force is divided into 
municipalities and the city of Skopje, and police are responsible for maintaining law 
and order, securing the border, traffic control and, of course, the protection of people 
and property (Stojanovski & Klajdžiev, 2006).  Uniformed police are predominantly 
ethnic Macedonian, although the force is becoming more diverse, with a growing 
proportion of ethnic Albanians (2.7% in 1992 to 6.6% in 2002) joining the ranks 
(Stojanovski & Klajdžiev, 2006).  One branch of the police, the Special Police Unit, a 
multi-ethnic unit made up of Macedonians and Albanians, is tasked with counter-
terrorism (as are some units of the Macedonian National Army).  While having a 
special police unit does not necessarily make the police combatants, perhaps it makes 
them more attractive retaliatory targets.  The GTD, however, does not distinguish 
terrorist attacks against the Special Police Unit separately from attacks on police, in 
general. 
Most (97.1%) terrorist attacks against the Macedonian police were 
“successful” at causing some damage, meaning bombs detonated or property was 
destroyed.  The majority of the attacks on police were armed assaults (61.8%) or 




one bombing, two kidnappings, and two unarmed assaults.  Most often, police were 
attacked at checkpoints (52.9%), on their posts (11.8%) or on patrol (2.9%) or the 
station was attacked (8.8%).  In some instances, police were murdered or police were 
attacked when responding to other crises, like on November 11, 2001, when militants 
seized a village, taking the citizens hostage.  Police engaged with the militants, whose 
focus turned to the officers, and consequently three officers were killed and two were 
injured (National Consortium, 2010). 
The group responsible for most (73.5%) of the terrorist attacks against police 
was the National Liberation Army (“UCK”, following the Albanian initials), founded 
to promote equal rights and to encourage a separate territory for ethnic Albanian 
minorities (Rubin, 2001).  UCK was disbanded under the Ohrid peace deal of August 
13, 2001, became a formal political party (the Democratic Union for Integration), and 
joined the government shortly thereafter (Partos, 2003).  The Albanian National 
Army (Albanian initials are “ASKh”) and the Army of the Republic of Ilirida also 
attacked Macedonian police (5.9% and 2.9%, respectively).  More extreme than 
UCK, AKSh is a separatist group seeking territory for ethnic Albanians (Partos, 
2003); Ilirida has a similar goal to partition Macedonia for a separate Albanian 
territory (Ordanoski, 2002).  Groups attacking police were unknown in 17.6% of the 
incidents. 
Attacks on both police and military are to gain territory for the ethnic 
Albanian minority living in Macedonia.  In one incident, a police convoy was 
attacked on its way to create a police presence in the village of Brest, preventing the 




stations in the area (Gall, 2001a).  According to news reports, villagers blame police 
for the fighting: “It’s usual that when the police come, the shooting starts…. While 
there were no police, there was no shooting. Then they came, and the shooting 
started” (Gall, 2001a, ¶14).  While their main goals focus around sovereign territory 
for ethnic Albanians, groups specifically target police seemingly because of 
repressive actions on the part of the police – police actions stemming from unpopular 
government policies.  In fact, during the 2001 NATO-led peace talks, ethnic Albanian 
groups specifically asked for representation in local police forces – initially a point of 
contention with the government (Gall, 2001b).  An UCK commander intimated that 
the ethnic Albanians living in Macedonia were afraid of the police, saying “The 
civilians feel safer with us here” (Gall, 2001b, ¶3). 
Georgia 
The country with the second highest proportion of terrorist attacks on police is 
Georgia.  Georgia gained its independence on April 9, 1991, during the breakup of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).  This was followed by unrest, 
namely ethnic conflict with the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whose 
residents attempted to secede from Georgia (Cotter, 1999).  With the breakup of the 
Soviet Union, the police became independent, as well; this and issues of corruption 
led to restructuring of the Ministry of Internal Affairs police division and reforms in 
policing agencies in 2005 – namely, decentralization and demilitarization, 
establishment of regional municipal police, and shrinking the police force to match 
European personnel standards (Glonti, 2006; Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, 




2006), and investment in training and modernized equipment led to increases in 
public perception of the police (Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, 2011).  
Nevertheless, over one-quarter (26.2%) of Georgia’s 65 terrorist attacks between 
1999 and 2008 were aimed at police. 
Most (94.1%) of the terrorist attacks against police were successful.  Terrorist 
groups most often (70.6%) used bombings/explosions to attack police.  Police also 
were the victims of armed assaults (23.5%) and one assassination.  Almost half of the 
attacks (47.l%) were attacks on a police station.  Typically, targets were not killed 
(70.6%) or wounded (47.1%).  In fact, when targets were killed, no more than five 
fatalities occurred per attack.  In only one attack, twenty victims were wounded; one 
to six victims were wounded in the remaining 47.0% of attacks.  The perpetrator is 
unknown in the majority of attacks (58.8%).  Not surprisingly given the ethnic-
nationalist conflict in Georgia, South Ossetian Separatists claimed responsibility for 
35.3% of the attacks on police and the Abkhazian Separatists claimed responsibility 
for one attack. 
According to separatist groups, they attack in retaliation for government 
actions (Thompson Financial News, 2008) and to maintain and expand what they 
consider their territory.  Georgian officials reported to the media that separatist 
groups warned police to withdraw so that these groups can occupy more of the 
region: “Ossetians threatened to attack[] Georgian police positions south of 
Akhalgori.… They want to extend the area of their occupation… they are trying to 
provoke a clash between Georgian and Ossetian forces” (AFP, 2008a, ¶2-3).  In one 




patrol in a village near South Ossetia; three more were wounded by a remote-
controlled bomb – ambushed when responding to the earlier incident (AFP, 2008b).  
In response to the police killings, a South Ossetian official reported that a villager had 
been killed by Georgian sniper fire the previous week (AFP, 2008b).  Another South 
Ossetian Separatist leader claimed they are fighting “the illegal presence of armed 
formations on the territory of South Ossetia and on its borders” (Thompson Financial 
News, 2008, ¶7).  From their description, it seems that police are considered such an 
illegal armed presence. 
Russia 
Following Georgia, Russia ranked third highest.  With the dissolution of the 
USSR, the Russian Federation (“Russia”) became independent on August 24, 1991.  
Since independence, Russians have had greater freedom, which has contributed to 
growing separatist movements, primarily from the Chechen Republic (Beck & 
Robertson, 2006; Bhattacharji, 2010).  Additionally, Russia continues to battle a 
rising crime rate, which doubled between 1988 and 2001, and government (especially 
police) corruption (Beck & Robertson, 2006). 
The police responsibilities in Russia are divided between the federal 
government and the provinces/localities. The main police force in the country is 
referred to as the militsiya even though it is not a militia or military force in the 
traditional sense; it operates solely as a civilian police force, housed under the 
Ministry of the Interior and administered at federal, regional and local levels (Beck & 
Robertson, 2006).  Crime control is only one mission of the police; “Under all 




ethnically diverse population spread over large geographical areas.  Instead of serving 
the people, the militia [sic] always sought to keep them submissive” (Roudik, 2008, 
p. 139-140).  And, as mentioned above, corruption is rampant (Taylor, 2006).  Police 
evaluations are based on statistics, namely the percentage of crimes solved by police, 
and individual officers must solve more cases each year (Roudik, 2008).  
Accordingly, the militsiya has been accused of ignoring reports of crimes difficult to 
solve, planting evidence on innocent people to easily “solve” crimes, and even 
inventing fictitious crimes solved (Roudik, 2008).  Police brutality and misconduct is 
widely recognized as a problem (Davis et al., 2004; Taylor, 2006), but the extent is 
unknown as there are no reliable data (Roudik, 2008).  Nevertheless, Gerber and 
Mendelson (2008) conclude the Russian police are predatory in that their activities 
are “devoted to the personal enrichment and self-preservation of the police 
themselves rather than the protection of the public or the systematic repression of 
subordinate groups…., motivated primarily by the interests of the police 
themselves…” (p. 2).  Given this description, it comes as no surprise that of the 825 
terrorist attacks in Russia, one-quarter (25.1%) victimized police. 
Most attacks on police were directed against the militsiya, generally, but a 
small percentage (8.2%) of those attacks was aimed specifically at paramilitary 
forces, namely the Federal Security Service (FSB – Federal'naya Sluzhba 
Bezopasnosti) and the Otryad Militsii Osobogo Naznacheniya (OMON).  Similar to 
the National Security Agency in the United States, Russia’s FSB has the main 
responsibility for counterintelligence and counterterrorism, as well as some law 




for retaining KGB practices, like those violating human rights (Taylor, 2006).  
Somewhat similar to SWAT in the United States, OMON is the Special Designation 
Militia Detachments of the militsiya, dealing with larger security matters, such as 
counterterrorism and riot control (Beck & Robertson, 2006). 
Interestingly, more than half (51.2%) of terrorist attacks on Russian police 
occurred during the summer months of June, July and August.  Almost all (95.7%) 
terrorist attacks against Russian police were successful.  While these attacks had at 
least some damage, no one was killed in 42.5% of the attacks.  In fact, 45.4% of the 
incidents had three or fewer fatalities, and, at most, 47 were killed in one incident.  
Similarly, more than one-third (36.7%) of the incidents had no casualties, with about 
another third (36.6%) having fewer than three victims wounded.  The few fatalities 
and casualties are unexpected, considering that most attacks were armed assaults 
(46.9%) or bombings/explosions (41.4%).  The most common (31.5%) way terrorists 
attacked police was while police were in their vehicles – namely, on patrol, 
transporting people, or in a convoy.  Police also were attacked in their stations 
(14.0%) or at a post or checkpoint (10.2%).  A notable percent (8.7%) of police were 
attacked in their homes. 
In most (56.0%) terrorist attacks against police, the group responsible is 
unknown; however, 41.5% of the attacks against police were claimed by Chechen 
separatists, a Muslim ethnic group residing in the North Caucasus region of Russia 
motivated to gain independence from Russia (Bhattacharji, 2010).  This is not 
surprising, given the human rights violations by police in that region (Taylor, 2006).  




Caucasus”, claiming the police “collaborate with Russian occupiers” (Bullough, 
2006, ¶4).  As an example of this “war against police”, in one incident a Chechen 
separatist suicide bomber drove a car into a police convoy, killing a high-ranking 
police official (Bullough, 2006). 
Afghanistan 
After the Soviet Union-supported government fell in 1992 following more 
than a decade of communist rule, several mujahedeen (Muslim fighter) parties came 
together to govern Afghanistan (“Afghanistan”, n.d.; Murray, 2006a).  This was 
short-lived, as the Taliban claimed power in 1996, only to be removed by a United 
States-supported coalition of Afghanis (“Afghanistan”, n.d.; “Background notes: 
Afghanistan”, 2010; Murray, 2006a).  In cooperation with 40 other countries, the 
United States has been militarily involved (mission termed Operation Enduring 
Freedom) since 2001 in an attempt to eradicate al-Qaeda.  Additionally, NATO’s 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been assisting with the training of 
police and security forces in Afghanistan, helping to stabilize the government and the 
country’s borders (“Background notes: Afghanistan”, 2010; Murray, 2006a). 
Given the historical turmoil in Afghanistan, an effective civilian police force 
was lacking (Murray, 2006a; Wilder, 2007).  For example, under the repressive 
Taliban rule, the Vice and Virtue Police strictly enforced religious codes, such as 
forbidding women to work, attend school or be on the streets without a male guardian 
– violation of which led to torture, imprisonment and execution (Deflem, 2011; 
Murray, 2006a).  However, reform efforts have been underway since 2002, helping to 




under the Ministry of Interior Affairs, modeled after European police (Deflem, 2011; 
Murray, 2006a; Wilder, 2007).  Nevertheless, the ANP faces a significant threat from 
the 2005 resurgence of the Taliban in southwestern Afghanistan and from the view of 
citizens that the police remain corrupt (Deflem, 2011; Wilder, 2007).  As evidence in 
support of this perceived corruption, President Karzai bypassed the merit-based 
selection process of police leaders, appointing, among others, 14 who had failed the 
police exams (Wilder, 2007).  More broadly, police officials have been known to 
collect salaries of nonexistent officers (Deflem, 2011), accept bribery and violate 
human rights (Wilder, 2007).  Additionally, the ANP has little accountability and 
there have been reports of inefficient vetting of officers, so those who are opposed to 
the government easily infiltrate police ranks; this has resulted in criminals within the 
police force, committing “theft, kidnapping, extortion and drug trafficking” (Wilder, 
2007, p. 1).  This perceived widespread corruption erodes not only police legitimacy, 
but the legitimacy of the government, as well (Wilder, 2007). 
Considering this inefficient and corrupt policing environment, it is not 
surprising that more than one-fifth (22.1%) of Afghanistan’s 1,426 total attacks 
targeted police between 1999 and 2008.  Most (96.5%) attacks on police were 
successful, resulting in some damage, but 79.1% had five or fewer fatalities.  (The 
deadliest attack had 36 fatalities.)  Suicide attacks made up a larger portion (16.8%) 
of attacks on police than in the other “top five” countries (where suicide attacks 
typically hover around 5% of attacks on police).  Most offenders attacking police 
used bombs or explosive devices (45.7%) or armed assaults (36.8%), although some 




(4.7%) or facility attacks (1.9%).  Police were most often attacked in transit – either 
their vehicles were attacked (13.3%), a roadside bomb was detonated as police passed 
(10.5%), or they were on patrol (4.4%) – or a post/checkpoint was attacked (25.0%).  
In about one-tenth of attacks, a police station (9.5%) or academy (1.3%) was targeted.  
Police were ambushed in 5.7% of the incidents, and, in some cases, were attacked at 
home (2.5%) or in their barracks (1.0%).  In 4.4% of incidents, police were 
kidnapped.  While rare, police also were attacked while guarding other targets (1.0%) 
and while responding to incidents (3.2%). 
The Taliban claimed responsibility for most (69.8%) of the attacks; 28.6% of 
the attacks on police remain unclaimed.  Deflem (2011) finds that terrorist attacks by 
the Taliban in particular have been directed away from military targets to the civilian 
police, as the police are more vulnerable targets in their small stations.  Despite the 
presence of NATO and US/Allied troops, interestingly, only four attacks on police 
(1.3%) occurred in the presence of the military.  Some argue that the police are being 
used as “cannon fodder” to draw out the Taliban, as they have lower salaries and are 
easier to replace than the military (Wilder, 2007).  Deflem (2011) explains that police 
are a “preferred target” of the Taliban to disrupt the democratization process because 
without an effective civilian police force, the state cannot “truly lay claim to a 
legitimate and effective monopoly of force” (p. 121).  He adds: “Taliban attack 
Afghan’s new system of policing to bring about a destabilization of society” (Deflem, 
2011, p. 119) – especially a society led by a US-backed President Karzai (Goldwert, 
2007).  Taliban attacks on police can be especially deadly, like the one in June 2007.  




and exploded when police tried to stop him from climbing the steps; this attack in 
Kabul killed 35 and wounded 50 people (Baker & Safi, 2007; Goldwert, 2007).  
While claiming the attack, a Taliban spokesman told the media, “This is part of our 
ongoing ambush operations…. The more we kill foreigners and Americans, the more 
we will kill Afghan forces who are working as their slaves” (Baker & Safi, 2007, ¶5). 
Algeria 
Algeria has been described as “a nation at war with itself” (Sweet, 2006a, p. 
14).  Like the other “top five” countries, Algeria has had a tumultuous history.  
Formerly under French rule, terrorism was a tool used by Algerians to gain 
independence from white minority rule (Sweet, 2006a).  In recent years, Algeria has 
struggled with an Islamic uprising, after the army voided the 1991 elections where 
Islamic fundamentalists won 42% of the vote (Library of Congress, 2008a; Sweet, 
2006a).  After declaring a one-year state of emergency, the military has dominated 
the state government of Algeria since its candidate won the 1999 elections (Library of 
Congress, 2008a; Sweet, 2006a).  Accordingly, conflict in Algeria tends to be 
between Islamic extremists against the military and police (Sweet, 2006a). 
The main policing agencies in Algeria were created in 1962: the Gendarmerie 
Nationale, housed under the Ministry of National Defense, and the Surete Nationale, 
resembling the French system is housed under the Ministry of the Interior (Library of 




the Surete Nationale polices the cities (Sweet, 2006a).13  Not very popular, police 
agencies have been accused of corruption and human rights abuses (Sweet, 2006a). 
About one-fifth (19.8%) of the 436 terrorist attacks in Algeria targeted police.  
Almost all (97.7%) terrorist attacks on police were successful in that some damage 
was caused.  While two of the deadliest terrorist attacks claimed 30 and 44 lives, 
similar to the other “top 5” countries, incidents where police were targeted involved 
few fatalities, with most (74.3%) incidents having two or fewer fatalities.  Terrorists 
were most likely to attack police in armed assaults (52.3%) or with bombs/explosions 
(38.4%) than unarmed assaults (3.5%), assassinations (3.5%) or hijackings (1.2%).  
Police often were attacks on their “home turf”, with 11.6% of attacks focused on 
police stations, 5.8% on officers’ homes, 2.3% on officer barracks, and 1.2% on the 
academy.  In one August 2008 incident, a suicide bomber supposedly affiliated with 
al-Qaeda killed more than 43 people when he drove a car into a police station, where 
recruits had gathered to register for training classes (Associated Press, 2008).  This 
attack followed two days after another where police were escorting a military official.  
In that incident, the officers were beheaded and their uniforms and guns were stolen 
(Associated Press, 2008).  Police were ambushed in over one-tenth (10.5%) of 
terrorist attacks and attacked frequently while on patrol (9.3%); police also were shot 
(22.1%) by terrorists or terrorists detonated a roadside bomb as police passed (9.3%).  
While most (65.1%) attacks went unclaimed, Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Fighting (GSPC) and Al-Qa-ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) were 
responsible for 19.8% and 10.5%, respectively, of the attacks on police.  Founded in 
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1996, GSPC is an Islamic fundamentalist group aiming to overthrow the Algerian 
government to create an Islamic state (BBC News, 2003).  In 2007, GSPC renamed 
itself AQLIM to align itself with al-Qaeda, strengthening its goals and broadening 
them to include westernized targets (BBC News, 2009; Hansen & Vriens, 2009).  
They target police and military institutions to show the inefficiency of state security 
forces.  After a suicide truck attack on a police station killing two people, AQLIM 
released a statement saying “This proved the failure of the futile military and political 
attempts of the apostates and their Crusader masters to stop such blessed (suicide) 
operations” (Sedarat, 2008, ¶3). 
Contrasting the “Top Five” with the “Bottom Ten” 
While police in the top five countries seem to be targets in the conflict with 
separatist and religious groups seeking their own territory or complete government 
takeover, this conflict plus a rapidly changing regime does not seem to be the case for 
the majority of the “bottom ten” countries.  United States, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Burma, Israel, Uganda, Lebanon, Great Britain, Angola, Burundi, and Greece 
all have more than 50 total terrorist attacks, but attacks directed toward police are 
relatively rare, comprising less than five percent of the total attacks in each country.  
While there is some ethnic or religious conflict in many of these bottom ten countries, 
none of these countries has experienced rapid regime change like the top five have.  
The US and Great Britain have had relatively stable governments for over two 
hundred years and Greece has not been involved in any major conflicts following 
World War II.  The main source of conflict in Burma was a repressive regime 




clashing with Arab countries over territory, but neither is experiencing a rapidly 
changing regime coupled with ethnic or religious conflict.  Ugandan officials have 
been accused of many human rights violations and there is much ethnic conflict, but 
the governmental regime has been relatively stable.  While Lebanon was involved in 
a lengthy civil war through 1990, the government has been somewhat stable through 
most of the time period under study; the main source of conflict was with other 
countries (namely, Israel and Syria) whose militaries were on Lebanese soil.  The 
exceptions include the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola, characterized 
by civil war and ethnic conflict throughout the time period under study, and Burundi, 
engaged in ethnic violence between Hutu and Tutsi people after the prime minister 
was assassinated in 1993.  Burundi has been relatively stable since a 2003 power-
sharing agreement between the Hutu and Tutsi. 
Summary 
The top five countries seem to be qualitatively different from most of the 
bottom ten and the evidence suggests a changing regime coupled with ethnic or 
religious tension between minority groups and the group in power is the root of 
terrorist attacks on police.  Put succinctly, there seems to be a lack of governmental 
legitimacy, and terrorist groups are targeting representatives of the government’s 
coercive authority: the police.  Comparing Gilley’s assessment of state legitimacy 
(presented in Chapter 2) with the “top five” and “bottom ten” countries, countries 
lower in state legitimacy seem to be in the “top five” while countries higher in state 
legitimacy seem to be in the “bottom ten”.  Macedonia (ranked 66 of 72), Georgia 




Algeria fairs somewhat better, ranking 48 (of 72).  (Afghanistan is not included in his 
sample.)  On the other hand, the United States (ranked 8 of 72) and Great Britain 
(ranked 18 of 72) have higher legitimacy scores; Greece (ranked 35 of 72) and 
Uganda (ranked 39 of 72) have mid-legitimacy rankings.  (Legitimacy rankings were 
not given for Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burma, Israel, Lebanon, Angola, 
and Burundi, as these countries were not in Gilley’s sample.)  Indeed, the most 
legitimate countries (i.e., Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Finland, Sweden) have few 
or no terrorist attacks against any target. 
However, legitimacy does not seem to be the only explanation for terrorist 
attacks against the police.  Societal schism and the presence of a foreign military also 
seem to play a role.  The next chapter reviews these and other explanations alternative 
to legitimacy that might account for why some countries (i.e., Macedonia, Georgia, 
Russia, Afghanistan and Algeria) have a high proportion of terrorist attacks against 




Chapter 4: Alternative Explanations for Terrorist 
Attacks on Police 
As outlined in the previous chapters, there are several reasons to suspect 
legitimacy impacts the proportion of terrorist attacks against police.  In this chapter, I 
review other possible explanations for terrorist attacks on police, drawing from the 
data summarized in Chapter 3 and reviewing the literature on terrorism, generally.  
While these may be alternative explanations, if true they do not preclude a legitimacy 
effect. 
I begin by exploring the possibility of societal schism as a factor contributing 
to terrorist attacks on police, followed by the cooperation with foreign security forces.  
Of course, terrorist attacks against police may be reciprocal – that is, terrorists could 
attack police in retaliation for attacks on them by police – and, police may be targets 
of terrorists because they are representatives of the government’s coercive authority 
(i.e., there is opportunity to attack police) – both of which are explored. 
Societal Schism 
Ethnic, religious or racial conflict within a country is important because 
societal schism may impact terrorist attacks against police.  Minority groups (i.e., 
those groups with disproportionately less power), generally, are less satisfied with the 
police than members of dominant groups, perhaps because police treat minority group 
members differently or at least minority group members perceive such discriminatory 
treatment (Weitzer & Tuch, 2004).  Additionally, minority group members may have 




(2006) argue “Repressive treatment of, and discrimination against, ethnic minority 
groups in terms of political under-representation can lead to ethno-political rebellion 
and motivate terrorist activity” (p. 77).  While Drakos and Gofas (2006) found no 
evidence supporting this in transnational terrorist incidents (against any target), 
repressive treatment of minority populations may play a role in the disproportionate 
targeting of police in terrorist attacks because they are responsible for enforcing the 
policies of the state – including those policies that may be deemed repressive. 
Beyond repressive treatment of minority groups, friction between different 
groups in society – especially minority groups with a dominant group holding 
governmental power – can lead to grievances.  The evidence presented in Chapter 3 
suggests societal schism may impact terrorist attacks against police.  The top three 
countries (i.e., Macedonia, Georgia and Russia) seem to have the same story: tied to 
the former Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, these are relatively newly independent states 
where the nature of conflict is between the reigning government and ethnic minority 
separatist groups, who comprise the bulk of terrorist attacks against police.  
Afghanistan, too, had ties to the former Soviet Union and recently has experienced 
drastic regime changes.  Instead of ethnic nationalist groups, the terrorist groups 
claiming responsibility for a large portion of terrorist attacks against the police are 
religious (Islamist) extremists.  Like Afghanistan, the Algerian government has had a 
tumultuous past and has been confronted by religious (Islamist) opposition groups 
vying for complete government power. 
Perhaps schism from a desire to create a separate nation based on ethnicity or 




achieving independence in the 1990’s or 2000s or separating along ethnic lines did 
not experience high proportions of terrorist attacks against police like the “top five” 
countries did.  In the Slovak Republic, Eritrea and the Czech Republic, all 
independent in 1993, police were not targets in any of the two, four or five 
(respectively) total terrorist attacks.  (See Table 1.)  The Slovak Republic and the 
Czech Republic peacefully dissolved Czechoslovakia, but Eritrea continues to 
struggle with Ethiopia, from which it separated in 1991, over border issues (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2011a).  Other former USSR countries all gained independence 
in 1991 and do not seem to experience high proportions of terrorist attacks against 
police (none of the four terrorist attacks were against police in Armenia and Belarus, 
none of the two in Estonia and Moldova, none of the five in Latvia, police were 
targets in only one of the two attacks in Kazakhstan, two of the eight attacks in 
Azerbaijan, one of sixteen in Kyrgyzstan, two of thirteen in Tajikistan, two of fifteen 
in Uzbekistan, none of twelve in Ukraine, and there were no recorded terrorist attacks 
against any target in Lithuania and Turkmenistan), nor do former Yugoslav countries 
(police targets account for two of 26 attacks in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14 of 135 in 
Kosovo, one of four in Serbia, none of the five in Croatia, and were not the target of 
the only attack in Montenegro and Slovenia).  However, several of these countries are 
continuously engaged in religious or ethnic conflict (e.g., Armenia with Azerbaijan 
over an ethnic Armenian populated territory in Azerbaijan; Russian troops are 
stationed in eastern Moldova to support its majority Slavic population; Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan both have poor interethnic relations; Islamic extremists are present in 




Albanians).  With the exception of Kosovo (police were targets in 10% of the 135 
terrorist attacks), these countries have very few terrorist attacks against any targets. 
Religious, ethnic or racial conflict may play a role, but it is unlikely the only 
or necessary factor leading to terrorist attacks on police or even terrorism in general.  
While India and Northern Ireland, both ripe with religious friction, experience quite a 
bit of terrorism, including high proportions of attacks targeting police (0.19 and 0.17, 
respectively), Nigeria also has religious friction (between Muslims and Christians) 
but a relatively lower proportion of terrorist attacks against police (0.08 – police were 
targets in 19 of 230 attacks).  Similarly, Sri Lanka, known for its ethnic tension 
between the dominant Sinhalese and the Tamil minority (the goal of the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam is to secede), and Indonesia, with its ethnic and religious 
conflict, both have over 300 terrorist attacks with a moderate proportion of terrorist 
attacks targeting police (0.13 and 0.14, respectively).  But Ethiopia, also involved in 
ethnic conflict with Oromo separatists, is relatively free from terrorism (police were 
targets in two of 35 attacks).14 
Additionally, the “bottom ten” countries experience societal schism.  Israel 
and Lebanon are well known for religious tensions, as is Great Britain (with Northern 
Ireland).   Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa) and Burundi are both 
characterized by ethnic turmoil between the Tutsis and Hutus.  The United States is 
ripe with racial tension.  Thus, this anecdotal evidence suggests that for every country 
                                                 
14 Perhaps racial tension instead of ethnic or religious conflict is the element of Societal Schism that 
more clearly leads to terrorist attacks against the police.  The Dominican Republic and Zimbabwe have 
a large amount of racial tension.  Police in the Dominican Republic are said to target people of darker 
skin color for deportation (Human Rights Watch, 2002).  Similarly, after a long period of white rule, 
the (numerical) majority black Zimbabweans targeted the (numerical) minority white land owners 
(BBC News, n.d.).  But the Dominican Republic has no recorded terrorist attacks against any target 




with societal schism and terrorism, there is another country with conflict but without 
terrorist attacks against police.  This is depicted in Figure 6, which compares the 
proportion of terrorist attacks against police in countries known to have high societal 
schism.  This figure demonstrates that divided countries vary greatly in the proportion 
of attacks that target police.  Perhaps something else is at play. 
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE. 
Presence of Foreign Security 
Somewhat related to the permanent struggle discussed in the section above is 
the presence of a foreign army, especially if that army is of a different religion.  This 
was the case of the League of Nations Mandate, giving Britain rule of Palestine in the 
1930s; with British troops and police on Palestinian soil, the Jewish Irgun specifically 
targeted police and other symbols of the predominantly Christian British authority 
(Cronin, 2009).  Today, Afghanistan and Iraq both have high proportions of terrorist 
attacks against police (Afghanistan is in the “top five” and Iraq ranks seventh 
highest).  Both have foreign armies on their soil – armies of a different religion, 
offering anecdotal support to this hypothesis.  The key, though, seems to be the 
presence of foreign troops. 
There is some empirical support, as well.  For example, studying all 315 
suicide attacks worldwide between 1980 and 2003, Pape (2006) found that suicide 
attacks increased when a territory had a foreign military on its soil – not because of 
Islamic militancy, as is commonly believed.  Pape concluded:  
what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular 




from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland.  Religion is 
rarely the root cause, although it is often used as a tool by terrorist 
organizations in recruiting and in other efforts in service of the broader 
strategic objective” (p. 4). 
Pakistan data presented by Hussain (2010) showed that suicide attacks, in 
general, increased beginning in 2001 – the beginning of the US-led invasion of 
Afghanistan, assisted by Pakistan – which he interpreted as discrediting Pape’s theory 
of military occupation, as a foreign democracy was not occupying Pakistan at the 
time the attacks began to increase.  However, the Pakistani government was 
cooperating with a foreign military – the United States.  Hussain suggested the 
increase in suicide terrorism in recent years is in defiance of government policies. 
One latent function of Pakistan’s cooperation with the US is the backlash it 
created, bringing the wrath of the Taliban to Pakistan (Hussain, 2010).  Indeed, 
Hussain (2010) observed that terrorist attacks against government targets (i.e., police 
and military) in Pakistan increased after 9/11, suggesting a reaction to government 
policies or an attempt to destabilize the government.  However, when the targets were 
disaggregated, there was little change in the percentage of police targeted before 
(10.02%) and after (10.66%) the US-led invasion of Afghanistan. 
Lebanon is another country with foreign military on its soil, where Syrian 
troops were stationed through most of the time period under study.  However, while 




Similar to societal schism, there seems to be examples of countries supporting 
and discrediting this hypothesis.  Perhaps cooperation with foreign militaries is less 
important than specific state actions against terrorist groups. 
Reciprocity of Attacks 
Police actions may affect terrorist attacks on police.  Specifically, police 
counterterrorism strategies may compel terrorist organizations to retaliate, to attempt 
removing the police obstacles or to free a captured comrade (Crenshaw, 2001; 
Cronin, 2009; Deflem & Sutphin, 2006).  However, we know little about this 
relationship across countries.  There is large variability in responses to terrorism both 
across nations and within nations over time, but the influence of arrests for terrorist 
offenses on terrorist attacks against police is difficult to test cross-nationally, given 
the paucity of comparative police data.  In many countries, researchers are unable to 
gather detailed arrest data or official data on terrorism (LaFree & Dugan, 2004), let 
alone arrest data for terrorism.15  Open sources of terrorism data generally include 
only the terrorism incident, not the arrest information (Hussain, 2010).  Some 
countries, like the United Kingdom, release terrorism-related arrest statistics (Home 
Office, 2010); these publicly-available data often are limited to westernized countries 
and more recent years.  Collecting data on many countries for cross-national research 
is a challenge, so studies of the impact of arrests on terrorism have focused on single 
countries. 
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For example, LaFree and colleagues (2009) studied counterterrorist (including 
two criminal justice-related) interventions in Northern Ireland.  Only one of the 
strategies had a deterrent effect; the two criminal justice responses actually led to a 
backlash.  “Internment” – detaining suspected terrorists – and “Criminalization/ 
Ulsterization” – treating detained terrorist suspects as criminals instead of political 
prisoners – both increased terrorist attacks.16  Similarly, Hussain (2010), focusing 
specifically on Pakistan, addressed whether general terrorism is, in part, caused by 
police actions.  Looking at police arrests of terrorists in the Punjab province of 
Pakistan between 1990 and 2009, he found that arrests actually increased terrorist 
incidents against all targets – but this increase caused by arrests decays over time.  
Taken together, the evidence suggests police actions may lead to terrorist retaliation. 
Increased Opportunity 
Related to police actions is opportunity, which also may play a role in terrorist 
attacks against police (Crenshaw, 2001).  Some areas are very under-policed, while in 
others officers are seen daily by citizens.  Just as citizens are the most ubiquitous and 
frequent targets of terrorists, perhaps the greater the number and accessibility of 
police lead to more terrorist attacks against them. 
South Asian countries, for example, have lower officers per capita and fewer 
police facilities, meaning there are fewer police targets.  So, we would expect to find 
fewer terrorist attacks targeting police.  However, these countries tend to have a great 
deal of terrorist attacks against police.  (See Table 3.)  Afghanistan, with somewhere 
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between 50,000 to 170,000 officers (or a police-to-population ratio of 1:164 to 1:560; 
Murray, 2006a) is a “top five” country; Nepal (with about 60,000 officers or a police-
to-population ratio of approximately 1:489; Nepal Police, 2010), Sri Lanka (with 
38,472 officers in 2002 or a police-to-population ratio of about 1:509; Vincentnathan, 
2006), Pakistan (having approximately 286,000 officers in 2003 or a police-to-
population ratio of about 1:537; Haye, 2006) and Bangladesh (with about 109,000 
police personnel or a police-to-population ratio of about 1:1,238; Bin Kashem, 2006) 
experience a moderate proportion of terrorist attacks against police (0.19, 0.13, 0.11 
and 0.08, respectively).  Bhutan has only about 3,417 police personnel (Jafa, 2006) or 
a police-to-population ratio of 1:626 and has no terrorist attacks against the police; 
however, Bhutan recorded only four terrorist attacks against any target between 1999 
and 2008. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE. 
Police in westernized countries are very accessible to the public.  Yet, these 
states tend to have lower terrorist attacks targeting police.  For example, the United 
States – with over one million police personnel in 2008 or a police-to-population ratio 
of 1:280 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009) – and Great Britain – England and 
Wales having 127,267 police personnel or officer-to-population ratio of 1:409 in 2002 
(Rowe, 2006) – are in the “bottom ten”.  Canada has approximately 60,000 police 
officers, which is an officer-to-population ratio of about 1:562 (Murray, 2006b), and 
Canada has very few (n=16) terrorist incidents between 1999 and 2008, with no 




These data suggest that more police per population leads to fewer terrorist 
attacks against the police, which is counter to the opportunity hypothesis.  And, the 
top five and bottom ten countries both have a wide range of police per capita.  The 
top five countries range from a low of about one officer for every 574 Afghanis to a 
high of about one officer per 131 Russians.  The bottom ten have a similar range, with 
a low of about one officer per 1,282 people in Uganda to a high of about one officer 
per 205 Greeks.  Both the top five and bottom ten countries include countries with a 
high police per population ratio and those with a low police per population ratio. 
Summary 
Each of the possible explanations discussed thus far seem plausible, but 
anecdotal evidence and previous research offer mixed evidence for each.  Societal 
schism is a logical explanation for generating terroristic grievance against the police, 
who may tacitly allow or explicitly encourage discrimination; while several countries 
fit this explanation, several others do not, suggesting something else is at play.  State 
cooperation with foreign militaries occupying their soil, while also creating terrorist 
enemies, can lead to a backlash from citizens surrounded by the presence of 
unpopular militaries and police who cooperate with such militaries.  Overly 
repressive or discriminatory state and police responses or misuse of force (e.g., 
assassinations or torture of terrorists) may provoke retaliation in the form of further 
attacks – and the retaliation may be supported or at least not discouraged by the 
public, who generally frown upon the killing of civilians, either by the government or 
terrorists.  Even terrorist arrests by police may lead to an increase in retaliatory 




and will compel the government to change its policies more quickly than the police in 
most countries; additionally, opportunity does not explain the underlying grievance 
generating the terrorist incident.  Accordingly, I have six hypotheses, which are 
defined below. 
Hypotheses 
The overarching research question is whether legitimacy impacts terrorist 
attacks and fatal terrorist attacks focusing on police.  The following hypotheses 
address this question more specifically. 
H1: Police legitimacy is negatively related to terrorist attacks on police and 
fatal terrorist attacks on police; that is, terrorist attacks and fatal terrorist 
attacks on police are disproportionately more common in states with low 
police legitimacy. 
Because police legitimacy also is based on how their employing agency, the 
government, is perceived, the second hypothesis focuses on the relationship between 
state legitimacy and attacks on police.  Specifically:  
H2: State legitimacy is negatively related to terrorist attacks on police and fatal 
terrorist attacks on police (i.e., terrorists take advantage of less legitimate 
governments). 
Other plausible explanations for terrorist attacks and fatal attacks against police exist, 
as outlined in this chapter.  Empirically accounting for each is important.17 
                                                 
17 Unfortunately, I am unable to test whether terrorist attacks are in response to counterterrorism 
policies, as the comparative data available on police responses to terrorism are limited to only a few 




H3: Societal schism is positively related to terrorist attacks on police and fatal 
attacks on police; that is, the greater the societal divide, the disproportionately 
more common terrorist attacks and fatal attacks on police. 
H4: Terrorist attacks against police and fatal terrorist attacks against the police 
are disproportionately more common in states that have on their soil a foreign 
military. 
H5: Terrorist attacks against police and fatal attacks on police are 
disproportionately more common when terrorists have more opportunity to 
attack police. 
Finally, recognizing that these other explanations may be subsumed under legitimacy: 
H6: Legitimacy mediates the effect of these other explanations. 
The present study will assess these hypotheses.  The next chapter will describe 
the methods used to assess the impact of legitimacy and these alternative explanations 





Chapter 5:  Data and Methods 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the influence of legitimacy and 
other factors on terrorist attacks and fatal terrorist attacks targeting police.  To do so, 
a cross-section of data from countries measured over a 10-year span is examined.  
This chapter describes the sample of countries, introduces the data sources, describes 
important variables, and outlines the plans for analyses. 
Operationalizing Terrorist Attacks against the Police 
The outcomes of interest are operationalized as the proportion of total terrorist 
attacks that targeted police and the proportion of fatal terrorist attacks that targeted 
the police.  Using these measures, I am able to better assess why a country with active 
terrorism is disproportionately selecting to target police compared to other countries.  
This approach is advantageous to other measures (e.g., frequencies) because these 
variables are insensitive to the overall number of terrorist attacks.  In other words, a 
country with a high number of terrorist attacks will likely also have a high number of 
attacks that target police; similarly, a country with a high number of fatal terrorist 
attacks probably will have a high number of fatal attacks on police.  However, the 
proportion of attacks that target police might be below average.  Despite this 
advantage, those countries with a low frequency of attacks will have arbitrarily high 
or low proportions of attacks against the police.  To account for this limitation, count 
models that control of the total number of attacks also are run to check the robustness 




Scope of the Sample 
The sample consists of 82 countries, listed in Table 4.  This is a convenience 
sample; countries are included because they have data available on most variables of 
interest.  Also because terrorist attacks against police are rare, I have constructed a 
cross-sectional dataset that covers a wide period of time: 1999-2008.  While this 
approach captures more variation of terrorist attacks on police, it introduces possible 
instability in the primary independent variables that could lead to measurement error 
and simultaneity.  Have said that, legitimacy appears to be relatively stable over time.  
(See Appendix A for detailed analyses.) 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE. 
Four of the “top five” high proportion countries are included in the sample; 
data were not available for Afghanistan.  Unfortunately, only three of the “bottom 
ten” countries are included (the United States, Great Britain – represented as the 
United Kingdom, and Uganda), as information was unavailable on several variables 
for Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burma, Israel, Lebanon, Angola, Burundi, 
and Greece. 
Data Sources 
Data were drawn from several sources, including the Global Terrorism 
Database, the World Values Survey, Integrated Network for Societal Conflict 
Research, Minorities at Risk Project, the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators, the CIA World Factbook, the Correlates of War Project, the World Health 
Organization, Amnesty International, Transparency International, and other sources.  




section, the following section will describe the details of how each variable was 
operationalized. 
Global Terrorism Database 
The dependent variables – the proportion of terrorist attacks directed against 
police and the proportion of fatal terrorist attacks targeting police – are drawn from 
the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).  The GTD is compiled by the National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), based 
at the University of Maryland, College Park.  Originally collected by Pinkerton 
Global Intelligence Services (PGIS), the GTD uses a broad definition of terrorism: 
“the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, 
economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation” (LaFree & 
Dugan, 2007, 184).  This definition guides the application of the selection criteria.  
Specifically, for inclusion in the GTD, an incident must satisfy three criteria outlined 
in the GTD codebook: 
(1) The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious 
calculation on the part of a perpetrator. 
(2) The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of 
violence – including property violence, as well as violence against 
people. 
(3) The perpetrators of the incident must [be] sub-national actors.  This 
database does not include acts of state terrorism. 
IN ADDITION, at least two of the following three criteria must be 




• The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, 
religious, or social goal.[…] 
• There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or 
convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) 
than the immediate victims.[…] 
• The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare 
activities.  That is, the act must be outside the parameters 
permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the 
prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-
combatants).  (p. 5; emphasis removed) 
The GTD includes data on terrorist incidents, both international and domestic, 
including but not limited to the date and location, type of target and number wounded 
or killed during the incident (LaFree & Dugan, 2007; National Consortium, 2008). 
Like any dataset, the data, overall, have potential limitations.  One potential 
problem is missing cases due to unreported events.  An inherent problem with using 
open source information is that the data are more likely to include the most 
newsworthy events (LaFree & Dugan, 2007).  However, terrorists typically seek 
public attention for their actions and terrorist attacks on police are those activities that 
“shock the conscience”, increasing the likelihood that both terrorist attacks in general 
and specifically attacks on police will indeed be reported events.    Studying other 
crimes (e.g., burglary) using media sources would severely undercount the true 
number of incidents, but terrorism is unique in that terrorist groups want the public to 




attention, as a terrorist incident typically is “designed to send messages to outsiders” 
(Damphousse & Smith, 1998, p. 209).  Also, because policework is not as clandestine 
as, say, military operations, this limitation should be less important – at least for the 
numerator – because governments are less hesitant to release information about police 
to news media.  Further, using fatal terrorist attacks – which are more sensational 
than nonfatal terrorist attacks, more likely to be reported in detail by the media and 
more likely to be included in the GTD – in addition to fatal and nonfatal attacks 
provides a check of the results. 
Despite these limitations, there are several advantages to using an event 
database to study terrorism and the GTD data are preferred to other open source 
terrorism databases (LaFree & Dugan, 2007), especially when trying to capture the 
rare event of terrorism and, specifically, terrorist attacks on police.  First, several 
other data sources (e.g., U.S. Department of State, International Terrorism: Attributes 
of Terrorist Events or “ITERATE”) have been restricted to only international terrorist 
incidents. 18  LaFree and Dugan (2007) looked at eight other sources of data on 
terrorism, largely from private companies assessing the dangerousness of other 
countries.  A major limitation of these other datasets on terrorist activity was the lack 
of information on domestic attacks – those attacks by members of the country under 
attack without any foreign involvement in the attack.  In other words, domestic 
terrorism events were missing from other datasets and, as a consequence, a large part 
                                                 
18 The ITERATE dataset also does not separate police targets.  The dataset does contain a qualitative 
file where each incident is described in detail; each incident could be reviewed to isolate terrorist 
attacks on police.  While ITERATE is similar to the GTD (see Enders et al. (2011) for a recent 
comparison of the two datasets) in that they are both incident-level and contain many of the same 
terrorist events, the GTD provides an added convenience of separating target types, which is 




of the nature of terrorism also was missing.  Similarly, Hamm (1998) points out that 
“incidents of domestic terrorism are especially susceptible to legal and bureaucratic 
ambiguities, and their proportional unreported rate probably exceeds that of index 
crimes” (p. 67).  Indeed, the GTD is an improvement over other terrorism databases 
because the GTD collects information on both intra- and international terrorism. 
However, the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), 
formerly the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, began to include data on 
both domestic and international terrorist events in 1998 and is available through 2008 
(2009 for some countries), also encompassing the time period of interest here.  The 
GTD is preferred to this dataset because the definition of terrorism used in the GTD is 
very broad, erring on the side of inclusiveness yet having controls to help insure that 
events fitting the definition and criteria discussed above are included.19  That said, a 
search of the RDWTI found 6,278 terrorist incidents where the police were targeted 
worldwide between 1999 and 2008, compared to the 2,827 recorded in the GTD.  
GTD data originally were collected by a private business, and as such PGIS was not 
subject to government influence like other databases – a trend continuing today.  For 
example, while RAND uses strict criteria, it is under pressure to include ambiguous 
attacks in Iraq that are less likely to be terrorist-related.  Indeed, 4,112 (65%) of the 
attacks on police recorded by RDWTI occurred in Iraq, while the GTD counted only 
746.  Without Iraq (which is not included in the present sample, anyway), the number 
of attacks on police is similar (2116 in RDWTI compared with 2,081 in GTD).  
However, because GTD provides more fields of information than that available in the 
                                                 





publicly-available version of RDWTI, I am better able to clean the GTD data, so it is 
preferable over RDWTI.  Overall, then, the GTD is the most comprehensive database 
on terrorism events worldwide and these are the best data to use for studying terrorist 
attacks on police. 
World Values Survey 
Police legitimacy and part of the state legitimacy measures are drawn from the 
World Values Survey (WVS).  The WVS, partnered with the European Values 
Survey (EVS), is a non-profit network of scholars assessing the social and political 
opinions of people around the globe.  Beginning in 1981 and through 2007, the WVS 
and the EVS have administered 5 waves of surveys.  The WVS surveys contain many 
of the same questions over time and across countries, translated to the respondent’s 
language, and are administered face-to-face, usually in the respondent’s home, to 
respondents of at least 18 years of age.  The survey question translations have been 
adjusted appropriately to consider any differences in meaning across countries 
(Esmer, 2004). 
Random probability sampling is used; WVS claims it takes a representative 
sample of at least 1,000 respondents from each country under study.  (See Table 5 for 
the number of respondents from each country during the survey waves.)  While 1,000 
survey participants may miss small segments of citizens, especially for countries with 
very large populations (like China), the WVS is the best measure of citizens’ 
perceptions available for the most countries.20  According to the WVS brochure 
                                                 
20 The WVS data are available online and were downloaded from the WVS website.  The official WVS 
5-wave aggregate dataset covering 1981 through 2008 was downloaded in SPSS format from the WVS 




posted on the organization’s website (www.worldvaluessurvey.org), almost 90 
percent of the world’s population in 97 countries has been represented in these 
individual-level data as of 2007.21 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE. 
Each wave includes many of the same questions, but all questions are not 
asked in all countries in every survey wave.  In other words, respondents in some 
countries are asked questions in one wave but not another.  Limiting the data to only 
one wave would exclude many countries, decreasing an already small sample size.  
While a ten-year span is covered and people’s opinions may change over time, 
evidence presented in Appendix A suggests that most of the variables of interest here 
are relatively stable over time.  Accordingly, the latest two waves (1999-2004 and 
2005-2008) were incorporated here to increase the sample size.  The specific year the 
survey was administered in each country is listed in Table 6. 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE. 
Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research 
Data on forcibly displaced populations from specific countries (part of the 
state legitimacy measure) and regime type (a control variable) were collected from 
the website for the Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) 
                                                                                                                                           
WVS website.)  Because the EVS was not part of the fifth (2005) wave of the WVS at the time of the 
download, the 4-wave WVS/EVS aggregate dataset covering 1981 through 2000 also was downloaded 
in SPSS format from the WVS website.  The 4-wave WVS/EVS aggregate file then was merged into 
the 5-wave WVS aggregate file to include the EVS, following the merging process described by Diez-
Medrano (2009). 
21 The most recent wave (2005-2008) included 56 countries, and the previous wave (1999-2004) 
included 68 countries, 31 of which overlap.  Of the latest two waves, 11 countries were excluded from 
the present sample because the questionnaire items relevant to this study were not asked or because 
data were unavailable for these countries on several variables of interest.  The 11 excluded countries 
are Andorra, Hong Kong, Iraq, Israel, Malta, Montenegro, Nigeria, Puerto Rico, Saudi Arabia, 




(http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm).  INSCR is the forum for the 
distribution of data collected by the Center for Systemic Peace and other 
organizations.  INSCR provides data on several state dimensions, using open source 
data and ensuring accuracy of the data by cross-checking information with other 
available data sources.  INSCR includes states with 500,000 or more population in 
2008,22 so it currently tracks data on 163 states. 
INSCR distributes data on forcibly displaced populations between 1964 and 
2008, focusing on independent countries with a population of at least 500,000 people.  
These annual data are collected by the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 
World Refugee Survey series and (since 2006) from the Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre, providing information on the number of forcibly displaced people 
from source and in host countries.  The data on forcibly displaced populations were 
downloaded from the INSCR website on March 13, 2010.  To correspond with the 
data collected from the WVS, data were collected for the same country-year listed in 
Table 6. 
INSCR also houses the POLITY IV Project, which reports regime type in 
countries with populations of at least 500,000 around the world, 1800-2009.  
According to its website, regime type is assessed annually through six measures of 
“key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and 
political competition” (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm, ¶2).  These 
                                                 
22 As of June 29, 2011, INSCR is tracking countries with populations of at least 500,000 in 2010, now 




data were collected from the INSCR website on March 13, 2010.23  See Table 6 for 
the specific country-year data were collected. 
Minorities at Risk 
Data on societal schism were collected from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) 
Project.  The MAR Project, housed at the University of Maryland, gathers 
information on politically-active ethnic groups in countries with a population of 
500,000 or more.  Minority ethnic groups included in the MAR must include at least 
100,000 people or account for 1% of a country’s population because they must have 
“the mobilization potential to influence central state politics in a meaningful way” 
(Asal & Pate, 2005, p. 29).  Additionally, the group must be politically significant in 
relation to the state.  Asal and Pate (2005) explain the two criteria of political 
significance: (1) “The group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic 
discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society; and, (2) The group is the 
basis for political mobilization and collective action in defense or promotion of its 
self-defined interests” (p. 29). 
A major drawback of these data is that MAR does not guarantee that all 
countries meeting the definitional criteria above are included.  Additionally, the MAR 
codebook explains that MAR “does not make claims regarding the 
comprehensiveness of the dataset. That is, there are ethnopolitical groups that meet 
the above criteria and are not included in the dataset” (p. 3).  While this is a 
limitation, this is the best international discrimination data available. 
                                                 




Notably, MAR ranks the annual level of political and economic discrimination 
experienced by each group.  Discrimination data are available from 1950-2003 by 
country; the discrimination data also are available by group from 2004-2006.24  
However, the recent years (2004-2006) include more variables from which to build 
the schism scale.  These data were downloaded from the MAR website 
(http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp) on April 24, 2010 and data from the most 
recent year available (2006) was used (although there was no change between 2004 
and 2006). 
ICPSR #21283: International Military Intervention, 1989-2005 
Presence of a foreign military, an alternative explanation for terrorist attacks 
against police, is drawn from Kisangani & Pickering’s ICPSR Study #21282: 
International Military Intervention, 1989-2005 (IMI).  The presence of a foreign 
military is defined here as a military intervention, which, according to this dataset is 
“the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc) of one 
country into the territory or territorial waters of another country, or forceful military 
action by troops already stationed by one country inside another, in the context of 
some political issue or dispute” (Pearson & Baumann, 1993, p. 4).  Interventions must 
be purposeful (not accidental) and exclude foreign military bases.  These data also 
exclude militias, paramilitaries and private security (Pearson & Baumann, 1993; 
Pickering & Kisangani, 2009).  In other words, the IMI “catalogs episodes when 
national military personnel are purposefully dispatched into other sovereign states 
anywhere on the globe” (Pickering & Kisangani, 2009, p. 590). 
                                                 




This dataset updates Pearson and Baumann’s (1993) original IMI data, which 
range from 1946-1988.  To ensure validity of the updated data, the coding schema 
used by Pearson and Baumann (1993) was replicated, modern literature was reviewed 
to validate variable operationalization, and experts were consulted to confirm face 
validity (Pickering & Kisangani, 2009).  To collect the data for the updated version of 
IMI, nine trained student research assistants were employed to search major news 
sources.  International military intervention was determined through confirmation of 
three or more news sources, with news and other sources (e.g., books, scholarly 
journal articles) used to detail the event (Pickering & Kisangani, 2009).  All coding 
was reviewed by the two principal investigators to increase reliability.   
These data were selected because they are more inclusive than comparable 
datasets.  The IMI includes both two-sided and one-sided action, unlike the 
Militarized Interstate Dispute data that is limited to two-sided conflict (Pickering & 
Kisangani, 2009).  Additionally, the IMI records incidents where military forces are 
dispatched onto foreign soil regardless of purpose – whether in support of the 
government (e.g., to provide humanitarian aid), in opposition to it, or neither 
(Pickering & Kisangani, 2009).  This is beneficial to other datasets that focus only on 
belligerent military force.  Further, the IMI includes both large and small states, 
unlike other datasets focusing only on major powers like the United States, Russia, 
Britain, and China (Pickering & Kisangani, 2009).  Given its comprehensiveness, 
these data were preferable for the present research.  Accordingly, data were 




April 9, 2011.  While data were available from 1989-2005, only the time period here 
(1999-2005) was used. 
World Bank 
Two control variables (i.e., gross domestic product, population) were drawn 
from the World Bank. The World Bank is somewhat of a misnomer, as it is not a 
“bank”, per se; instead, the World Bank (established in 1944 and headquartered in 
Washington, D.C.) is comprised of two development institutions owned by 186 
countries and designed to provide assistance to developing and poorer countries in an 
effort to reduce poverty.  The World Bank also collects data on countries around the 
globe, with a special attention to developing countries.  Data are submitted by 
member countries to the World Bank, so the data largely depend on the country’s 
statistical system; the World Bank website reports that it provides grants and training 
to help developing countries improve their statistical programs 
(http://data.worldbank.org).  Additionally, the World Bank partners with other 
agencies like the IMF and the United Nations to share data and to ensure high 
standards for timely, accurate and reliable data.  One of the statistical publications 
authored by the World Bank is the World Development Indicators, which records 
demographic (e.g., population), economic (e.g., Gross Domestic Product) and other 
information on all member countries.  These data were downloaded on April 10, 2010 
from the World Bank website.  While the World Bank has compiled country 
information in its World Development Indicators dataset since 1960, the specific year 





CIA World Factbook 
The Gini Index, a control variable, was collected from the CIA World 
Factbook.  The CIA World Factbook is a compilation of information (e.g., geography, 
population, government, economy) on countries around the world.  While these data 
may be limited in that they are compiled by the Central Intelligence Agency and 
include the biases inherent in government agencies, data are gathered from several 
government agencies and other published sources.  Additionally, information like 
opinions about foreign governments that may suffer from bias is not used in the 
present research.  So, this limitation is minimal here.  According to its website the 
CIA updates the information regularly – almost weekly – which is an advantage of 
these data.  The Gini Index and other data were downloaded April 8, 2011 from the 
CIA World Factbook website (http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/print_2172.html).  Table 6 outlines the specific country-year used for 
consistency with other independent and control variables. 
Correlates of War 
Two control variables (i.e., civil war and interstate war) were collected from 
the Correlates of War (COW) dataset.  The COW project collects information on both 
intrastate (civil) and interstate conflict from 1816 through 2007 and these measures 
have been used in other terrorism research (e.g., Mullins & Young, forthcoming).  In 
order for a conflict to be included in the COW dataset, the government must be 
involved in active military action and at least 1,000 military battle fatalities must have 
occurred; that is, COW only records major armed conflicts, which is beneficial to 




be involved in effective resistance, which means “…both sides [were] initially 
organized for violent conflict, or the weaker side must be able to inflict upon the 
stronger opponents at least five percent of the number of fatalities it sustains” 
(www.correlatesofwar.org).  According to COW, interstate war is “Sustained armed 
combat between two or more state members of the international system which meets 
the violence threshold” of 1,000 military battle-related fatalities (Eck, 2005, p. 29), 
and civil war or “intrastate war” is “sustained combat between the armed forces of the 
government and forces of another entity for central control or for local issues” (Eck, 
2005, p. 30). 
One potential limitation of the COW dataset is that its inclusion criteria may 
have changed with its changing definition over time (Eck, 2005; Sarkees, undated), 
challenging the reliability of these data.  The slight changing of the inclusion criteria 
of COW has not affected the interstate war list (used in the present research); the 
intra-state (civil) war list (also used here) has become more detailed, indicating 
whether intra-state war was a civil war for central control or over local issues, a 
regional internal war, or an intercommunal conflict (Sarkees, undated).  But, these 
changes are before the time period of this study, as the changing typology has 
affected thirty wars between 1816 and 1992 (the primary change has been moving 
extra-systemic wars to the intra-state war category). 
Another, related, possible critique of the COW data is that there are alternative 
war lists that vary from COW (see Sambanis, 2004, for a review), suggesting that 
“the concept of … war may mean different things to different people” (Sambanis, 




Further, COW is the most widely used dataset and has a set of coding criteria, so its 
intrastate war and interstate war datasets are incorporated here.  These datasets were 
downloaded from the COW website (www.correlatesofwar.org) on April 8, 2011.  
While COW tracks wars since 1816, the current time frame of this study is 1999-
2008; the data for these years are used. 
World Health Organization 
Homicide information was collected from the World Health Organization 
(WHO).  The WHO, part of the United Nations, collects statistics on health around 
the world.  One topic on which WHO collects data is mortality, which includes 
intentional homicide.  In the WHO Mortality Database, the cause of death is 
determined by the relevant civil service.  WHO collects this information from the 
national civil registration systems of each country and has compiled an annual 
summary of the total deaths from each cause, including homicide, since 1979.  The 
WHO is preferable to other sources of international homicide data (i.e., Interpol, the 
United Nations – which also are used in some cases here) because it excludes 
attempted homicide and is based on actual deaths (Mullins & Young, forthcoming; 
see also Aebi, Killias, & Tabares, 2003; Kalish, 1988; LaFree, 1999; Messner & 
Rosenfeld, 1997; Neapolitan, 1997).25  Accordingly, these data were downloaded on 
April 17, 2011 from the United Nations’ website (http://www.unodc.org).  The year 
of data used for each country is listed in Table 6 for consistency with other 
independent variables. 
                                                 
25 How WHO treats deaths from terrorism is unclear.  To avoid potential overlap, models are run with 





Data on capital punishment, a control variable, were drawn from Amnesty 
International.  Amnesty International is an international non-governmental 
organization devoted to promoting human rights around the world.  Amnesty 
International collects information on a variety of human rights topics, including 
capital punishment.  Because the organization advocates for the abolition of the death 
penalty, one might expect a possible bias; however, it is because of this focus that the 
organization arguably has the most updated information on the death penalty around 
the world.  Accordingly, the list of abolitionist and retentionist countries was 
downloaded from the Amnesty International website 
(http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty) on July 24, 2010.  The information is not 
in a spreadsheet dataset; instead, a list of dates when the death penalty was banned in 
a given country and a country’s last known execution is posted on Amnesty 
International’s website.  Accordingly, data from the entire time frame of this study 
(1999-2008) were used. 
Transparency International 
Information on corruption was drawn from Transparency International.  
Transparency International is a non-governmental organization committed to 
eliminating corruption around the world.  According to its website, the organization 
defines corruption as “abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency 
International, 2010, ¶1).  To assess corruption, Transparency International surveys 
both experts (in the Corruption Perceptions Index) and citizens (in the Global 




here, the former source – the Corruption Perceptions Index – is chosen instead 
because the Global Corruption Barometer is limited to approximately 60 countries 
and data are unavailable for several of the countries included in this sample. 
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is published annually; at least three 
surveys of experts are required before inclusion in the CPI.  The surveys ask opinions 
of business people and country analysts/experts questions regarding “bribery of 
public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, and 
questions that probe the strength and effectiveness of public sector anti-corruption 
efforts” (Transparency International, 2010, ¶2).  Approximately 180 countries 
currently are represented in the CPI data (from 41 countries in 1995), which are 
available online at www.transparency.org.  Data were downloaded on May 29, 2010; 
specifically, data corresponding with the country-year listed in Table 6 was used here. 
Variables 
Several variables were compiled from the data sources discussed above.  Each 
variable is described below. 
Dependent variables: Measuring terrorist attacks on police 
The dependent variables, the proportion of terrorist attacks against the police 
and the proportion of fatal attacks against the police, were downloaded from the 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) website on July 29, 2010.  The GTD is an 
incident-level database, compiled from open-source information on terrorist incidents 
worldwide since 1970 (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 




gathered only between the years 1999 and 2008.  The data are limited to this ten-year 
period to match the time span from which data were collected on the main 
independent variables.  More importantly, this ten-year period was selected because, 
as mentioned in Chapter 3, data on incidents after 1997 contain more information so I 
am better able to identify attack targets relevant to this study: the police. 
According to the GTD codebook, as a target type, attacks on “police” include: 
… attacks on members of the police force or police installations; this 
includes police boxes, patrols headquarters, academies, cars, 
checkpoints, etc. Includes attacks against jails or prison facilities, or 
jail or prison staff or guards. Also includes attacks against private 
security guards and security forces. (p. 26) 
This incorporates a broad definition of “police”, so each incident was reviewed to 
remove attacks on prisons/jails and private security.26 
Important, the GTD counts up to three types of targets (targtype1, targtype2, 
and targtype3) for each incident.  In the present data, a new, dichotomous variable 
was created to reflect whether the police were targeted in any of the three target 
fields; if the police were any of these target types, the attack was coded to reflect that 
police were targeted in that incident.  Because the GTD is an incident-based dataset, 
these data were aggregated to the country-level to match the unit of analysis.  So, the 
number of incidents where the police were the primary, secondary or tertiary target 
                                                 
26 Not all terrorist attacks against law enforcement officials or facilities (i.e., excluding jail/prison and 
private security) were able to be completely cleanly separated from the general category “police”.  
Other fields in the data (such as the corporation of the target, the target description or the summary of 
the incident) sometimes provide more information on the target and every effort was made to remove 
cases not involving police (see footnote 16 in Chapter 3).  However, many cases remain that are not 
clearly identified as police or prison/private security.  While this may be a limitation of the data used 
for this study, a benefit is this all-encompassing definition, which fits nicely into the broad focus of 




first was tabulated for each country over the years 1999 through 2008; the same was 
done for the number of incidents in which a fatality occurred.  Similarly, the number 
of total terrorist incidents was tabulated for each country over the years 1999 through 
2008.  To compute the proportion of terrorist attacks where police were targeted 
during this time period, the number of such incidents per country was divided by the 
total number of terrorist incidents against any target per country.  To compute the 
proportion of fatal attacks against police, the number of incidents in which a fatality 
occurred and police were targeted were divided by the number of fatal incidents 
against any target during this time period. 
Police legitimacy 
Scholars have operationalized police legitimacy in several ways.  Here, police 
legitimacy is measured as confidence in police (see Bennett et al., 2009; Hinds, 2007; 
Jang et al., 2010; Reisig & Lloyd, 2009), which can be considered a proxy for police 
legitimacy.  Indeed, Jang and colleagues (2010) write “Confidence in the police is an 
important issue in any country because of its close association with the legitimacy of 
a police force” (p. 57).  Confidence in police was drawn from the WVS (variable 
e069_06 in the merged data).  As indicated above, the WVS did not ask this question 
in all countries during every survey wave.  Because this question was not asked in the 
2005-2008 wave for about 30 countries, data for these were drawn from the previous 
wave (1999-2001) – the most recent data available (see Table 6 for the specific year 
the survey was administered in each country included in the present sample).27  As 
                                                 
27 Note that data were available for Great Britain, not the entire United Kingdom, but the UK is the 
country used in all analyses.  The reason UK is the country used in all analyses is that data sources for 




demonstrated in Appendix A, these data are relatively stable over time, justifying 
using multiple survey waves in this cross-sectional sample. 
For each country in the sample, respondents were asked: 
I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could 
you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal 
of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or 
none at all?  The police. 
Responses followed a four-point Likert scale: 1= a great deal; 2= quite a lot; 3= not 
very much; 4= none at all; -1= don’t know; and -2=no answer.  For each country-
year, the percent of citizens who responded “a great deal” or “quite a lot” was 
calculated (“don’t know” and “no answer” responses were excluded from the 
computation).  
Recall that police legitimacy is not only generated from the behavior of the 
police.  Because police legitimacy stems, in part, from the legitimacy of the state, a 
discussion of the measure of state legitimacy – included here – is warranted. 
State legitimacy 
Given the debate about how to define and measure legitimacy, no cross-
national database of state legitimacy has yet been developed (Gilley, 2006).  The 
measures used here were created by drawing from several data sources.  Recognizing 
the three ways in which legitimacy is historically interpreted (Beetham, 1991, 1993), 
this research adopts Gilley’s operational definition of legitimacy: “a state, meaning 
the institutions and ideologies of a political system, is more legitimate the more it 




standpoint of all of its citizens…” (2009, p. 16).  Accordingly, state legitimacy, as 
measured here, taps into three elements: (1) views of legality, the predictable rules 
and laws that the government follows; (2) views of justification, the state respects 
citizens customs, having the moral right to rule; and (3) acts of consent, the conscious 
citizen actions, obeying the government. 
State legitimacy is measured from the standpoint of the citizens subject to the 
state’s rule.  The concept of legitimacy can be recognized in terms of citizens’ 
attitudes and actions (Gilley, 2006; LaFree, 1998; Levi et al., 2009).  Citizens’ 
perceptions of legitimacy are important because objective measures of whether a 
political system is indeed legitimate fall short assessing whether citizens subjected to 
the system perceive it to be such.  By relying on attitudinal measures the data will 
capture variation in perception across culture that might be lost if I were relying only 
on objective measures.  Behavioral measures of legitimacy also are important because 
they compensate for some inherent issues in attitudinal surveys, including dishonesty 
in reporting and misunderstanding the question posed.  Accordingly, both measures 
of attitudes and measures of behaviors are necessary and are used to gain a more 
complete picture of legitimacy.  Legitimacy, though, is a multidimensional concept, 
so attitudinal and behavioral measures must tap into the components comprising 
legitimacy. 
Views of legality.  To represent the element views of legality (i.e., the state 
follows the rules), three variables are used: (1) citizens’ confidence in the national 
government; (2) citizens’ confidence in civil services; and (3) citizens’ confidence in 




(variables e069_11, e069_08, and e069_17 respectively).  Similar to the Confidence 
in Police variable described above, participants were asked: 
I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could 
you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal 
of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or 
none at all? 
The organization – the civil service, the national government, and the justice system – 
was then named.  Responses followed a four-point Likert scale: 1= a great deal; 2= 
quite a lot; 3= not very much; 4= none at all; -1= don’t know; and -2=no answer.  For 
each country, the percent who responded “a great deal” or “quite a lot” was calculated 
for each variable.28  Again, please see Table 6 for the year of data used for each 
country. 
Views of justification.  To represent the element views of justification (i.e., the 
state has the moral right to rule), one variable is used: refugees who have fled the 
country (“Refugees”).  The legitimate state has a responsibility to protect all citizens 
from discrimination (Jones, 2008; Otunnu, 2002).  When the government fails to 
protect a group persecuted for its customs or when the government actively 
                                                 
28 Survey data were not available for several countries.  Accordingly, data from an earlier wave of the 
survey were collected – before the ten-year time frame used here.  Specifically, confidence in 
government was drawn from the 1996 survey for Belarus, Croatia, Estonia, and Latvia and the 1997 
survey for Lithuania.  (Given that these were measured right after the Soviet and Yugoslav dissolution, 
there might be some shifting later on.  Looking at confidence in civil services, there was a large shift in 
attitudes between the 1994-1999 wave and the 1999-2004 wave for Belarus, dropping from 51.34% to 
22.95% of the population who had at least some confidence in civil services, Estonia, dropping from 
60.92% to 40.57%, and Lithuania, dropping from 41.00% to 20.37%.  However, Croatia and Latvia 
remained relatively stable, dropping from 37.92% to 31.28% and increasing from 44.13% to 49.17%, 
respectively.  Whether the percentage of citizens who had at least some confidence in the government 
rose to their previous levels or remained low in later years is unknown.)  Confidence in the justice 
system was drawn from the 1995 survey for Nigeria, the 1996 survey for Bangladesh, Philippines, and 
Venezuela, the 1997 survey for Pakistan, and the 1998 survey for Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
Macedonia.  No country had missing data for confidence in civil services.  Importantly, analyses 




persecutes a group (e.g., genocide, ethnic cleansing), the government’s moral 
legitimacy is depleted (Otunnu, 2002) and citizens turn to alternative leaders (e.g., 
militias, “freedom fighters”) to replace responsibilities of the government or they flee 
the adverse circumstances (Jones, 2008).  Accordingly, the number of refugees who 
left the country is an indicator of the legitimacy of the government. 
Data on refugees from specific countries were collected from the Integrated 
Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) and, to be consistent with the other 
state legitimacy indicators, data for each country were collected for years 
corresponding with the WVS surveys (see Table 6 for the specific year used for each 
country).  Specifically, the number of refugees (in millions) originating from each 
country is used.  According to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, a 
refugee is defined as “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country 
of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” 
(Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2011, p. 3).  The 
measure is limited to only the type of persecution that is evident by refugees leaving 
the country; it misses those who are discriminated against but are unable to leave (i.e., 
internally displaced persons).  While this is a crude measure, it taps into failure of the 
state to protect persecuted groups, representing views of justification. 
Acts of consent.  The final component of state legitimacy is acts of consent 




are used to tap into this component: (1) Citizens’ reported belief that cheating on 
taxes is never okay; and (2) refraining from protesting. 29 
Belief that cheating on taxes is never okay (“Against Tax Fraud”) is drawn 
from the World Values Survey (question f116).  Participants were asked: “Please tell 
me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, 
never be justified, or something in between...  Cheating on taxes if you have a 
chance”.  Responses were coded on a ten-point scale, ranging from 1=never 
justifiable to 10=always justifiable.  (-1= don’t know and -2= no answer also were 
response codes.)  The percentage of participants who responded 1=never justifiable 
was used to measure this element.30  “Never justifiable” was selected because any 
higher on the scale would indicate that tax fraud would be acceptable under some 
circumstances – including the possibility of state illegitimacy. 
Another element of acts of consent is whether people participate in peaceful 
protests.  People protest against an illegitimate government or state policy.  By 
protesting, people are actively demonstrating their lack of consent for the state, 
indicating their disapproval and perception of illegitimacy.  Question e027 of the 
World Values Survey asks respondents, 
                                                 
29 Some (e.g., Gilley, 2006, 2009) argue that acts of consent is, by definition, purely behavioral.  
However, Tankebe (2009) notes that consent is only crudely behavioral and cautions of the “possible 
dangers of methodological tautology when researchers seek to operationalize legitimacy with a scale 
that includes within it aspects of what it is trying to explain, that is, public behavior” (p. 1280, footnote 
1).  While this criticism is valid, the present research focuses on acts of terrorism, which are an 
extreme way for citizens to demonstrate they do not voluntarily consent to the state’s rule.  The 
variable used for acts of consent, citizen’s reported belief that cheating on taxes is never okay, has little 
to do with the outcome variable, the proportion of terrorist attacks on police.  So, this concern is 
minimal here.  The other variable used to measure acts of consent is people reporting they would never 
engage in a legal protest.  On its surface this may seem to partially overlap with the dependent variable 
– terrorism – but terrorism is illegal, not legal, violence.  Also, terrorism is an extreme form of 
demonstration, which does not seem to be conveyed in the survey question asked.  Nevertheless, 
models are run both with and without the Never Protest variable to avoid tautological concerns and 
differences are noted. 




Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different 
forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for 
each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you 
might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.  Attending lawful 
demonstrations. 
Participants responded 1= have done; 2= might do; or 3= never do.  Because people 
who consent to the state’s rule would not protest against it, the percentage of people 
who responded they would never participate in protest is an indicator of acts of 
consent.  Again, this is a crude measure of consent, as there may be other reasons not 
to attend a lawful demonstration both unrelated to legitimacy and tied to illegitimacy, 
such as a belief that protests do not affect change, not wanting to take time away from 
work, a belief that most causes are not worthwhile, or fear of punishment from an 
illegitimate regime. 
Table 7 summarizes the measures used for each element of state legitimacy. 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE. 
Alternative explanation variables 
As described in Chapter 4, alternative explanations for terrorist attacks on 
police should be included to avoid erroneous conclusions.  In this section, I describe 
the other independent variables used to test hypotheses three through five: Societal 
Schism, Foreign Military, and Police Per Capita, which represents opportunity. 
Societal schism.  Societal schism refers to the level of divide or disunity in a 




(MAR) database, using data from the year 2006, the most recent year available.31  
The country-level discrimination data are available from 1950-2003, but these data 
only include the aggregate Political Discrimination Index and Economic 
Discrimination Index for each group.  MAR has group-level data updated from 2004-
2006, which can be aggregated to the country level; these updated data include 
significant changes (according to the MAR website).  These recently released data 
include new variables that are of interest here. 
MAR includes assessments of a minority group’s differences in terms of 
language (0=linguistic assimilation with plurality group; 1=group speaks multiple 
languages, at least one different from plurality group; 2=group speaks primarily one 
language, different from plurality group), customs (0=same social customs as 
plurality; 1= different social customs from plurality), beliefs (0=same religion as 
plurality; 1=different sect within same religion as plurality; 2=different religion), race 
(0=no physical differences in appearance; 1=physically distinguishable subtype of 
same racial stock; 2=different racial stock from the dominant group with substantial 
intermixture; 3=different racial stock, little or no intermixture), with higher values 
representing greater differences.  Because there may be several minority groups who 
are discriminated against within a country, following Lai (2007), the highest score 
within a state is used.  An index summing each of these four differences was used to 
tap into societal schism.  This index ranges from a possible 0 (no differences from 
dominant group) to 8 (very different in terms of language, customs, beliefs and race).  
                                                 




Several (13) countries had no groups listed in the MAR dataset;32 while these 
countries may have minority groups who experience discrimination, these countries 
may simply not be included in the MAR data, which does not claim to represent all 
countries worldwide, or these groups may not fit the definition of the MAR project.  
These countries receive a score of 0 for Societal Schism. 
Presence of foreign military.  Data were drawn from Kisangani & Pickering’s 
ICPSR Study #21282: International Military Intervention, 1989-2005 to measure 
foreign military presence.  Using these data, a dichotomous variable was created, 
tapping into whether a foreign military was present – even on a peacekeeping mission 
– on a country’s soil any time between 1999 and 2005 (1=foreign intervention; 
0=not). 
Opportunity.  Opportunity to attack police is measured by the number of 
police officers per 100,000 people, drawn from the World Police Encyclopedia (Das, 
2006).  Police personnel were not explicit for some countries in this source, so police 
officer per 100,000 citizens for the year 2004 was supplemented by the United 
Nations’ 9th Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems 
(for Belarus, Lithuania, Moldova, Philippines, Portugal, South Korea, and 
Zimbabwe), the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 2004 Uniform Crime Reports (for 
the United States), and European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control 
International Statistics on Crime and Justice, 2011, accessed through 
Nationmaster.com (http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/cri_pol_off-crime-police-
officers) (Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2006, Guatemala for 2000, Jordan for 2006, 
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Malaysia for 2000, Morocco for 2001, Thailand for 1995, and Venezuela for 2001).33  
Information was missing from each of these sources for eight countries (Bulgaria, 
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Iran, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago). 
Control variables 
There is mixed evidence that country-level variables (e.g., gross domestic 
product, political rights) impact citizen acceptance of authority (Levi et al., 2009) and 
terrorism in general (Piazza, 2006).  Nevertheless, these variables may be important 
to the study of terrorism and terrorist attacks on police.  Perhaps the reason for this 
mixed evidence is because macro-level factors are mediated through legitimacy.  
Therefore, several control variables are included. 
While there is some conflicting evidence these factors influence general 
terrorism, they may or may not influence terrorist attacks on the police or affect 
attacks on police in the same way.  This may be problematic if they influence general 
terrorism (the denominator of the dependent variable), but not terrorist attacks on 
police (the numerator), affecting the proportion.  In this way, these variables can have 
an opposite effect than predicted on the dependent variables. To be consistent with 
the independent variables, one-tailed tests are used for each control variable, although 
really there are no directional expectations. 
Additional data regarding macro-level publicly-available information about 
the countries where the incidents occurred were collected.  These variables are 
included in the models and described below.  Unless otherwise noted, data were 
collected on each variable to match the country-year described in Table 6. 
                                                 





Regime type.  The type of political regime may affect terrorism.  First, 
democracies, with more freedoms, may provide the atmosphere and opportunity for 
terrorism at lower cost and risk (Drakos & Gofas, 2006).  Authoritarian regimes, with 
tighter control, may have fewer terrorist attacks because of the greater control and 
because citizens may perceive that resistance is futile (see Gibson, 1989).  Some 
empirical evidence supports the contention that autocracies produce fewer terrorist 
organizations (Lai, 2007).  However, Drakos and Gofas (2006) point out democracies 
may appear to have more terrorism because non-democracies tend to underreport 
terrorist incidents.  They find a weak statistical relationship between democracy and 
terrorism, as the polity coefficient switches sign and significance between models. 
On the other hand, democracies incorporate public representatives into 
decision-making and there is more opportunity at the political table, so diverse groups 
can voice their opinions and grievances without resorting to violence (Drakos & 
Gofas, 2006).  Crenshaw (1981) argues one of the main motivations for terrorist 
activity is the absence of this opportunity for involvement in the political process. 
Finally, democratic regimes may be considered more legitimate because 
democratic countries are not police states (Herbert, 2006).  Public involvement in the 
electoral system may have an impact on police legitimacy or perceptions of police, 
generally.  Regarding the latter, Goldsmith (2005) summarizes “A deficit of trust is 
all too common in deeply divided, post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies” (p. 
444).  In less democratic countries, police may be used as a tool of illegitimate 
regimes, decreasing citizen confidence in police; and, in fact, confidence in police is 




Polity data were gathered from the POLITY IV Project, downloaded from the 
INSCR website on March 13, 2010.34  Table 6 lists the specific year data were drawn 
for each country.  The POLITY IV data compute institutionalized democracy and 
institutionalized autocracy scores for each country per year (1800-2008).  According 
to the codebook, several pieces of information are used to assess both democracy and 
autocracy: (1) competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment (democracies 
hold elections while autocracies are selective and closed); (2) constraint on the chief 
executive (constraints are substantial in democracies while autocracies have little to 
no constraints); and (3) competitiveness of political participation (democracies are 
unrestricted, open and fully competitive while political participation is 
suppressed/repressed or restricted in autocracies).  The data also include a “Polity2” 
score, combining the autocracy and democracy variables by subtracting the autocracy 
score from the democracy score.  This scale ranges from -10 (very autocratic) to 10 
(very democratic).  The POLITY IV Project website suggests that researchers can 
create a categorical variable (see http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm).  
Following this advice, for example, Lai (2007) created a trichotomous categorical 
variable (autocratic states scored -6 to -10, anocratic states scores -5 to +5, and 
democratic states scored +6 to +10), which he then made into three dichotomous 
variables.  This process was replicated here, creating a dummy variable for Autocratic 
states, a second for Anocratic states, and a third dummy variable for Democratic 
states. 
Iceland and Luxembourg are missing in the Polity IV dataset.   According to 
the CIA World Factbook, Iceland is a constitutional republic (Central Intelligence 
                                                 




Agency, 2011b).  The president and parliament are elected by popular vote every four 
years; several political parties operate in Iceland (Central Intelligence Agency, 
2011b).  Similar to the UK, Luxembourg is a constitutional monarchy (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2011d).  While the monarchy is hereditary, popular elections are 
held every five years to the legislative Chamber of Deputies with the leader of the 
majority party typically appointed as prime minister (Central Intelligence Agency, 
2011d).  Because both of these countries meet some of the main elements of the 
operational definition of democracy (as defined by the Polity IV codebook) and are 
not clear autocracies, for the purposes of this research, both countries were coded as a 
democracy (not an autocracy or anocracy).35 
Poverty.  Impoverished economies may impact terrorism directly (Drakos & 
Gofas, 2006) because they provide a large pool of persons vulnerable to recruitment 
into terrorism, as terrorist groups may offer opportunity unavailable through 
legitimate occupations (Kennedy, 1998; Kushner, 1998; but see Radu, 2002).  While 
some studies report a significant impact of poverty (Mullins & Young, forthcoming; 
see also Lai, 2007), others report no effect (Piazza, 2006) or a curvilinear effect (Lai, 
2007).36  The extant evidence suggests that poverty, in itself, may not be a direct 
cause of terrorism.  However, absolute economic indicators may be misleading and 
relative economic indicators may be more appropriate in the study of terrorism. 
                                                 
35 The Polity IV codebook defines “A mature and internally coherent democracy… as one in which (a) 
political participation is unrestricted, open, and fully competitive; (b) executive recruitment is elective, 
and (c) constraints on the chief executive are substantial” (p. 13). 
36 Lai (2007) found the logarithm of GDP per capita was positive and significant and the squared term 
was negative and significant, which was interpreted as meaning that states with mid-level GDP per 




Following prior research, gross domestic product (GDP), collected from the 
World Bank, is used as an absolute economic indicator.  Specifically, GDP per capita 
in 2000 US dollars (in thousands) is used to assess a country’s wealth.37 
Relative deprivation.  LaFree (1998) argues that relative measures of 
economic stress are more pertinent to crime, and, by extension, terrorism, than are 
absolute measures of economic stress: 
Absolute measures generally refer to how individuals or groups of individuals 
are doing in comparison to some fixed level of economic well-being…. By 
contrast, relative measures of economic stress emphasize how one individual 
or group of individuals is doing compared to other individuals or groups. (p. 
119) 
Relative measures are preferred for two reasons:  While a group may be more 
prosperous than in the past or compared to citizens of other countries (e.g., Great 
Britain compared to Haiti), “these same individuals may experience substantial 
feelings of deprivation compared to the relatively affluent individuals who surround 
them” (LaFree, 1998, p. 120; see also Gurr, 1970).  Additionally, “absolute measures 
of economic stress may mask changes at the margins of the income distribution that 
are likely to affect crime trends” (LaFree, 1998, p. 120).  Even if a society has an 
increasing GDP, for example, the same society may also experience increasing 
economic inequality (LaFree, 1998). 
Economic inequality may impact police legitimacy which, in turn, may impact 
terrorism. Goldsmith (2005) summarizes “wherever there are strong indicators of … 
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relative socio-economic inequality, public trust in police tends to be problematic” (p. 
444).  Jang and colleagues (2010) argue that in countries with greater economic 
inequality, citizens may view police treatment as unequal, which, in turn, affects 
citizen perception of police.  (However, they found no significant impact of economic 
inequality on confidence in police in the 15 countries under study.)  According to 
LaFree (1998), “Those who believe that economic institutions are unfair or unjust 
might be reasonably expected to have less interest in helping to control or regulate the 
criminal behavior of others” (p. 82), and those who are relatively deprived 
economically may be more likely to view related institutions as illegitimate.  So, there 
is reason to suspect that greater relative deprivation increases both general terrorism 
and attacks on police.  Accordingly, a positive relationship is expected. 
To assess relative deprivation, the Gini Index, which assesses the level of 
inequality between high and low incomes, is used.  The higher the Gini Index, the 
greater the inequality.  The CIA World Factbook was used to collect data on the Gini 
Index for family income in each country under study.  The data were downloaded 
April 8, 2011 from the CIA World Factbook website 
(http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/print_2172.html).  
Only some years are reported for each country; Gini Index data was collected for the 
country-year closest to that described in Table 6.38  The CIA World Factbook did not 
report a Gini Index for Trinidad and Tobago. 
Violence.  Violence may affect terrorism in several ways.  First, high violence 
by the state or its citizens sends the message that violence is an acceptable way to 
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which data were available in the CIA World Factbook during two years, a paired samples t-test was not 




resolve disputes.  Crenshaw (1981) would refer to this as social facilitation, “social 
habits and historical traditions that sanction the use of violence against the 
government, making it morally and politically justifiable, and even dictating an 
appropriate form…” (p. 382). 
Second, violence may be contagious.  Drakos and Gofas (2006) found 
evidence of infectious contagion or spatial diffusion; in their models, the level of 
terrorism in a region predicted the count of terrorist attacks in a given country in that 
region.  Similarly, Lai (2007) found terrorist incidents are more likely in states that 
share borders with states higher in terrorist activity.  Terrorist groups may cooperate, 
sharing information and training (Drakos & Gofas, 2006).39  Alternatively, terrorist 
groups may have operations in more than one country, also accounting for infectious 
contagion (Drakos & Gofas, 2006, p. 90). 
Third, state involvement in violence may affect social control capabilities.  
Prior research suggests that war may have an impact on terrorist incidents (Lai, 
2007).  Unpopular international war may reduce the legitimacy of the government, 
causing domestic unrest that may breed terrorism; also international war may 
encourage foreign fighters to attack the state through terrorist attacks (Drakos & 
Gofas, 2006).  On the other hand, states may tighten domestic security measures 
during times of war, increasing the cost and risk associated with terrorism, leading to 
decreased incidents of terrorism (Drakos & Gofas, 2006).  Or, during times of war, 
states may be less able to control their territory (Lai, 2007).  Drakos and Gofas (2006) 
found interstate conflict to be a significant predictor of the count of terrorist attacks in 
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a given country between 1985 and 1998.  Countries engaged in international disputes 
were more likely to have more terrorist attacks than countries not involved in such 
conflict. 
Crime also may have an impact on legitimacy (LaFree, 1998).  The 
instrumental or performance-based argument of legitimacy holds that legitimacy and 
crime are inversely related.  That is, as crime decreases, perceptions of legitimacy 
increase, as the government (i.e., the police) is performing adequately in protecting 
the public.  In addition to affecting state legitimacy, crime may affect police 
legitimacy.  Studies have shown that violent crime affects citizens’ attitudes toward 
the police.  For example, Stack and colleagues (2007) found that homicide rates 
impacted citizens’ attitudes toward law and order in 14 countries.  Areas high in 
crime impact police perceptions of citizens, making police more suspicious of citizens 
and creating an “us” versus “them” attitude (Goldsmith, 2005).  Goldsmith (2005) 
writes “The problem deepens because official contempt begets public distrust…. In 
deeply divided societies, this attitude will serve to reinforce those … already 
suspicious towards police and even call forth hostile public reactions, including 
violent attacks, against the police” (p. 454).  Indeed, in a cross-national comparison of 
15 countries examining the impact of confidence in the police (as measured by the 
World Values Survey), Jang and colleagues (2010) found that those respondents in 
nations with higher homicide rates reported less confidence in the police. 
Several measures of violence within a state are used here, including state 
involvement in war, homicide, terrorist activity in the region, and capital punishment.  




a positive relationship between the violence variables and the proportion of fatal and 
nonfatal attacks on police. 
War data was drawn from the Correlates of War dataset.  Two dichotomous 
variables were created, assessing whether a state was involved in intra- or inter-state 
conflict any time between 1999-2008 (1=involved; 0=not involved). 
The only crime for which there is somewhat reliable information across 
countries is homicide.  Accordingly, the measure of violent crime used in the present 
research is homicide rates per country, drawn primarily from the World Health 
Organization (WHO) data.  For countries missing from the WHO intentional 
homicide reported data, homicide information was substituted from other sources, 
including the United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal 
Justice Systems (available online at http://www.unodc.org).  Specifically, homicide 
data from Canada, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Portugal and Sweden were drawn from 
the 9th UN Crime Trends Survey and Argentina, Panama, Paraguay, and the United 
States were drawn from the 10th UN Crime Trends Survey.40  Information from Brazil 
came from the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Justice of Brazil, collected by the 
UN.  The UN also collected homicide data on Chile from the National Police of 
Chile, Colombia from Medicinalegal citing National Police of Colombia, Guatemala 
from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) citing the National Police 
of Guatemala, Mexico from the ICESI citing the National Police of Mexico, the 
United Kingdom from the Statistical Office of the European Communities Crime and 
                                                 
40 According to the questionnaire, intentional homicide is “death deliberately inflicted on a person by 
another person, including infanticide” and non-intentional homicide is “death not deliberately inflicted 
on a person by another person. That includes the crime of manslaughter but excludes traffic accidents 





Criminal Justice Statistics, Uruguay from the Ministry of Interior of Uruguay, and 
Venezuela from the Chacao Municipality citing the National Police of Venezuela. For 
all of these countries, homicide data are from the year 2004 (or 2005, in the cases of 
Argentina, Serbia and the United States). 
Regional terrorist activity also is an important control variable.  The total 
number of terrorist attacks against any target in the region – excluding the current 
country – between 1999 and 2008 were drawn from the GTD.  The GTD’s regional 
delineations were used, as described in Table 4. 
State-sanctioned violence is measured by the use of capital punishment, drawn 
from Amnesty International’s database on capital punishment.  A list of countries that 
have abolished the death penalty and the date of abolition is available on the Amnesty 
International website (www.amnesty.org).  Death Penalty is measured as a 
dichotomous variable, whether a country has abolished the death penalty for all 
crimes either in practice (i.e., a moratorium or most recent execution occurred before 
1999) or in law as of 2008 (0=abolished death penalty; 1=has not abolished death 
penalty). 
Taken together, these measures of violence may be part of a latent variable.  
Mullins and Young (forthcoming) found a single factor, which they called “culture of 
violence”, represented by war, state violence and citizen violence (i.e., homicide 
rates); this factor had the strongest association to terrorist attacks.  Unfortunately, 
some of these variables do not meet the assumptions of factor analysis, as three 
variables (Civil War and Interstate War and Death Penalty) are not continuous, so the 




Corruption.  Corruption data were downloaded from Transparency 
International.41  Transparency International annually publishes the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI), compiled from surveys of experts including business people 
and country analysts.42  Scores on the CPI range from a possible 0-10, with 0 
representing high corruption in a country and 10 representing a highly “clean” or not 
corrupt country.43 
Population density.  Finally, the extant literature empirically demonstrates that 
countries with more people experience more terrorism (Drakos & Gofas, 2006; Lai, 
2007; Piazza, 2006).  Mullins & Young (forthcoming) argue that states with higher 
populations are expected to produce more people motivated to use terrorist violence.  
Higher populations also mean fewer resources available per person.  Drakos and 
Gofas (2006) interpret population density in terms of resource scarcity; they hold that 
“access to and control over natural resources is an important cause of tension” (p. 77).  
The total population and population density were downloaded from the World Bank 
Development Indicators. 
Summary 
All variables and their sources are summarized in Table 8. 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE. 
                                                 
41 The World Values Survey has a question asking respondents about corruption (see question e196 in 
the integrated questionnaire).  However, this question was asked in only about half of the countries 
included in this sample.  Accordingly, the corruption measure from Transparency International is used. 
42 For a country to be included in the CPI, a minimum of three such surveys are needed. 
43 Data were not available for Bosnia-Herzegovina for 2001, so corruption data were drawn from the 





Constructing state legitimacy 
State legitimacy is a latent construct that is believed to be made up of three 
components (views of legality, views of justification and acts of consent), described 
above.  Accordingly, factor analysis is appropriate.  Maximum likelihood factor 
analysis is most desirable, as it offers the calculation of several goodness of fit 
statistics to better assess the factor (Brown, 2006; Costello & Osborne, 2005).  
However, maximum likelihood relies on several assumptions: (1) a large sample size; 
(2) continuous variables; and (3) multivariate normal distribution (Brown, 2006).  
Especially of note is that a skewed distribution affects model fit tests (Brown, 2006).  
If the maximum likelihood assumptions are not met, principal axis factor analysis will 
be used, as it does not assume a multivariate normal distribution (Costello & 
Osborne, 2005). 
Tobit model 
The statistical package Stata (version 10) is used for analyses.  Because the 
dependent variables – the proportion of terrorist attacks against police and proportion 
of fatal terrorist attacks targeting police – are proportions, they are continuous 
variables censored at zero and one.  Accordingly, Tobit analysis is most appropriate.  
The Tobit model primarily assumes that the errors are normal and homoskedastic 
(Long, 1997).  These assumptions are tested to assess the qualities of the estimates.  
The distribution of the error terms and the normal probability plot are examined to 




homoskedasticity.  Also, bivariate correlations are computed to assess evidence of 
multicollinearity among the independent variables. 
Limitations and Additional Analyses 
Small sample size 
With a sample size of only 82, statistical power should be assessed.  Statistical 
power is used to assess the likelihood of a Type II Error – that the researcher is 
unable to identify an existing relationship.  In other words, “the greater the statistical 
power of a test, the less chance there is that a researcher will mistakenly fail to reject 
the null hypothesis” (Weisburd and Britt, 2003: 606).  Cohen’s (1988) power tables, 
used to assess statistical power, incorporate four factors: significance level, sample 
size, directionality (one-tailed or two-tailed tests), and effect size (Cohen’s d).  The 
significance level is set at 0.05, the sample size is 82, all hypotheses are one-tailed 
tests, regression is the statistical method used to analyze the data, and the sample size 
corresponds to a power value equal to or greater than 0.95 to minimize the probability 
of Type II Error, so power tables corresponding to t-tests are used to assess the effect 
sizes: small (Cohen’s d = 0.20), medium (Cohen’s d = 0.50), and large (Cohen’s d = 
0.80). 
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE. 
As shown in Table 9, the analysis should be able to detect only a medium to 
large effect, given the size of the sample, while minimizing both Type I and Type II 
Errors.  In other words, the smaller sample size makes rejecting the null hypothesis 




power may be considered a drawback.  However, because only a large effect will be 
detected here, this lends more weight to any significant findings.  That is, reaching a 
significant relationship between police legitimacy and terrorist attacks on police – 
despite the low statistical power – will lend to the robustness of the findings. 
Due to these concerns about sample size, the models are kept as parsimonious 
as possible while still remaining informative.  First, separate models are run with each 
primary independent variable.  Next, models are run with each primary independent 
variable and the control variables.  Then, models are run with all of the independent 
variables and control variables.44  Finally, the last set of models is run with all of the 
independent variables and the relevant control variables, with relevancy determined 
by F-tests. 
Missing values 
In addition to the small sample size, values are missing on some variables (see 
Table 10 for the countries missing values on each variable).  There are several 
techniques available to deal with missing data (see Allison, 2001).  Listwise deletion 
(also called complete-case analysis) is most common, but removing observations with 
missing data is undesirable here, considering the already low statistical power 
discussed above.  Listwise deletion can inflate standard errors and lead to biased 
estimates when data are not missing completely at random (Allison, 2001; Schafer & 
Olsen, 1998).  To accommodate the concern for removing cases with missing 
information, substituting the variable mean (also referred to as mean imputation or 
simple or single imputation) often is used.  This method, too, can lead to biased 
                                                 
44 While regression analyses should have, at minimum, a ratio of one predictor for every five cases, 




estimates because it does not take into account the uncertainty of the imputed values 
(Allison, 2001; Schafer & Olsen, 1998; Stuart, 2009).  Maximum likelihood 
estimation is another way to resolve the problem of missing data and can be 
beneficial – but only for large samples, which is not the case here.  Maximum 
likelihood estimation is further limited in that “it requires a model for the joint 
distribution of all variables with missing data” and multivariate normal model often is 
not realistic (Allison, 2001, p. 27).  An alternative is multiple imputation, which 
produces consistent and efficient estimates, but also assumes the data are missing at 
random (Allison, 2001; Schafer & Olsen, 1998).  While the logic behind multiple 
imputation is simple in that the process fills in missing values multiple times to create 
multiple datasets and then combine results across datasets, finding the right 
imputation model is difficult at best and may introduce bias (Allison, 2001).  
Nevertheless, a benefit of multiple imputation is that it accounts for the uncertainty in 
the imputed values, unlike mean substitution (Schafer & Olsen, 1998; Stuart, 2009). 
INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE. 
All of these methods are mainly appropriate for data that are missing 
completely at random or missing at random, which may or may not be the case here.  
We can never know whether data are missing at random or missing complete at 
random because we are unable to test for it: “Because we do not know the values of 
the missing data, we can not compare the values of those with and without missing 
data to see if they differ systematically on that variable” (Allison, 2001, p. 4).  That 
said, Mullins & Young (forthcoming) suggest that the international data – similar to 




countries are more likely to have missing data than more developed countries, and 
this can be predicted using, for example, Gross Domestic Product.  Specifically, they 
found that countries with lower GDP had more missing data than countries with 
higher GDP.  Mullins & Young (forthcoming) also found that missing data are more 
likely in countries with fewer terrorist attacks.  If that is the case with the current data, 
then the missing at random assumption required for each method listed above would 
be violated. 
Allison (2001) observes that “The only really good solution to the missing 
data problem is to not have any” (p. 2), as we cannot know whether the manipulated 
dataset contain the true values of the missing data.  However, when missing data are 
unavoidable, as they are here, the best way to handle the missing data is to triangulate 
methods.  Mullins & Young (forthcoming), also using comparative data to study 
terrorism, employed two techniques to impute data, comparing the results from each 
approach, as well as with the results of the listwise deletion method.  If these different 
methods produce results that all tell a similar story, the results are considered more 
trustworthy.  Accordingly, several approaches to address missing data issues are 
compared in this dissertation: multiple imputation by chained equations (MICE, 
which fills in the missing values on each variable, in turn, using all of the other 
variables as predictors in regression models),45 mean substitution for missing values, 
and listwise deletion.  The results from the multiple imputation data are reported in 
Chapter 6 (see Appendix B for comparisons with mean substitution and listwise 
deletion); substantive differences between missing data methods are noted. 
                                                 




Extreme proportions of terrorist attacks against police 
One limitation of using proportions is that those countries with a low 
frequency of total terrorist attacks will have arbitrarily high or low proportions 
dependent on the target.  Countries where there are very few total terrorist attacks and 
most or very few are targeted against the police will produce proportions that might 
be arbitrarily close to 1 or 0.  According to the Law of Large Numbers, as the number 
of total terrorist attacks increases, the observed proportion comes closer to the true 
proportion (see Bachman & Paternoster, 2004; Greene, 2008).  However, when a 
country has relatively few total terrorist attacks, there may be error in the dependent 
variable.  To account for this limitation, count models also are run (with the total 
number of police as an exposure variable and the total number of terrorist attacks 
against non-police targets as a control variable) to check the robustness of the results 
found in the Tobit model. 
Violations of Tobit assumption 
Tobit assumes normally distributed error terms and homoskedasticity, which 
may be violated in these data.  To address this issue, semi-parametric models using 
Censored Least Absolute Deviations (CLAD) estimator will check the robustness of 
the results.46  CLAD is slightly different than Tobit regression, as it is median 
                                                 
46 Another alternative to Tobit is Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares (SCLS) estimator for the 
censored regression model.  Its assumptions are more relaxed than Tobit but more restrictive than 
CLAD.  SCLS does not require that the errors follow a specific distribution, only that they are 
symmetrically distributed and unimodal with a mean of 0 (Powell, 1986; Sullivan et al., 2008).  
Estimates will be consistent even if the error terms are heteroskedastic.  SCLS is a two-step process, 
where first the data are symmetrically truncated from the uncensored end of the distribution; then, 
analyses proceed with the remaining cases (Powell, 1986; Sullivan et al., 2008).  Unfortunately, this 
trimming process results in a reduced sample size for analysis.  Powell (1986) demonstrated SCLS 




regression and has minimal assumptions (Powell, 1984; Sullivan et al., 2008).  CLAD 
estimates do not require homoskedasticity (Powell, 1984) or that the error terms are 
symmetrically distributed, but it does require that the error median be equal to zero 
(Sullivan et al., 2008).  However, Sullivan and colleagues (2008) find that “CLAD, 
with its relaxed assumptions regarding error terms, may be used as a benchmark, this 
does not mean that it always gives the best approximation of the true relationship” (p. 
413, footnote 16, emphasis in original).  The small sample size presented here may 
lead to inflated standard errors (Sullivan et al., 2008), as CLAD also reduces the 
sample size. 
Sullivan and colleagues (2008) advise researchers to triangulate models, using 
multiple Tobit models to test results and thoroughly examining the distribution of the 
error terms.  At the very least, running multiple models allows for sensitivity checks 
on the Tobit model (Sullivan et al., 2008).  Following this advice, the assumptions for 
the traditional Tobit model and CLAD are tested and two sets of models are 
computed (Tobit and CLAD), as reported in the next chapter. 
However, Tobit also assumes that the regressors that affect whether the police 
are ever targeted and the parameters that show the nature of this relationship – 
P(y≥0|X) – are equal to those that predict how many times (relative to other attacks) 
the police are targeted – E(y|Y>0, X) (Lin & Schmidt, 1984).  This assumption is 
unlikely met in countries with no terrorist attacks and perhaps also in countries with 
terrorist attacks, requiring alternative estimation methods.  One way to address this 
issue is to use Cragg’s (1971) “double-hurdle” or “two-tiered” model, where a probit 
                                                                                                                                           
countries available for analysis.  The small sample size here will inflate standard errors, making the 




model is estimated to determine the probability of a non-zero value and a truncated 
normal model is estimated to predict non-zero values.  Such models will be estimated 
using the Stata command craggit (see Burke, 2009), and a likelihood ratio test will 
be used to confirm whether this Tobit assumption is violated.  Significant likelihood 
ratio tests indicate the assumption is violated and Cragg’s model is more appropriate 
than the Tobit model; if not significant, the likelihood ratio tests will confirm that this 
Tobit assumption is not violated and is indeed preferable to Cragg’s two-tiered 






Chapter 6:  Results 
In this chapter, I begin with sample summary statistics, followed by an 
explanation of the state legitimacy factor analysis results.  The remainder of this 
chapter addresses the results of the Tobit models, answering the question “does 
legitimacy influence the proportion of terrorist attacks against police?”.  These results 
are then confirmed using negative binomial regression analyses.  Unless otherwise 
indicated, all statistics reported were calculated with missing data imputed through 
multiple imputation; see Appendix B for comparisons with other data imputation 
methods. 
Summary Statistics 
This section describes the variables used to better understand the nature of 
terrorist attacks against police in the 82 countries under study.  The regions 
represented in the sample are depicted in Figure 7.  Most countries in the sample are 
located in Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa or the Americas (which is not surprising, as 
this is a convenience sample, including countries for which data were available).  
Looking at Figure 8, these regions experience relatively little terrorist attacks 
targeting police compared to regions having fewer countries in the sample.  South 
Asia (35.5%), Southeast Asia (16.6%), Russia and the Newly Independent States 
(15.7%), and the Middle East/North Africa (9.7%) comprise the bulk of terrorist 
attacks on police, followed by Western Europe (8.4%), South America (7.8%), 
Eastern Europe (2.7%), and Sub-Saharan Africa (2.1%).  The remaining regions 




INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE. 
INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE. 
Turning to countries, only four countries (about 5% of the sample) 
experienced no terrorist attacks against any target; the remaining 78 countries had at 
least one terrorist attack (see Figure 9).  Of the countries that had at least one terrorist 
attack, none of these attacks were directed against the police in 37 countries.  Of the 
51 countries that had fewer than 20 total terrorist attacks, 12 had at least one attack 
directed against the police.  An additional five countries had between 21 and 30 total 
terrorist attacks between 1999 and 2008; of these countries, three had attacks against 
the police.  For these 17 countries, the small denominator may be an issue affecting 
the proportion, that is, if these countries had more general terrorist attacks, police may 
have been targeted. 
INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE. 
Looking at fatal terrorist attacks, 31 countries (about 38% of the sample) did 
not have any terrorist attacks resulting in fatalities.  (See Figure 10.)  Of the 51 
countries having at least one fatal terrorist attack against any target, 34 countries had 
20 or fewer fatal terrorist attacks and 22 countries had no fatal attacks against police.  
Of these 34 countries with 20 or fewer fatal terrorist attacks, police were targeted in at 
least one of these incidents in 12 countries.  An additional three countries had 
between 21 and 30 fatal terrorist attacks against any target and all of these countries 
experienced at least one attack on the police.  For these countries, the few fatal 
attacks against any target (i.e., the small denominator) may affect the proportion of 




INSERT FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 11.  The proportion of terrorist 
attacks against police ranged from 0 to 0.391; that is, some countries had no terrorist 
attacks against police while in one country 39% of the terrorist attacks targeted police 
(see Table 11).  Specifically, half (n= 41) of the countries in the sample had no 
terrorist attacks on police, while the other half (n= 41) had a proportion of terrorist 
attacks against police that was greater than zero.  The proportion of fatal terrorist 
attacks targeting police ranged from 0 to 0.667 in this sample, meaning some 
countries experienced no fatal terrorist attacks targeting police while in one country 
two-thirds of the terrorist attacks involving fatalities targeted police.  The average 
country in this sample had a proportion of 0.078 (median 0.003) attacks on police and 
0.077 (median 0.000) fatal attacks involving police.  Fifty-three countries had no fatal 
terrorist attacks against police, while 29 countries had a proportion of fatal attacks 
targeted against police that was greater than zero.  Looking at Figures 10 and 11, the 
distribution of the proportions of terrorist attacks on police and fatal attacks involving 
police depict such terrorist incidents as rare events in the countries sampled. 
INSERT FIGURE 11 ABOUT HERE. 
INSERT FIGURE 12 ABOUT HERE. 
Descriptive statistics for the independent variables also are presented in Table 
11.  On average, more than half of the citizens have a great deal or quite a lot of 
Confidence in the Police ( x = 56.815%, s= 19.961), although the percent of citizens 
having confidence in the police varied greatly among the countries sampled, ranging 




similar story.  On average, about half of the citizens have at least some confidence in 
the civil services ( x = 45.807%, s= 18.417), the national government ( x = 46.768%, 
s= 18.417), and the justice system ( x = 52.479%, s= 19.503), although the countries 
in this sample had a wide range of responses, from less than 10% to more than 95% 
of citizens having confidence in these agencies.  Refugees (in millions) is highly 
skewed ( x = 19.965, median= 0, s= 60.397), ranging from 0 to 340.  More than two-
thirds of citizens in the average country believed tax fraud is never justified ( x = 
71.911%, s= 13.550), and less than half reported they would never engage in a legal 
protest ( x = 45.958%, s= 17.620).  Turning to the other independent variables, on 
average the countries sampled had a moderate amount of societal schism ( x = 3.085, 
s= 2.205).  Less than one-quarter (24%) of the countries sampled had foreign military 
on their soil between 1999 and 2008, perhaps because few countries were involved in 
inter-state or civil war (15% and 17%, respectively).  Police Per Capita ranged from a 
censored 0 (see Appendix B for more information on the imputed data) to about 835 
police officers per 100,000 people ( x = 294.675, s= 177.005). 
INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE. 
As shown in Table 11, most (73%) of the countries sampled were democratic 
and a small portion (9%) was autocratic, leaving the remaining 18% anocratic.  The 
Gross Domestic Product (in thousands) ranged in the sampled countries from $0.175 
to $43.420 and is positively skewed ( x = 9.696, median= 3.716, s= 11.937).  While 
GDP indicates some sample countries are wealthy, economic inequality ranged from 
14.4 to 65.0 (recall a higher Gini Index corresponds to higher inequality), averaging 




The homicide rate ranged in the sample countries from 0.2 to 69.0, and is 
positively skewed ( x = 9.055, median= 3.650, s= 11.969).  Turning to another 
measure of violence, regional terrorism (minus the country’s total terrorism directed 
toward any target) averaged about 1456 incidents (s= 1660.178), with some countries 
located in regions with little terrorism and others in regions with a great deal of 
terrorism during this time period (range 18-6213).  More than two-thirds (70%) of the 
countries sampled have abolished the death penalty either in law or in practice. 
On average, countries were moderately corrupt ( x = 4.686, s= 2.382), ranging 
from a great deal of corruption (1.2) to not at all corrupt (10.0).  Finally, countries 
varied in size, with population density ranging from 2.7 to 1120.1 ( x = 120.512, s= 
153.001). 
State Legitimacy Factor Results 
The literature indicates that state legitimacy is comprised of three elements: 
views of legality (i.e., the state follows the rules), views of justification (i.e., the state 
has the moral right to rule), and acts of consent (i.e., citizens actively acknowledge 
the state has the right to rule).  As described earlier, six variables are used here to tap 
into each element (i.e., views of legality: confidence in the government, confidence in 
the civil services, confidence in the justice system; views of justification: Refugees; 
acts of consent: Against Tax Fraud, Never Protest).  Because six variables are used to 
measure one latent construct – state legitimacy – factor analysis is the appropriate 
analytical tool. 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy of 0.715 (considered 




sphericity (χ2= 103.41, df= 15, p= 0.000), both computed using PASW (i.e., SPSS 
version 18), confirmed that factor analysis is appropriate with the variables described 
earlier.  While ideally the sample size would be larger (i.e., over n= 200; Comrey & 
Lee, 1992), factor analysis assumptions are met: interval-level data are used and 
examination of scatterplots indicated an arguably linear relationship between each 
variable pair. 
While maximum likelihood factor analysis is ideal, its assumptions were not 
met.  The Refugees variable is highly skewed (most countries in the sample had no 
refugees) and transformation attempts (i.e., log) did not reduce the skewness.  
Because the inclusion of the skewed Refugees variable violates the multivariate 
normal distribution assumption of maximum likelihood factor analysis, principal axis 
factoring factor analysis was used.  Recall that principal axis factor analysis has less 
stringent assumptions than maximum likelihood factor analysis in that principal axis 
factor analysis does not assume a multivariate normal distribution (Costello & 
Osborne, 2005). 
Another issue to consider before moving forward with the principal axis factor 
analysis is missing data.  As is common in comparative research, missing data is 
present on four of the six legitimacy variables, as summarized in Table 10.  Listwise 
deletion would reduce the sample size from 82 to 63, which is undesirable, given the 
already low statistical power.  Accordingly, to address the missing data issue on the 
legitimacy indicators, both multiple imputation and mean substitution were used.  For 




between these analyses and analyses using the multiple imputation dataset are noted 
where appropriate.47 
Principal axis factoring factor analysis was computed in PASW (i.e., SPSS 
version 18).  A scree plot (see Figure 13) suggested a one or two factor solution, 
contrary to expectations.  As shown in Table 12, the eigenvalue for a one factor 
model was 2.563, explaining nearly 43% of the variance; the next largest eigenvalue 
was 1.043, explaining about 17% of the variance; and all further eigenvalues were 
below the commonly accepted 1.0.48  Additionally, not all variables loaded onto one 
factor.  (See Figure 14.)  On the first factor, factor loadings exceeded 0.70 for 
confidence in the government, confidence in civil services and confidence in the 
justice system.  However, Refugees had a factor loading greater than 0.60 on the 
second factor; both Against Tax Fraud and Never Protest did not load at all (factor 
loadings were less than 0.30 on each factor).49  While the anticipated one factor 
solution was not supported by the data, these results do seem to indicate three 
separate elements of state legitimacy, as suggested by the literature.50 
                                                 
47 The results of the mean substitution sample are noted for ease of presentation.  Stata’s mim 
command would not report results for a factor analysis across the imputed samples.  As indicated in 
Appendix B, 40 imputation samples were generated in Stata 10; discussion of results would be more 
complicated than simply presenting the results of the mean substitution sample.  That said, results of 
factor analyses in several of the imputed samples are noted. 
48 Principal axis factor analysis was computed on over one-quarter (n= 12) of the multiple imputed 
datasets.  The analyses on the multiple imputed samples suggested a one-factor solution, as the largest 
eigenvalue ranged from 2.11 to 2.24 and the next largest eigenvalue ranged from 0.24 to 0.30.  The 
proportion of variance explained by the first factor ranged from 1.01 to 1.05; the variance explained by 
the second factor ranged from 0.12 to 0.14. 
49 Promax rotation, an oblique rotation method which allows multiple factors to be correlated, showed 
no substantive differences from the unrotated results. 
50 This was more clearly shown across the factor analyses in the multiple imputed dataset, where the 
promax rotation again showed the views of legality variables (i.e., confidence in the government, 
confidence in the civil services and confidence in the justice system) load onto one factor.  The highest 
loading for Refugees was about 0.43 on a second factor, and the highest loadings for the acts of 
consent variables (i.e., percent of citizens reporting that tax fraud is never justified and percent of 
people who would never engage in a legal protest) was on a third variable, although the factor loadings 




INSERT FIGURE 13 ABOUT HERE. 
INSERT FIGURE 14 ABOUT HERE. 
INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE. 
A second principal axis factoring factor analysis was computed with only the 
views of legality variables (i.e., confidence in the government, confidence in civil 
services and confidence in the justice system) because these three variables loaded 
onto one factor and because a minimum of three variables are needed for factor 
analysis.51  (The other three variables are included separately as indicators of 
legitimacy in the following analyses.)  The eigenvalue for a one-factor solution was 
2.341; the next highest eigenvalue was 0.400.  The variance explained by one factor 
was 78.03%, and the scree plot suggested a one factor solution (results not shown).  
Further, all three variables loaded onto one factor and all loadings were greater than 
0.700.  Accordingly, factor scores were computed.  Ranging from -2.240 to 2.560, the 
views of legality factor had a mean of 0.000 and a median of -0.110 (s= 0.938).  To 
ensure that this factor measures what it purports to measure, validity tests were 
conducted. 
Validity tests 
Validity of the views of legality factor and the three other state legitimacy 
indicators (i.e., Refugees, Against Tax Fraud and Never Protest) was assessed 
through both discriminant and convergent validity tests.  The discriminant validity 
test expects a weak correlation between the state legitimacy indicators and concepts 
                                                 
51 Again, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy of 0.719 (still considered “middling”, 
see Kim & Mueller, 1978, citing Kaiser, 1974) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity (χ2= 89.49, df= 3, p= 




with which it is thought to be unrelated, like population.  The number of people living 
in a country should have nothing to do with how those people perceive the legitimacy 
of the state (Gilley, 2006).  As shown in Table 13, correlations between the state 
legitimacy indicators and Population Density range from r= 0.035 (Refugees) to r= 
0.267 (views of legality factor).  Against Tax Fraud and Never Protest are weakly 
correlated with Population Density (r= 0.177 and r= 0.132, respectively), as is 
Refugees.  However, the correlation between the views of legality factor and 
Population Density is statistically significant, which is contrary to expectations. 
INSERT TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE. 
The convergent validity test gauges how well state legitimacy is related to 
other concepts with which it is expected to be correlated.  For example, state 
legitimacy is thought to be related to corruption, as people find corrupt governments 
less legitimate (see, e.g., Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Seligson, 2006).  The state 
legitimacy indicators are weakly to moderately correlated with Corruption.  The views 
of legality factor is more strongly correlated with Population Density (r= 0.267) than 
with Not Corrupt (r= 0.044).  Against Tax Fraud also is weakly correlated with Not 
Corrupt and in the opposite direction than that predicted (r= -0.024), suggesting that a 
greater percentage of people report cheating on taxes is never acceptable in countries 
that are more corrupt.52   Not Corrupt is moderately related to both Refugees (r=  
-0.233, p= 0.036) and Never Protest (r= -0.354, p= 0.001); both relationships are 
statistically significant.  However, these correlations offer mixed conclusions, as the 
correlation coefficients are negative, meaning people fled the country but reported 
                                                 
52 Recall that a high score on the Not Corrupt variable indicates little corruption; conversely, a low 




never protesting in regimes with high corruption.   This offers weak support for the 
state legitimacy indicators. 
Taken together, some of the results are consistent with the divergent and 
convergent validity tests, while some results are not.  Perhaps this is because the bulk 
of the indicators are survey measures and citizens in more repressive regimes may 
believe they will be punished for survey responses that are negative toward the 
government.53  To explore which countries may be driving the legitimacy indicators, 
the next sections examines which countries rank most and least legitimate according 
to these indicators. 
Ranking state legitimacy indicators 
The scant empirical research on comparative state legitimacy indicates that 
Nordic countries (like Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway) and western 
democracies are among the most legitimate countries (Gilley, 2006, 2009).  To assess 
whether this holds true here, the countries were ranked by each state legitimacy 
indicator.  First, Table 14 shows the views of legality factor ranked by country.  While 
the Nordic countries rank relatively high on the views of legality factor, they are 
outranked by Vietnam, Bangladesh, China, Jordan, Malaysia and Tanzania.  Canada, 
the United Kingdom and the United States fall toward the middle of this list, ranking 
32, 41 and 45, respectively.  This was unexpected. 
INSERT TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE. 
To explore what may be driving these seemingly odd rankings, individual 
rankings of each of the three indicators (i.e., confidence in the civil services, 
                                                 
53 Interaction terms of the legitimacy variables and Autocratic were created and added to the models 




confidence in the national government and confidence in the justice system) are 
presented in Table 15.  The people of Vietnam, China and Bangladesh have the most 
confidence in their government and civil services; Vietnam and China also have high 
confidence in the justice system.  Uganda and Rwanda, countries known for 
genocide, have high confidence in the views of legality measures, too.  Peru, 
Argentina, Lithuania and Macedonia fall toward the bottom of each confidence 
ranking.  Greece, recently in the news for financial issues, ranks 79th in confidence in 
civil services and 46th in confidence in the justice system (no value was recorded by 
the WVS for confidence in the national government).  Norway, Finland and Denmark 
rank in the top ten confidence in the justice system, and Sweden ranks tenth in 
confidence in the civil services.  Western countries (e.g., Canada, France, the United 
Kingdom) fall toward the middle of these rankings.  For example, the Netherlands 
ranks 65th in confidence in civil services, 64th in confidence in the government and 
45th in confidence in the justice system. 
INSERT TABLE 15 ABOUT HERE. 
Taking these rankings into consideration and thinking back to the possible 
error introduced by methods to replace missing values, perhaps the best way to 
capture confidence is by taking the average of the three variables for each country.  
Because these three variables are highly correlated, giving each variable an equal 
weight is acceptable.54  Taking the average confidence score for each country 
preserves the interpretation and may be a better way to deal with missing data 
(instead of mean substitution or multiple imputation, both of which introduce 
                                                 
54 Confidence in civil services is highly correlated with confidence in government (r= 0.742) and with 
confidence in the justice system (r= 0.730).  Confidence in government also is strongly correlated with 




unknown error).  Accordingly, the confidence variables were combined into one 
variable (“Mean State Confidence”) representing the mean of confidence in the civil 
services, the government and the justice system ( x = 48.434, median= 46.842, s= 
16.885); the combined rankings are presented in Table 16.  This new “Mean State 
Confidence” variable is used in analyses. 
INSERT TABLE 16 ABOUT HERE. 
The rankings of the other legitimacy indicators are presented in Tables 16, 17 
and 18.  Croatia, Vietnam, Colombia, China and Morocco have the highest number of 
Refugees (see Table 17); while Vietnam and China are among the “most legitimate” 
by the Mean State Confidence (see Table 16), they are among the “least legitimate” 
according to the Refugees indicator.  Turning to the next legitimacy indicator, the 
percentage of citizens who believe cheating on taxes is never justifiable (see Table 
18) is highest in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, Ethiopia and Indonesia; again, the 
Nordic countries fall toward the middle of the ranking.  Similarly, the percentage of 
citizens who report they would never protest (see Table 18) is highest in Guatemala, 
Jordan, Pakistan, Thailand, Egypt, and Vietnam, outranking Finland (ranked 31), 
Switzerland (ranked 58), Denmark (ranked 64), and Norway (ranked 72).  These 
rankings imply low face validity for each indicator; further validity tests confirm the 
low validity of these indicators, as the Mean State Confidence variable is more highly 
correlated with Population Density (r= 0.241) than with Not Corrupt (r= 0.097).  
INSERT TABLE 17 ABOUT HERE. 




Recall that these variables (with the exception of Refugees) are survey 
measures.  While some of these countries (e.g., Uganda, Rwanda) achieve 
unexpectedly high legitimacy, this could be due to citizens socialized to support the 
government.  Countries like Uganda and Rwanda may not have international 
legitimacy, but seem to have within-country legitimacy.  Western countries may be 
more critical of the government because citizens have more freedom of speech.  
Whether there is something else at play is outside the scope of this dissertation, but is 
an interesting question for scholars to explore.  Because this dissertation relies on 
citizens’ views of state legitimacy instead of outsiders’ opinions, the legitimacy 
indicators (i.e., Mean State Confidence, Refugees, Against Tax Fraud, Never Protest) 
were used in the analyses that follow. 
Predictors of the Proportion of Terrorist Attacks on Police 
Multicollinearity 
Before reporting the results of the regression models, the bivariate correlation 
matrix was reviewed to assess possible multicollinearity among the predictor 
variables (see Table 19).  Most important, the police legitimacy variable is highly 
correlated with the Mean State Confidence variable (r= 0.706).  Accordingly, police 
legitimacy is included in models separate from the state legitimacy variables. 
INSERT TABLE 19 ABOUT HERE. 
Among the control variables, the highest correlation is between GDP and Not 
Corrupt (r= 0.866), indicating possible collinearity.  GDP also is moderately 




Homicide (r= -0.394).  Because of these relatively high correlations, GDP is removed 
from the models reported below and any differences with GDP are noted.  
Additionally, Gini Index and Homicide also are highly correlated (r= 0.687).  Models 
are run with and without each variable, and any differences are noted. 
Proportion of attacks on police 
The first set of Tobit models uses the dependent variable measuring the 
proportion of terrorist attacks against police; these results are presented in Table 20.55  
Model 1 includes only Confidence in Police (the proxy for police legitimacy).56  
While the coefficient is in the predicted direction (i.e., the proportion of terrorist 
attacks on police increases when the percent of citizens who have confidence in the 
police decreases), the relationship likely is due to chance alone ( β̂ = -0.0009, t=  
-0.078, p= 0.219).57  The CLAD analysis, which has less restrictive assumptions than 
Tobit regression, confirms this finding ( β̂ = -0.0006, s x = 0.0009, t= -0.699, p> 0.05, 
n= 80). 
INSERT TABLE 20 ABOUT HERE. 
                                                 
55 The Tobit model assumptions – namely, that the errors are normal and homoskedastic (Long, 1997) 
– seem to be met in models using the proportion of terrorist attacks on police as the dependent 
variable, despite its skew.  Both the Breuch-Pagan test and White’s test indicate homoskedasticity in 
all models using the proportion of terrorist attacks on the police as the dependent variable.  Inspection 
of the distribution of the error terms and the normal probability plot indicate the error terms are mound 
shaped with a slight skew to the right for models using either dependent variable.  However, models 
using the proportion of fatal terrorist attacks against police as the dependent variable violate the 
assumption of homoskedasticity.  Accordingly, I remain cautious while interpreting the hypothesis 
tests. 
56 The Stata command craggit was used to compute Cragg’s model with Tobit, which is nested 
within Cragg’s double-hurdle model (see Burke, 2009).  The results suggested Tobit analysis is 
identical to Cragg’s (1971) alternative, and therefore Tobit is appropriate for Model 1. 
57 To test for a nonlinear relationship, Confidence in Police was squared.  With the inclusion of this 
squared term, the sign of the Confidence in Police variable switched direction, becoming positive ( β̂ = 
0.0094, t= 1.44).  Both the Confidence in Police variable and its squared term ( β̂ = -0.0001, t= -1.59) 




Model 2 again considers this relationship, but includes the control variables.58  
Again, there is no significant relationship between police legitimacy and the 
proportion of terrorist attacks on police ( β̂ = 0.0009, t= 0.061, p= 0.272), but notice 
that the sign of the coefficient switches.  The Gini Index coefficient ( β̂ = 0.0083, t= 
2.34, p= 0.011) and Not Corrupt ( β̂ = -0.0274, t= -1.72, p= 0.045) reach significance 
in the expected direction.  For each unit increase on the economic inequality scale, the 
proportion of terrorist attacks on police is expected to increase by 0.0042 units, 
holding all other variables constant.59  Similarly, for each additional unit increase on 
the corruption scale (approaching less corruption), the proportion of terrorist attacks 
on police is expected to decrease by 0.0139, controlling for other variables.  
(Homicide also would approach significance in a two-tailed test, as its sign is in the 
opposite direction than that predicted: the higher the homicide rate in a country, the 
smaller proportion of terrorist attacks against police.)  Additionally, Interstate War 
approaches significance ( β̂ = 0.1020, t= 0.57, p= 0.065): states involved in wars with 
other states have a higher proportion of terrorist attacks on police than states not 
involved in war.60 
                                                 
58 Tobit analysis is appropriate for Model 2, as a comparison to Cragg’s double-hurdle model indicated 
non-significant differences.   
59 To interpret these results, the Tobit coefficients are multiplied by the average predicted probability 
of being uncensored.  For this model, the average predicted probability of being uncensored is 0.5060. 
60 Including GDP in this model, all coefficients remain the same, but the standard error of Not Corrupt 
increases (from 0.015 to 0.022).  Gini Index and Homicide remain significant predictors of the 
proportion of terrorist attacks directed against the police and Interstate War remains marginally 
significant (p= 0.064), but Not Corrupt is no longer significant (p= 0.109).  Without Gini Index (and 
excluding GDP), Not Corrupt remains significant and Interstate War remains marginally significant.  
Interestingly, the coefficient for Homicide decreases (from -0.0044 to -0.0005); consequently, 
Homicide is no longer significant.  On the other hand, the coefficient for Death Penalty increases (from 
0.0259 to 0.0703), and Death Penalty becomes marginally significant (p= 0.09).  Including Gini Index 
but removing Homicide (and excluding GDP) the Gini Index coefficient decreases (from 0.0083 to 




This model was replicated using CLAD, but would not converge with the 
inclusion of several control variables (regime type measures, Interstate War and 
Population Density).  This may be due to collinearity, but none of the correlations 
was greater than r= 0.15.  Nevertheless, these variables were excluded in the CLAD 
robustness check.61  CLAD results are based on a sample of 50 cases, and no variable 
was significant.  Specifically, the Gini Index ( β̂ = 0.0028, s x = 0.0068, t= 0.42, p> 
0.05) and Not Corrupt ( β̂ = -0.0194, s x = 0.0315, t= -0.61, p> 0.05) no longer 
reached statistical significance, which may be expected given the smaller sample size 
and lower statistical power.  The signs of the coefficients of each variable remained 
the same in the CLAD model as they were in the Tobit model.  The magnitude of the 
coefficients was smaller in the CLAD model than in the Tobit model (except for Not 
Corrupt, which was approximately the same in the CLAD model as in the Tobit 
model), and CLAD produced larger standard errors.  Confidence in Police, for 
example, failed to reach significance using either statistical test, with the CLAD 
model having a smaller coefficient and larger standard error ( β̂ = 0.0003, s x = 
0.0026, p> 0.05) than the Tobit model including the same predictor variables ( β̂ = 
0.0004, s x = 0.0014, p> 0.05). 
Model 3 adds the other possible explanations: Societal Schism, Foreign 
Military Presence and opportunity to attack police (measured by Police Per Capita).62  
                                                                                                                                           
Corrupt increases, making it marginally significant (instead of significant), and the p-value for 
Interstate War decreases, making it significant (instead of marginally significant). 
61 A Tobit regression analysis was performed without these variables.  Gini Index remained significant, 
but Not Corrupt did not.  Additionally, Civil War became marginally significant, as its coefficient 
increased and standard error decreased.  No other substantive differences emerged. 
62 Again, Tobit analysis is appropriate here, as a comparison to Cragg’s double-hurdle model indicated 




Again, the sign of the police legitimacy variable is in the opposite direction (i.e., 
greater citizen confidence in police leads to a higher proportion of terrorist attacks on 
police) and remains insignificant – although the p-value ( β̂ = 0.0019, t= 1.27, p= 
0.105) moves closer to a p< 0.10 cutoff.63  The CLAD estimator confirmed these 
results ( β̂ = 0.0011, s x = 0.0039, t= 0.27, p> 0.05).  As shown in Table 20, two of the 
three alternative explanations significantly predict the proportion of terrorist attacks 
on police: the proportion of terrorist attacks directed against police is expected to 
increase by 0.0124 with each unit increase on the Societal Schism scale, holding all 
else constant ( β̂ = 0.0248, t= 2.22, p= 0.015) and by 0.0642 when countries have a 
foreign military on their soil, controlling for all other variables ( β̂ = 0.1286, t= 2.48, 
p= 0.008).64  Again, the Gini Index is significant ( β̂ = 0.0630, t= 1.84, p= 0.036), 
indicating that for each unit increase in relative deprivation, the proportion of terrorist 
attacks on police is expected to increase by 0.0314, holding all else constant.  Not 
Corrupt ( β̂ = -0.0101, t= -0.64, p= 0.261) and Interstate War ( β̂ = 0.0308, t= 0.46, p= 
0.322) are no longer significant (p< 0.10) predictors. 
Again, CLAD would not converge with the inclusion of four variables (regime 
type measures, Interstate War and Population Density); CLAD was run without these 
                                                                                                                                           
GDP.  When Gini Index is excluded (also without GDP), Homicide loses significance.  When 
Homicide is excluded (also without GDP), Gini index just loses significance (p= 0.102).  It also is 
interesting to note that when Regional Terrorism and GDP are excluded from the model, police 
legitimacy is significant at p< 0.10; the same is true when Civil War and GDP are excluded from the 
model. 
63 With the squared police legitimacy term in the model, the coefficient of Confidence in Police would 
have approached significance had the sign been in the expected direction ( β̂ = 0.0085, t= 1.37, p= 
0.087).  The squared term failed to reach significance ( β̂ = -0.0001, t= -1.10). 
64 As in the previous models, the Tobit coefficients are multiplied by the average predicted probability 
of being uncensored so that the results can be interpreted.  For this model, the average predicted 




variables.  No variable reached statistical significance using the CLAD estimator – 
but the sample was reduced to 45 observations in the CLAD analysis, which may 
have affected the findings.  With the exception of Death Penalty which remained 
approximately the same, the coefficients were smaller in magnitude in CLAD than in 
Tobit calculated with the same variables, and all of the standard errors were larger in 
CLAD.  Interestingly, the sign of the Regional Terrorism and Death Penalty 
coefficients switched direction: Regional Terrorism became positive in CLAD and 
Death Penalty became negative in CLAD.  Recall the sample was reduced by almost 
half using CLAD, which may account for these differences. 
In the interest of parsimony, irrelevant variables are systematically removed 
from the model according to the following process.  The p-values were very high for 
Regional Terrorism and Population Density, suggesting these variables are unrelated 
to the proportion of terrorist attacks on police.  An F-test indicated these two 
variables add nothing to the model (F(2,1000)= 0.02, p= 0.982).  Also, recall that 
Regional Terrorism is a measure of violence, which is covered by other variables in 
the model (i.e., Civil War, Interstate War, Homicide, and Death Penalty).  Population 
Density is a control variable; it is not theoretically relevant.  Accordingly, Regional 
Terrorism and Population Density were removed from the model.  Like Population 
Density, Not Corrupt is used as a control variable.  Interestingly, Not Corrupt is 
moderately correlated with Confidence in Police (r= 0.5595), with Homicide (r=  
-0.3982), with Foreign Military Presence (r= -0.3800), with the Gini Index (r=  
-0.3784), with Anocracy (r= -0.3693), with Societal Schism (r= -0.3498) and with the 




multicollinearity here.  Additionally, there are several measures of violence that may 
be excluded from the model.  Homicide seems to be the only violence measure that 
contributes to understanding the proportion of terrorist attacks against the police, as 
removing it slightly alters some results (see Footnotes 60 and 62).  Civil War, 
Interstate War, the Death Penalty and Not Corrupt can be removed, as they do not 
contribute to the model (F(4,1000)= 0.56, p= 0.689). 
Model 4 presents the results of the more parsimonious model.65  There is little 
change in the value of the coefficients and in the standard errors; consequently the 
substantive results remain the same: greater societal schism, the presence of a foreign 
military and greater relative deprivation increase the proportion of terrorist attacks 
against police.  This is interesting because without GDP and either Regional 
Terrorism or Civil War, police legitimacy approaches significance (see Footnote 62); 
removing these and other control variables in Model 4 did not produce the same 
results.  In other words, police legitimacy had no significant influence on the 
proportion of terrorist attacks on police.  The CLAD estimator – using a sample size 
of 55 – again found no statistically significant variables; Foreign Military Presence 
and the regime type variables had to be excluded from the model to achieve 
convergence.  (Tobit analysis on Model 4 excluding Foreign Military Presence and 
the regime type variables produced the same substantive results as those shown in 
Table 20; that is, Societal Schism and relative deprivation remained significant 
                                                 
65 Comparing Tobit to Cragg’s double-hurdle model indicated significant differences between the two, 
suggesting Cragg’s double-hurdle model is more appropriate.  According to Cragg’s alternative, only 
Societal Schism and Foreign Military Presence (but not relative deprivation) are significant on the first 
tier, indicating these variables impact whether a country experienced a terrorist attack targeting police 




predictors of the proportion of terrorist attacks against the police, while police 
legitimacy did not.) 
Taken together, these results suggest that police legitimacy (as measured by 
Confidence in Police) may not affect the proportion of terrorist attacks on police.  
Two of the alternative explanations – Societal Schism and Foreign Military Presence 
– were significant in every Tobit model (but no variables reached significance in the 
CLAD models, which may be due to the low power produced by the small sample 
sizes of the CLAD analyses).  Additionally, relative deprivation (as measured by the 
Gini Index) also seems to be important in the Tobit models (although not in CLAD).  
Overall, we should not yet discount the first hypothesis; hypotheses 3 and 4 receive 
some support by these results. 
Table 21 presents the second set of models using the dependent variable 
measuring the proportion of terrorist attacks against police.  Instead of police 
legitimacy, these models use the state legitimacy indicators.  Model 5 shows the 
results including only the state legitimacy indicators to predict the proportion of 
terrorist attacks on police.66  While the signs of the Mean State Confidence ( β̂ =  
-0.0012, t= -0.87, p= 0.193) and the number of Refugees ( β̂ = 0.0001, t= 0.20, p= 
0.423) are in the expected direction, Against Tax Fraud ( β̂ = 0.0004, t= 0.22, p= 
0.412) and Never Protest ( β̂ = 0.0008, t= 0.64, p= 0.264) are in the opposite direction 
than that predicted.  Similar to the analyses using Confidence in Police, the state 
legitimacy indicators also are not significant predictors of the proportion of terrorist 
attacks on police in these one-tailed tests.  CLAD analysis confirms these results.  
                                                 




While the magnitude of the coefficients and standard errors are higher on each state 
legitimacy indicator using the CLAD estimator, none reaches statistical significance. 
Control variables are added to Model 6.67  With the exception of Refugees, all 
of the state legitimacy indicators are in the predicted direction, but the only 
significant indicator is the percentage of citizens who would never protest ( β̂ =  
-0.0028, t= -1.74, p= 0.044).  For each additional percent of the population who 
would never protest, the proportion of terrorist attacks on police is expected to 
decrease by 0.0014 units, holding all other variables constant.68  However, none of 
the state legitimacy indicators were significant in the CLAD analysis; in fact, the sign 
of the coefficients of all state legitimacy indicators, except Mean State Confidence, 
switched.  That said, the results of the CLAD analysis should be interpreted with 
caution, as the sample size was reduced from 82 to 38 observations.  Similar to the 
previous set of results, relative deprivation (as measured by the Gini Index) is 
significant in Model 6 ( β̂ = 0.0105, t= 2.80, p= 0.0035): for each unit increase 
(approaching inequality) on the Gini Index, the proportion of terrorist attacks against 
the police is expected to increase by 0.0053, holding all else constant.  (It should be 
noted that Homicide would approach significance in a two-tailed test, as its sign is in 
the opposite direction than that predicted.)  In this model, Not Corrupt approaches 
significance ( β̂ = -0.0210, t= -1.83, p= 0.0665).69  However, these variables were no 
                                                 
67 According to a comparison with Cragg’s alternative, Tobit is acceptable.  There were no significant 
differences between analytical methods. 
68 For Model 6, the average predicted probability of being uncensored is 0.5024. 
69 When GDP is included in the model, Not Corrupt is no longer marginally significant.  Also, recall 
that there may be concerns of a possible tautology by including Never Protest.  Model 6 remains 
substantively the same without Never Protest, except Interstate War approaches significance ( β̂ = 




longer significant in the CLAD analysis.  CLAD would not converge with the regime 
type variables and Population Density in the model.  With these variables excluded, 
Death Penalty reached significance in the direction opposite of that predicted ( β̂ =  
-0.0971, s x = 0.1389, t= -0.70, p< 0.05).  (Tobit analysis run with the same variables 
excluded produced the same substantive results as those Tobit results reported for 
Model 6 above.)  Again, the CLAD analysis should be interpreted with caution, as the 
sample size was reduced to 38. 
The other explanations (societal schism, presence of a foreign military and 
opportunity to attack police) are added in Model 7.70  The coefficient of Mean State 
Confidence increases slightly and its standard error decreases; however, with the 
exception of Never Protest, none of the state legitimacy indicators are significant.  
Never Protest remains significant and the magnitude of its coefficient increases ( β̂ =  
-0.0033); Gini Index also remains significant, but the magnitude of its coefficient 
decreases ( β̂ = 0.0089).  Not Corrupt is no longer marginally significant, but Civil 
War is ( β̂ = 0.0888, t= 1.40, p= 0.083).  Similar to the previous set of models, 
Societal Schism and the Foreign Military Presence are significant.  For each unit 
increase on the societal schism scale, the proportion of terrorist attacks directed 
against the police is expected to increase by 0.1234 units, controlling for the other 
variables.71  Similarly, the presence of a foreign military on a country’s soil is 
expected to increase the proportion of terrorist attacks on police by 0.0654, holding 
                                                 
70 Again, Tobit is appropriate to use (compared to Cragg’s alternative). 




all else constant.72  Checking this model with the CLAD estimates was fruitless, 
considering the sample size was reduced from 82 to 27 and the model would not 
converge with the inclusion of Interstate War and Not Corrupt.  Similar to Tobit 
models, Societal Schism ( β̂ = 0.0433, s x = 0.0266, t= 1.63, p< 0.05) reached 
significance using the CLAD estimator; Foreign Military Presence ( β̂ = -0.1423, s x = 
0.1324, t= -1.07, p< 0.05) would reach significance in a two-tailed test, as its 
coefficient sign switched direction to that opposite of what was predicted.  Unlike 
earlier results, the CLAD estimator found Mean State Confidence ( β̂ = -0.0041, s x = 
0.0036, t= -1.15, p< 0.05), Against Tax Fraud ( β̂ = -0.0055, s x = 0.0048, t= -1.15, p< 
0.05) and Regional Terrorism ( β̂ =0.00003, s x = 0.00003, t= 0.97, p< 0.05) important 
predictors of the proportion of terrorist attacks against the police.  Again, these 
CLAD results should be taken with a grain of salt, given the small sample size. 
For the sake of parsimony, the bivariate correlation matrix again was 
scrutinized.  (See Table 19.)  Focusing specifically on the correlations with the state 
legitimacy indicators, the highest correlations were between Never Protest and Death 
Penalty (r= 0.4392), Mean State Confidence and Regional Terrorism (r= 0.4206), 
Never Protest and Gini Index (r= 0.4052), Mean State Confidence and Police Per 
Capita (r= -0.3803), Never Protest and Autocracy (r= 0.3783), Never Protest and Not 
Corrupt (r= -0.3587), Refugees and Autocracy (r= 0.3051), Never Protest and 
                                                 
72 There are no substantive differences with or without GDP.  When Never Protest is excluded from the 
model, the only difference is that Civil War no longer approaches significance.  Only Societal Schism 
and Foreign Military Presence remain significant when the Gini Index variable is removed from the 
model.  Removing Homicide or Population Density decreases the coefficient and slightly decreases the 
standard error of Civil War, making it insignificant.  Otherwise, there are no substantive changes.  No 
matter what variables are included or excluded, Societal Schism and Foreign Military Presence remain 




Regional Terrorism (r= 0.3279), and Against Tax Fraud and Regional Terrorism (r= 
0.3051).  A series of F-tests were conducted to determine which sets of control 
variables contributed the least to the model.  After exploring these results, the regime 
variables (Autocracy and Anocracy), several violence measures (Interstate War, 
Regional Terrorism, and Death Penalty), and the control variables (Not Corrupt and 
Population Density) were removed (F(7,1000)= 0.25, p= 0.9716).  Model 8 presents 
the results of the parsimonious model.73  As expected, Never Protest, Societal Schism, 
Foreign Military Presence, and relative deprivation (as measured by the Gini Index) 
remained significant.74  Civil War became significant ( β̂ = 0.0894, t= 0.168, p= 
0.0485).75  (Homicide would be significant in a two-tailed test, as its sign is in the 
opposite direction than predicted.) 
INSERT TABLE 21 ABOUT HERE. 
In summary, one state legitimacy indicator (Never Protest) approached 
significance in several Tobit models where control variables were included, offering 
                                                 
73 Cragg’s double-hurdle model is preferable to Tobit, as there are significant differences between the 
two analytical methods.  According to Cragg’s alternative, Foreign Military Presence and Societal 
Schism are significant predictors and Never Protest and Gini Index are marginally significant 
predictors of whether a state experienced a terrorist attack targeting the police.  (Mean State 
Confidence, Refugees and Homicide would be marginally significant in a two-tailed test.)  However, 
no variable significantly predicted the expected value of a terrorist attack against the police, given that 
an attack occurred. 
74 Interestingly, without Gini Index, Never Protest is no longer significant, and Civil War becomes 
marginally significant ( β̂ = 0.0820, t= 1.26, p= 0.071).  Excluding Homicide reduces Never Protest 
and Gini Index to marginal significance ( β̂ = -0.0018, t= -1.35, p= 0.0905 and β̂ = 0.0040, t= 1.57, p= 
0.061, respectively); Against Tax Fraud switches signs ( β̂ = 0.0002, t= 0.14, p= 0.4435), but it remains 
insignificant.  There are no other substantive changes aside from those mentioned – in other words, 
Societal Schism and Foreign Military Presence are always significant (p< 0.05). 
75 When Never Protest is excluded from the model, the only substantive change is that both the 
coefficient and standard error of Civil War decrease, making this variable marginally significant ( β̂ = 




some support to hypothesis 2.76  Additionally, societal schism and presence of a 
foreign military again were significant in the expected direction for all Tobit models.  
Accordingly, hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4 were confirmed.  Among the control 
variables, relative deprivation was most consistent, approaching significance in most 
Tobit models.  The next section confirms whether these results are upheld with 
another measure of terrorist attacks on police: proportion of fatal terrorist attacks 
directed against police. 
Proportion of fatal attacks on police 
Recall that a danger in using media reports to collect data (as the GTD does) 
is the possibility that some events may not be covered.  To increase the likelihood that 
the terrorist event was reported by the media and, in turn, included in the GTD, the 
next set of models replicates Models 1-8, but using the proportion of fatal terrorist 
attacks targeted against police as the dependent variable.  Results of the Tobit 
analyses are reported in Table 22.  The CLAD estimator would not converge with any 
model with this dependent variable.  Accordingly, only the Tobit results are discussed 
for the rest of this section.  However, because these Tobit models violate the 
assumption of homoskedasticity (see Footnote 55), these results should be interpreted 
with caution. 
                                                 
76 To determine whether a nonlinear relationship exists between the state legitimacy indicators and the 
proportion of terrorist attacks against the police, Mean State Confidence, Against Tax Fraud and Never 
Protest each were squared and added to the models reported.  None of the results changed with the 
inclusion of these squared terms; in other words, there is no relationship – linear or nonlinear – 




Following the analyses for the other dependent variable, Model 9 includes 
only the police legitimacy measure.77  Here, police legitimacy (measured as 
Confidence in Police) is significant in the expected direction ( β̂ = -0.0039, t= -1.94, 
p= 0.028).  For each additional percent of citizens who have at least some confidence 
in the police, the proportion of fatal terrorist attacks directed at the police is expected 
to decrease by 0.0014.78 
INSERT TABLE 22 ABOUT HERE. 
However, this relationship did not hold when control variables were added in 
Model 10.79  In fact, the sign changes direction ( β̂ = 0.0006, t= 0.29, p= 0.3855).  
Similar to earlier models, relative deprivation (as measured by the Gini Index) is 
significant ( β̂ = 0.0179, t= 3.01, p= 0.002); for each unit increase on the Gini Index 
(toward perfect economic inequality), the proportion of fatal terrorist attacks against 
police is expected to increase by 0.0064.80  (Homicide also would reach significance 
in a two-tailed test, as its sign is in the opposite direction than that predicted.)  
Interstate War and Not Corrupt are significant predictors ( β̂ = 0.2388, t= 2.17, p= 
0.0165 and β̂ = -0.0894, t= -3.13, p= 0.0015, respectively).  Involvement in war with 
other countries increases the expected proportion of fatal terrorist attacks on police by 
0.0858, holding all else constant.  Each unit increase on Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index (approaching corruption-less states) is expected to 
                                                 
77 Tobit was not significantly different from Cragg’s alternative and is acceptable to use here. 
78 Similar to the previous set of models, the Tobit coefficients are multiplied by the average predicted 
probability of being uncensored so that the results can be interpreted.  For Model 9, the average 
predicted probability of being uncensored is 0.3631. 
79 Cragg’s alternative is comparable to Tobit, so the latter is used here. 




decrease the proportion of fatal terrorist attacks against police by 0.0321 unit, 
controlling for the other variables.  (In a two-tailed test, this model would indicate 
that, on average, both autocratic governments and anocratic governments have lower 
proportions of fatal terrorist attacks on police, compared to democratic governments, 
holding all else constant ( β̂ = -0.1892, t= -1.32, p= 0.0950 and β̂ = -0.1681, t= -1.79, 
p= 0.0390, respectively)). 
Because police legitimacy and Not Corrupt are moderately correlated (r= 
0.5586), Model 10 was run without Not Corrupt (results not shown).  Interestingly, 
police legitimacy again is significant ( β̂ = -0.0039, t= -1.92, p= 0.0295) when Not 
Corrupt is removed from Model 10.  Specifically, for each additional percent of 
citizens who have at least some confidence in police, the proportion of fatal terrorist 
attacks against the police is expected to decrease by 0.0014, holding all else 
constant.81  Removing Not Corrupt affects other variables, too.  Regime type no 
longer reaches significance.  Interstate War is not significant; instead, Civil War 
becomes an important predictor of fatal attacks on police ( β̂ = 0.1187, t= 1.89, p= 
0.0315).  Gini Index remains significant.  The effect of Not Corrupt seems to be 
limited to this dependent variable; removing Not Corrupt from Model 2 (using the 
proportion of fatal and nonfatal terrorist attacks on the police as the dependent 
variable) produced no substantive differences from the results reported in Table 20. 
The alternative explanations are added to Model 11.82  These results tell a 
similar story: police legitimacy does not seem to influence the proportion of fatal 
                                                 
81 For Model 10 excluding Not Corrupt, the average predicted probability of being uncensored is 
0.3516. 




terrorist attacks against police and, again, the sign is in the opposite direction 
(removing Not Corrupt produced no substantive changes like those in Model 10).  On 
the other hand, Societal Schism ( β̂ = 0.0768, t= 2.91, p= 0.0000), Foreign Military 
Presence ( β̂ = 0.1023, t= 1.54, p= 0.064), relative deprivation ( β̂ = 0.0161, t= 2.97, 
p= 0.0020) and Not Corrupt ( β̂ = -0.0640, t= -2.53, p= 0.0070) significantly influence 
the proportion of fatal attacks on police, as predicted. 83  For each unit increase in 
societal schism, the proportion of fatal attacks on police is expected to increase by 
0.0275, holding all else constant.  The presence of a foreign military is expected to 
increase the proportion of fatal attacks on police by 0.0366, controlling for all other 
variables.84  (Homicide also would be significant, if this were a two-tailed test; states 
with more homicides have a smaller proportion of fatal terrorist attacks directed 
toward police.)85 
                                                 
83 Interestingly, when Autocracy is removed, the coefficient of Foreign Military Presence decreases 
(but its standard error remains the same), and it no longer is marginally significant.  Societal Schism, 
Gini Index and Not Corrupt remain significant.  (Homicide still would be significant in a two-tailed 
test, as its sign is in the opposite direction.)  The coefficient of Civil War increases (accompanied by a 
slight increase in its standard error), moving it close to significance (p= 0.1035), and the Death Penalty 
becomes marginally significant (p= 0.066).  When Anocracy is removed, there are no substantive 
differences. 
84 The average predicted probability of being uncensored in Model 11 is 0.3576. 
85 Recall that Gini Index and Homicide are correlated (r= 0.6868), so models were run excluding each 
variable.  Without Gini Index, Societal Schism and Not Corrupt remain significant and Foreign 
Military Presence remains marginally significant.  (Homicide becomes only marginally significant – in 
the opposite direction.)  The coefficient of police legitimacy drops quite a bit; it remains insignificant.  
(If the predictions were opposite or if these were two-tailed tests, both regime type and Population 
Density would matter, as the signs of the coefficients are in directions opposite of that predicted.  
Compared to democracies, both autocratic and anocratic governments have lower proportions of fatal 
terrorist attacks on police ( β̂ = -0.2036, t= -1.49, p(one-tailed)= 0.0700 and β̂ = -0.1573, t= -1.70,  
p(one-tailed)= 0.0470, respectively).  Countries with larger population densities have fewer fatal terrorist 
attacks targeting the police ( β̂ = -0.0003, t= 1.40, p(one-tailed)= 0.0825).)  Removing Homicide increases 
the coefficient and standard error of Foreign Military Presence, but it remains only marginally 
significant ( β̂ = 0.1200, t= 1.63, p= 0.054).  Gini Index’s coefficient decreases (from 0.016 to 0.006), 
as does its standard error, making Gini Index only marginally significant (p= 0.098).  Not Corrupt 
remains significant, although the magnitude of its coefficient decreased (from -0.0640 to -0.0471).  No 




In the interest of parsimony, several irrelevant variables were removed.  A 
series of F-tests indicated that the regime type variables (i.e., Autocracy and 
Anocracy), two violence measures (i.e., Regional Terrorism and Death Penalty) and 
Population Density did not contribute much to the model (F(5,1000)= 1.22, p= 
0.2988).  These variables were removed in Model 12, the parsimonious model.86  
Removing the irrelevant variables from the model produced no substantive changes in 
the independent variables.  The coefficient of Confidence in Police ( β̂ = 0.0006, t= 
0.28, p= 0.3915) is similar to the coefficient in Model 10 (police legitimacy plus 
control variables) and does not influence the proportion of fatal attacks on police.  
Societal Schism still is significant ( β̂ = 0.0742, t= 3.91, p= 0.0000) and Foreign 
Military Presence remains marginally significant ( β̂ = 0.1017, t= 1.48, p= 0.0715).  
The magnitude of the Not Corrupt coefficient decreases by half ( β̂ = -0.0362, t=  
-1.62, p= 0.0550); it is now marginally significant.  (Homicide still would be 
significant in a two-tailed test, as its sign remains in the opposite direction.)  While 
removing Not Corrupt in Model 10 allowed a significant relationship between police 
legitimacy and the proportion of fatal attacks on police, it does not have the same 
impact in this parsimonious model.  In fact, the only substantive effect of removing 
Not Corrupt from Model 12 is that Civil War becomes significant (p= 0.027). 
The final set of models uses the state legitimacy indicators to measure 
legitimacy instead of the Confidence in Police variable, still using the proportion of 
fatal terrorist attacks on police as the dependent variable.  (See Table 23.)  The only 
important state legitimacy indicator was the Mean State Confidence, which was 
                                                 




marginally significant ( β̂ = -0.0033, t= -1.36, p= 0.0885).87  For each additional 
percent of Mean State Confidence, the proportion of fatal terrorist attacks directed 
against the police is expected to decrease by 0.0012, holding all else constant.88  
Notably, an F-test failed to reach significance (F(4,1000)= 0.71, p= 0.5841), 
indicating these state legitimacy alone do not contribute much to understanding the 
proportion of fatal terrorist attacks directed against the police. 
INSERT TABLE 23 ABOUT HERE. 
Control variables are added to Model 14, and the marginally significant 
relationship between the Mean State Confidence and fatal attacks on police 
disappears.89  Notably, the sign of the Mean State Confidence coefficient switches 
direction and is no longer marginally significant.90  While the sign of the Refugee 
coefficient is in the expected direction, it is not significant, nor is the percent of 
people who are Against Tax Fraud (the sign of this coefficient is in the opposite 
direction of that predicted).  Only one legitimacy indicator is significant and in the 
expected direction: Never Protest.  For each additional percent of citizens who report 
they would never protest, the proportion of fatal terrorist attacks against the police is 
expected to decrease by 0.0022.91  (Interestingly, when Not Corrupt is removed, 
Mean State Confidence approaches significance ( β̂ = -0.0035, t= -1.45, p= 0.076) and 
                                                 
87 The Tobit model was not significantly different from Cragg’s alternative, indicating Tobit is 
acceptable here.  Removing Never Protest slightly decreases both the coefficient and standard error of 
Mean State Confidence, but this variable remains marginally significant.  There are no substantive 
changes when Never Protest is excluded from the model. 
88 The average predicted probability of being uncensored for this model is 0.3626. 
89 Tobit and Cragg’s double-hurdle model were not significantly different, suggesting Tobit is 
acceptable here. 
90 Without Never Protest, the sign of Mean State Confidence is in the expected direction, but still not 
significant.  The only substantive change to Model 14 without Never Protest is that Civil War is no 
longer significant. 




Never Protest remains significant.)92  Relative deprivation is significant, as is Not 
Corrupt.  (Homicide would be significant in a two-tailed test, as its sign is in the 
opposite direction: countries with a higher homicide rate have lower proportions of 
fatal attacks on police.)  For each unit increase on the Gini Index (approaching perfect 
inequality), the proportion of fatal terrorist attacks against the police is expected to 
increase by 0.0077, holding all else constant.93  For each unit increase on the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (approaching less corruption), the proportion of fatal 
attacks on police is expected to decrease by 0.0310, holding all else constant.  (If this 
was a two-tailed test or if the expected direction were opposite, regime type would 
matter – specifically Anocracy approaches significance.  Compared with democratic 
regimes, autocratic states have a lower proportion of fatal attacks on police.)  War 
also is important, as Civil War is marginally significant (p< 0.10) and Interstate War 
reaches significance (p< 0.05).  Controlling for the other variables in the model, 
involvement in civil wars and wars with other states is expected to increase the 
proportion of fatal terrorist attacks targeting police by 0.0509 and 0.0732, 
respectively.  These results also are presented in Table 23.94 
Model 15 also includes the alternative explanations (societal schism, presence 
of a foreign military and opportunity, measured by Police Per Capita); results are 
                                                 
92 The only other change to the results when Not Corrupt is removed from the model is that Interstate 
War (and Anocracy) is no longer significant. 
93 Without Gini Index, the magnitude of the coefficient of Never Protest decreases by half and this 
variable becomes only marginally significant ( β̂ = -0.0036, p= 0.0685).  Civil War is no longer 
significant (nor is Homicide, although the coefficient remains negative) and the Death Penalty 
coefficient increases, approaching significance ( β̂ = 0.1335, p= 0.0615).  Removing Homicide, which 
is correlated with Gini Index (r= 0.6868), produces no substantive changes to the results. 




displayed in Table 23.95  Mean State Confidence still is not significant, and the sign 
of the coefficient is in the opposite direction than that predicted ( β̂ = 0.0007, t= 0.31, 
p= 0.3805).96  The sign for Refugees switches, opposite of that predicted; it, too, 
remains insignificant ( β̂ = -0.0003, t= -0.62, p= 0.2695).  Similar to Model 14, the 
sign of the coefficient of Against Tax Fraud is opposite of that predicted, which is a 
moot point as this variable does not reach significance ( β̂ = -0.0004, t= -0.18, p= 
0.4280).  The only state legitimacy indicator that is significant is Never Protest ( β̂ =  
-0.0068, t= -3.16, p= 0.0010), and its coefficient is approximately the same as that in 
the previous model (without the alternative explanations).97  For each percent increase 
in citizens who report they would never lawfully protest, the proportion of fatal 
terrorist attacks on police is expected to decrease by 0.0024, holding all else 
constant.98  The story for the alternative explanations is the same as previous models: 
Societal Schism is a significant predictor and Foreign Military Presence approaches 
significance – both in the expected direction.  For each unit increase in societal 
schism, the proportion of fatal terrorist attacks directed toward the police is expected 
to increase by 0.0257 and the presence of a foreign military is expected to increase 
the proportion of fatal attacks on police by 0.0416, controlling for all other variables.  
Relative deprivation (as measured by the Gini Index; β̂ = 0.0203, t= 3.72, p= 0.0000) 
and Not Corrupt ( β̂ = -0.0549, t= -2.51, p= 0.0075) remain significant (although the 
                                                 
95 Cragg’s alternative would not converge for Model 15; accordingly, Tobit is reported. 
96 When Not Corrupt is removed from the model, the sign of Mean State Confidence coefficient 
switches to that expected, although it still does not reach significance.  All other results remain the 
same (except Foreign Military Presence reaches statistical significance, p< 0.05). 
97 Excluding Never Protest produces no substantive differences in the results, except Foreign Military 
Presence and Civil War are no longer significant. 




magnitude of both coefficients decrease slightly).99  (Homicide also would be 
statistically significant in a two-tailed test, but its sign is in the opposite direction than 
that predicted.)  While its coefficient remains the same as the previous model ( β̂ = 
0.1411, t= 1.81, p= 0.0370), the standard error of Civil War decreases, making it 
statistically significant; Interstate War, on the other hand, is no longer significant.100  
(The coefficient of Anocracy, which would have been marginally significant in the 
previous model, had this been a two-tailed test or if the prediction were opposite, 
drops by almost two-thirds and it no longer approaches significance ( β̂ = -0.0613, t= 
-0.73, p(one-tailed)= 0.2335)). 
Six non-essential control variables were removed from the parsimonious 
model (Model 16), presented in Table 23.101  Specifically, F-tests indicated that the 
regime type variables (i.e., Autocracy and Anocracy), some violence measures 
(Regional Terrorism, Death Penalty and Interstate War), and Population Density do 
not contribute to the model (F(6,1000)= 0.47, p= 0.8284), so they were excluded.  
The remaining variables tell a similar story as the previous model.  Only one state 
legitimacy variable is significant and in the predicted direction: Never Protest; its 
coefficient is the same as the previous model ( β̂ = -0.0069, t= -3.31, p= 0.0005).  The 
sign of the coefficient for two of the state legitimacy indicators – Mean State 
Confidence ( β̂ = 0.0005, t= 0.26, p= 0.3970) and Against Tax Fraud ( β̂ = 0.0005, t= 
                                                 
99 Removing Gini Index produces no substantive differences (although Homicide no longer would be 
significant in a two-tailed test, and the sign of its coefficient still is in the opposite direction).  
Removing Homicide produces no substantive differences, except the coefficient of Not Corrupt 
decreases, making it only marginally significant. 
100 When Civil War is removed from the model, Interstate War becomes statistically significant; all 
other results remain the same. 





0.22, p= 0.4120) – is in the opposite direction than that predicted, although neither is 
significant (the sign of the coefficient of the latter variable switched from the 
previous model).102  Societal Schism remains an important predictor of the proportion 
of fatal terrorist attacks against the police ( β̂ = 0.0730, t= 4.45, p= 0.0000) and 
Foreign Military Presence reaches significance in the model ( β̂ = 0.1374, t= 1.94, p= 
0.0285), as its coefficient increases and standard error slightly decreases.  Among the 
control variables, relative deprivation (as measured by the Gini Index), Civil War and 
Not Corrupt remain significant.  (Homicides still would be significant in a two-tailed 
test, as it remains in the opposite direction than that predicted.) 
To summarize, these results suggest that societal schism, the presence of a 
foreign military and relative deprivation are important determinants of both the 
proportion of terrorist attacks on police and the proportion of fatal terrorist attacks on 
police in support of hypotheses 3 and 4.  Corruption and civil war also seem to play a 
role in predicting the proportion of fatal attacks against police.  In some models, one 
state legitimacy indicator – the percent of citizens who report they would never 
protest – reaches significance, offering support for the second hypothesis.  While 
these results downplayed the importance of both police and state legitimacy, the 
legitimacy indicators were significant in some models, depending on the other 
variables included. 
                                                 
102 The sign of the coefficient of Mean State Confidence switches to that predicted when Never Protest 
is removed from the model, although Mean State Confidence does not reach significance.  The other 




Confirming with Count Models 
As described at the outset of this chapter, several countries experience little 
terrorism against any target between 1999 and 2008, reducing the denominator of the 
proportions used as the dependent variables in the previous analyses, artificially 
inflating some.  To compensate for this issue, similar predictor variables as those used 
in Models 1-16 are included in count Models 1-16, but instead using the number of 
terrorist attacks on police per country and the number of fatal terrorist attacks against 
police per country as the dependent variables.  Because the dependent variables are 
counts, Poisson regression analysis or, in the case of overdispersion, negative 
binomial regression analysis is appropriate.  Given that the standard deviation is 
almost three times the mean for both the number of attacks on police ( x = 17.415, s= 
51.136) and the number of fatal attacks on police ( x = 10.402, s= 33.270), 
overdispersion is present.  This was confirmed by the significant likelihood ratio tests 
in each of the 40 imputed datasets, indicating negative binomial regression was a 
better choice than Poisson regression. 103  Additionally, because half of the countries 
in the sample had no terrorist attacks against the police and 53 countries had no fatal 
attacks on the police, zero-inflated negative binomial regression analysis may be 
more appropriate than negative binomial regression.  However, zero-inflated 
regression failed to converge for all models except Model 1 (including only 
Confidence in Police with the number of attacks on police as the dependent variable), 
so the Vuong test (Vuong, 1989) was computed in each of 20 (of the 40) multiply 
imputed datasets for that model; while the test statistics were positive (generally 
                                                 
103 Likelihood ratio tests confirming evidence of overdispersion are not available using Stata’s (version 




greater than 1.00), the insignificant results of the Vuong test (all p’s> 0.10) found that 
zero-inflated models were not necessary.104  Accordingly, negative binomial 
regression analysis was used to produce the estimates in Tables 19-22. 
While these models are similar to the Tobit models, there are differences with 
the count models that should be noted.  Because the population of police available as 
possible terrorist targets differs across countries, possible heteroskedasticity may be 
introduced (Greene, 2008).  To account for this, an exposure variable (the number of 
police officer per country, roughly calculated as the product of Police Per Capita and 
population) was used in the count models, which is one difference between the count 
models and the models above.  Additionally, the total number of terrorist attacks 
excluding those targeting police (“Non-Police Targeted Terrorism”) was included as a 
control variable so that there is no overlap between this variable and the dependent 
variable.  Except for these differences, the models reported below are the same as the 
Tobit models unless otherwise noted.105 
In Model 1, including only confidence in the police, the sign of the coefficient 
is in the expected direction in that states where citizens have less confidence in police 
experience a higher number of terrorist attacks directed toward police – similar to the 
results of the Tobit analysis.  (See Table 24.)  But, this variable still does not reach 
significance ( β̂ = -0.0248, t= -1.21, p= 0.1135). 
                                                 
104 Nevertheless, because of the positive value of the Vuong test statistic across imputed samples, zero-
inflated negative binomial regression was computed on individual datasets for Model 1 for comparison 
to the negative binomial regression results.  The coefficients were very close (0.977 in the negative 
binomial regression and 0.992 in the zero-inflated negative binomial regression). 
105 The number of terrorist attacks against any target minus the attacks directed against the police is 
highly correlated with the dependent variable, the number of attacks on police (r= 0.994), and 
moderately correlated with Civil War (r= 0.5669).  Models including control variables are run with and 




Adding control variables (including Non-Police Targeted Terrorism) in count 
Model 2 had similar results as the Tobit model.  Specifically, the sign of the police 
legitimacy coefficient switches to the opposite direction than that predicted, and both 
the magnitude of the coefficient and the standard error decreased.  The Gini Index 
( β̂ = 0.0669, t= 1.52, p= 0.0645) and Not Corrupt ( β̂ = -0.04967, t= -3.22, p= 
0.0005) emerged as important control variables, as in the Tobit model.  (Homicide 
also would be significant in a two-tailed test, but its coefficient is in the opposite 
direction than that predicted – similar to the Tobit model.) 
There also were some differences between the Tobit and count models.  Not 
surprisingly given the almost perfect correlation (r= 0.994), Non-Police Targeted 
Terrorism was a significant predictor of the number of terrorist attacks on police ( β̂ = 
0.0037, t= 3.15, p= 0.001).  For each additional terrorist attack on another target, 
attacks directed toward police increase by a factor of 1.0037 (exp(0.0037)).  
(Differing from the Tobit analysis, Autocracy would reach significance if this were a 
two-tailed test or if the predicted sign was in the opposite direction ( β̂ = -2.3626, t=  
-2.07, p(one-tailed)= 0.0190).  Autocratic regimes (compared to democracies) decrease 
the expected rate of terrorist attacks on police by a factor of 0.0942.  Death Penalty 
also would reach significance in a two-tailed test – but the sign of its coefficient was 
in the opposite direction than that predicted; states with the death penalty had fewer 
terrorist attacks directed against the police.)106 
                                                 
106 No substantive differences emerged when Civil War was excluded from the model.  Removing Gini 
Index also produced no substantive difference (except Homicide would no longer reach significance in 
a two-tailed test; its coefficient remained in the opposite direction than that predicted).  Without 




The alternative explanations were included in Model 3.  Looking at 
Confidence in Police, the magnitude of the coefficient is higher than in the previous 
two models and the standard error is lower.  Again, the sign of the coefficient is in the 
opposite direction of that predicted.  But, had the sign been in the opposite direction 
or had this been a two-tailed test, police legitimacy would have reached significance 
( β̂ = 0.0286, t= 1.75, p= 0.0400).  As in the Tobit model, two of the three alternative 
explanations are significant predictors of the number of terrorist attacks on the 
police.107  Countries higher in societal schism ( β̂ = 0.2909, t= 2.26, p= 0.0120) and 
countries that have a foreign military on their soil ( β̂ = 1.6349, t= 2.69, p= 0.0035) 
experience higher terrorist attacks directed against their police forces.  Specifically, 
each unit increase on the schism scale increases terrorist attacks on police by a factor 
of 1.3376; having a foreign military presence increases the expected number of 
terrorist attacks on police by 5.1289.  Unlike the Tobit model, the Gini Index 
coefficient is no longer an important predictor.  Non-Police Targeted Terrorism 
remains significant; including the alternative explanations only slightly affected its 
coefficient ( β̂ = 0.0033, t= 2.76, p= 0.0030).  (Autocracy would remain significant if 
this were a two-tailed test or if the predicted sign was negative, although both the 
magnitude of its coefficient and standard error ( β̂ = -3.0100, t= -2.48, p(one-tailed)= 
0.0065) increased from count Model 2.)  With the inclusion of the other explanations, 
the magnitude of the coefficient of Not Corrupt decreases, making it only marginally 
                                                 
107 Note that Police Per Capita, a proxy measure for opportunity, again is not significant, adding little 
to the model.  Because the total number of police was used as the exposure variable, Model 3 was run 
with and without Police Per Capita.  The only difference is that without Police Per Capita, Not Corrupt 




significant ( β̂ = -0.2288, t= -1.37, p= 0.0855).  While not significant, the sign of the 
coefficients of Interstate War, Regional Terrorism and Population Density switched 
from Tobit Model 2.108 
Using the same predictors as Model 4 from the Tobit analysis, Civil War, 
Interstate War, Regional Terrorism, Death Penalty, Not Corrupt and Population 
Density were excluded after an F-test indicated they did not significantly contribute 
to the model (F(6,1000)= 1.42, p= 0.2044).  There is little change in the coefficient or 
standard error of the Confidence in Police variable from the previous count model.  
As in count Model 3 and in the Tobit analyses, Societal Schism ( β̂ = 0.2575, t= 2.01, 
p= 0.0225) and Foreign Military Presence ( β̂ = 2.1919, t= 4.41, p= 0.0000) remain 
significant.  Non-Police Targeted Terrorism ( β̂ = 0.0038, t= 3.77, p= 0.0000) is an 
important predictor of the number of terrorist attacks against the police, as is 
Anocracy ( β̂ = 1.1088, t= 1.69, p(one-tailed)= 0.0460).  For each additional terrorist 
attack against another targets, the number of terrorist attacks targeting the police 
increases by a factor of 1.0038.  Compared to democratic governments, a country 
having an anocratic government increases the expected number of terrorist attacks 
targeting the police by a factor of 3.0307.  (Autocracy also would be important in a 
two-tailed test ( β̂ = -2.8049, t= -3.12, p(one-tailed)= 0.0010), differing from the Tobit 
analyses where neither regime type variable was important in Model 4.)  Also 
                                                 
108 No significant differences emerged when either Gini Index, Homicide or Civil War were excluded 




differing from the Tobit analyses is the Gini Index – which remains insignificant here 
( β̂ = 0.0348, t= 0.81, p= 0.2090).109 
INSERT TABLE 24 ABOUT HERE. 
Turning to Model 5 (see Table 25), which measures legitimacy through the 
state legitimacy indicators, the average state confidence coefficient is significant and 
its sign is in the predicted direction ( β̂ = -0.0330, t= -2.13, p= 0.017): for each unit 
increase in the Mean State Confidence, the number of terrorist attacks against the 
police increases by a factor of 0.9675.  The sign of the Refugees coefficient also is in 
the expected direction, but this variable and the other two state legitimacy indicators – 
with signs in the opposite direction than that predicted – fail to reach significance; 
recall in the Tobit analyses that none of the state legitimacy indicators was significant 
in Model 5.110 
With the inclusion of the control variables in Model 6, the significance of 
Mean State Confidence disappears ( β̂ = -0.0141, t= -0.75, p= 0.2280).  (See Table 
25.)  In fact, count Model 6 resembles the findings in Model 6 of the Tobit analysis.  
The sign of the Mean State Confidence coefficient remains negative, but inclusion of 
the control variables decreases its magnitude and increases its standard error.  The 
sign of Refugees switches to opposite of predicted ( β̂ = -0.0016, t= -0.25, p= 0.4025) 
and the sign of Never Protest also switches to that expected.  The magnitude of the 
coefficient of Never Protest increases, as does its standard error, and it now is 
                                                 
109 Removing Police Per Capita, Gini Index or Homicide produced no substantive changes in Model 4. 
110 Even without Never Protest, Mean State Confidence is marginally significant, with its sign in the 
expected direction ( β̂ = -0.0242, t= -1.66, p= 0.0490).  Refugees ( β̂ = 0.0071, t= 1.17, p= 0.121) and 




significant ( β̂ = -0.0421, t= -2.12, p= 0.0170), similar to the trend in the Tobit 
analysis.  Unlike the Tobit analysis of Model 6, in the count model the sign of 
Against Tax Fraud ( β̂ = 0.0453, t= 2.42, p(one-tailed)= 0.0080) remains positive – 
opposite of expectations.  (Also note that this variable would be significant in a two-
tailed test.)  Looking at the control variables, Non-Police Targeted Terrorism again is 
significant ( β̂ = 0.0051, t= 4.09, p=0.000).  Similar to the Tobit analysis, relative 
deprivation is important ( β̂ = 0.0827, t= 1.78, p=0.038), as is Not Corrupt ( β̂ =  
-0.3104, t= -2.06, p=0.0195).  None of the other control variables reached 
significance.111  (That said, it should be noted that Death Penalty would be significant 
in a two-tailed test, as its sign is in the direction opposite of that predicted.) 
Including the alternative explanations in Model 7 tells the same story.  (See 
Table 25.)  Again – and similar to the Tobit analyses – two of the state legitimacy 
indicators (i.e., Mean State Confidence and Never Protest) are in the expected 
direction and only one, Never Protest, is significant (Mean State Confidence: β̂ =  
-0.0035, t= -0.16, p= 0.4365 and Never Protest: β̂ = -0.0463, t= -2.11, p= 0.0175).  
Refugees and Against Tax Fraud are in the opposite direction than that predicted 
(although if this were a two-tailed test, Against Tax Fraud would be marginally 
significant: β̂ = 0.0359, t= 1.87, p(one-tailed)= 0.0305).  Among the alternative 
explanations, Societal Schism ( β̂ = 0.2634, t= 1.94, p= 0.0260) and Presence of a 
                                                 
111 Excluding Never Protest switches the sign of the Refugees variable and Gini Index is no longer 
significant; the rest of the results remains substantively the same.  When Gini Index is excluded, the 
magnitude of the Never Protest coefficient decreases, as does its standard error, and this variable only 
approaches significance.  Removing other control variables (e.g., Homicide, Civil War) does not 




Foreign Military ( β̂ = 1.3624, t= 1.86, p= 0.0315) are important predictors of the 
number of terrorist attacks against the police, while Police Per Capita is not ( β̂ =  
-0.0003, t= -0.18, p= 0.4300).  Non-Police Targeted Terrorism remains significant 
( β̂ = 0.0037, t= 2.91, p= 0.0020).  However, relative deprivation (as measured by the 
Gini Index) and Not Corrupt are no longer significant – while both standard errors are 
approximately the same, the magnitude of the coefficients decreases ( β̂ = 0.0585, t= 
1.19, p= 0.1180 and β̂ = -0.1050, t= -0.67, p= 0.2500, respectively).  While the sign 
of the Civil War and Regional Terrorism coefficients switch direction, neither 
variable is a significant predictor of the number of terrorist attacks on police.112 
Finally, count Model 8 uses similar predictor variables as Model 8 from the 
Tobit analysis.  Again, an F-test indicated that the regime type variables (i.e., 
Autocracy and Anocracy), several violence measures (i.e., Interstate War, Regional 
Terrorism and Death Penalty), Not Corrupt and Population Density did not add much 
to the model (F(7,1000)= 1.34, p= 0.2295), so these variables were removed.  While 
the sign of the Mean State Confidence switches direction, it remains insignificant 
( β̂ = 0.0107, t= 0.51, p= 0.3050); the other state legitimacy indicators remain the 
same as the previous two models: Refugees and Against Tax Fraud are not significant 
( β̂ = -0.0101, t= -1.87, p(one-tailed)= 0.0310 and β̂ = 0.0316, t= 1.58, p(one-tailed)= 0.0575, 
respectively), and Never Protest remains significant in the expected direction ( β̂ =  
-0.0627, t= -2.84, p= 0.0025).  Societal Schism is not significant ( β̂ = 0.1389, t= 1.03, 
p= 0.1515), as its coefficient drops in magnitude (and its standard error remains the 
                                                 




same).  Foreign Military Presence ( β̂ = 2.5316, t= 3.64, p= 0.0000) and Non-Police 
Targeted Terrorism ( β̂ = 0.0033, t= 2.30, p= 0.0105) remain significant, while Police 
Per Capita remains unimportant ( β̂ = -0.0000, t= -0.01, p= 0.4955).  Gini Index once 
again approaches significance ( β̂ = 0.0696, t= 1.29, p= 0.0985), and the coefficient of 
Civil War doubles from the last model ( β̂ = 1.5625, t= 1.92, p= 0.0275), making it 
significant in count Model 8.113 
INSERT TABLE 25 ABOUT HERE. 
Mirroring the Tobit analyses, the remaining count analyses use the total 
number of fatal terrorist attacks per country targeting the police.  Model 9 includes 
only Confidence in Police.  (See Table 26.)  While the sign of the coefficient is in the 
expected direction (and slightly larger in magnitude than Model 1, which uses total 
fatal and nonfatal attacks on police as the dependent variable), it does not reach 
significance ( β̂ = -0.0261, t= -1.05, p= 0.1465). 
Adding the control variables in count Model 10 does not make this measure 
important to explaining the number of fatal terrorist attacks on police.  Just the 
opposite – both the magnitude of the coefficient and the standard error decreases for 
the Confidence in Police variable.  In fact, like in the Tobit analysis, the sign of the 
coefficient switches direction ( β̂ = 0.0068, t= 0.38, p= 0.3510).  Also similar to the 
Tobit analysis, relative deprivation ( β̂ = 0.0816, t= 1.63, p= 0.0520) and Not Corrupt 
( β̂ = -0.7488, t= -3.81, p= 0.0000) are significant predictors, although Interstate War 
                                                 





is not ( β̂ = -0.1849, t= -0.21, p= 0.4160).  Non-Police Targeted Terrorism is 
significant ( β̂ = 0.0039, t= 3.08, p= 0.0010), as is Autocracy ( β̂ = -2.1807, t= -1.90, 
p= 0.0570).  (Again, if these were two-tailed tests, Homicide and Death Penalty 
would approach significance.)114 
The alternative explanations are added to Model 11.  Even though the 
magnitude of the Confidence in Police variable increases and its standard error is 
about the same, it still does not reach significance and the sign of the coefficient 
remains in the opposite direction ( β̂ = 0.0137, t= 0.78, p= 0.2170).  Like in most 
previous models, both Societal Schism ( β̂ = 0.4441, t= 2.43, p= 0.0075) and Foreign 
Military Presence ( β̂ = 1.1837, t= 1.93, p= 0.0270) are significant predictors of the 
number of fatal terrorist attacks on police.  (Interestingly, for the first time, the Police 
Per Capita variable would have been significant if this were a two-tailed test, but its 
sign is in the opposite direction than that expected ( β̂ = -0.0038, t= -2.12, p(one-tailed)= 
0.0170), suggesting fatal terrorist attacks on police are higher in state with fewer 
police per capita.)  Among the control variables, Gini Index no longer is marginally 
significant ( β̂ = 0.0283, t= 0.59, p= 0.2770); Non-Police Targeted Terrorism and Not 
Corrupt remain important predictors ( β̂ = 0.0040, t= 3.18, p= 0.0010 and β̂ =  
-0.6301, t= -2.94, p= 0.0015, respectively).115  (In a two-tailed test, Homicide would 
                                                 
114 When Homicide is removed from the model, Autocracy and Gini Index index no longer approach 
significance.  Removing other variables from the model (e.g., Gini Index, Civil War) produces no 
substantive differences. 
115 Without either Gini Index, Civil War or Death Penalty, Population Density would become 
significant if its predicted sign was in the opposite direction.  When Homicide is removed, Population 
Density again would become marginally significant if its expected sign was opposite and Regional 




approach significance ( β̂ = -0.0085, t= -1.87, p(one-tailed)= 0.0305), but note that the 
sign of the coefficient is in the opposite direction than predicted.  Additionally, the 
magnitude of the Autocracy coefficient increases (as does its standard error), and it 
would reach significance in a two-tailed test ( β̂ = -3.5432, t= -2.73, p(one-tailed)= 
0.0030).) 
Ideally, count Model 12 would use the same predictor variables as the 
parsimonious model used in Tobit analyses, removing the regime type variables (i.e., 
Autocracy and Anocracy), Regional Terrorism, Death Penalty and Population 
Density.  However, an F-test indicated that these variables – specifically, Autocracy – 
significantly contribute to the count model (F(5,1000)= 3.53, p= 0.0036).  
Accordingly, Autocracy was included, while the other four variables (i.e., Anocracy, 
Regional Terrorism, Death Penalty, Population Density) were removed (F(4,1000)= 
1.79, p= 0.1284).  So, count Model 12 differs slightly from the parsimonious Tobit 
Model 12.  The results, though, tell a similar story.  While its coefficient increases, 
Confidence in Police remains insignificant with the sign in the opposite direction 
( β̂ = 0.0227, t= 1.32, p(one-tailed)= 0.0930).  Societal Schism ( β̂ = 0.3248, t= 1.88, p= 
0.0300) and Foreign Military Presence ( β̂ = 1.5743, t= 2.94, p= 0.0015) are 
significant predictors of the number of fatal terrorist attacks against the police.  The 
sign of Police Per Capita ( β̂ = -0.0028, t= -1.67, p(one-tailed)= 0.0480) continues to be 
opposite of that anticipated and remains insignificant (although it would approach 
significance in a two-tailed test).  Looking at the control variables, Total Terrorism is 
                                                                                                                                           





significant ( β̂ = 0.0034, t= 2.60, p= 0.0045), as is Civil War ( β̂ = 1.8505, t= 2.13, p= 
0.0170) and Not Corrupt ( β̂ =  
-0.5916, t= -2.75, p= 0.0030).  (Interstate War would approach significance in a two-
tailed test, although its sign is opposite of that expected: β̂ = -1.4812, t= -1.83,  
p(one-tailed)= 0.0340.)  Relative deprivation (as measured by the Gini Index) approaches 
significance ( β̂ = 0.0596, t= 1.40, p= 0.0810).  (In a two-tailed test, Homicide would 
be significant: β̂ = -0.0885, t= -2.65, p(one-tailed)= 0.0040, as would Autocracy: β̂ =  
-3.6398, t= -3.22, p(one-tailed)= 0.0005.)  While Gini Index is more volatile in the count 
models, the story remains relatively the same as the Tobit analyses, but adding an 
additional important predictor of terrorist attacks on police: Non-Police Targeted 
Terrorism. 
INSERT TABLE 26 ABOUT HERE. 
As in the Tobit analyses, Models 13-16 focus on fatal terrorist attacks on 
police, including state legitimacy indicators as predictors.  (See Table 27.)  Beginning 
with Model 13 which uses only the state legitimacy indicators as predictors, none of 
the state legitimacy indicators reach significance (although in a two-tailed test, Never 
Protest would approach significance: ( β̂ = 0.0382, t= 1.87, p(one-tailed)= 0.0310).  In 
fact, only two of the coefficient signs (that of Mean State Confidence and Refugees) 
are in the expected directions.  These results are similar to Tobit model 13, with one 
exception: recall in the Tobit Model 13 that Mean State Confidence approaches 





Control variables are added to Model 14.  Similar to the Tobit analysis, the 
sign of all state legitimacy variables (except Against Tax Fraud) switches direction 
from count Model 13 (in the Tobit analyses, Refugees was the exception).  The 
magnitude of the coefficients of Mean State Confidence ( β̂ = 0.0009, t= 0.05, p= 
0.4805) and Refugees ( β̂ = -0.0004, t= -0.08, p= 0.4700) decreases.  Again, Never 
Protest reaches significance ( β̂ = -0.0321, t= -2.19, p= 0.0145).  (In a two-tailed test, 
Against Tax Fraud would reach significance, too: β̂ = 0.0569, t= 2.61, p(one-tailed)= 
0.0045.)  Also similar to the Tobit analysis, the Gini Index emerges as a significant 
predictor of fatal terrorist attacks against the police ( β̂ = 0.1141, t= 2.27, p= 0.0115), 
as does Not Corrupt ( β̂ = -0.7739, t= -3.83, p= 0.0000).  (Homicide and Death 
Penalty would reach significance in a two-tailed test: β̂ = -0.0792, t= -2.13,  
p(one-tailed)= 0.0170 and β̂ = -1.2786, t= -2.12, p(one-tailed)= 0.0170, respectively.)  Non-
Police Targeted Terrorism in a country, too, is significant ( β̂ = 0.0053, t= 4.46, p= 
0.0000).  Unlike the Tobit analysis, Anocracy, Civil War and Interstate War are not 
significant in the count analysis.116 
Alternative explanations are included in Model 15.  (See Table 27.)  Looking 
at the state legitimacy indicators, while the magnitude of each coefficient increases, 
there are no substantive changes from Model 14.  The only significant state 
legitimacy indicator is Never Protest ( β̂ = -0.0408, t= -1.95, p= 0.0260) – as in the 
Tobit analysis.  Also the same as the Tobit analysis, Societal Schism is significant 
                                                 
116 When Gini Index is removed from Model 14, Never Protest approaches significance (as would 
Autocracy and Death Penalty in a two-tailed test).  Removing other variables (e.g., Civil War, 




( β̂ = 0.3650, t= 2.18, p= 0.0150), Foreign Military Presence approaches significance 
( β̂ = 0.9513, t= 1.41, p= 0.0790) and Police Per Capita is insignificant ( β̂ = -0.0011, 
t= -0.61, p= 0.2700).  Among control variables, Not Corrupt is significant ( β̂ =  
-0.5862, t= -2.81, p= 0.0025) like in the Tobit analysis and the Gini Index approaches 
significance ( β̂ = 0.0799, t= 1.43, p= 0.0765), while it was significant (p< 0.01) in 
the Tobit analysis.  Again, Non-Police Targeted Terrorism is significant ( β̂ = 0.0045, 
t= 3.92, p= 0.0000).  (If these were two-tailed tests, Interstate War and Death Penalty 
would be marginally significant and Homicide would reach significance.)  Unlike the 
Tobit analysis, Civil War is insignificant.117 
Finally, count Model 16 attempted to use the same predictors as those in the 
parsimonious Tobit Model 16, excluding the regime type variables (i.e., Autocracy 
and Anocracy), Interstate War, Regional Terrorism, Death Penalty and Population 
Density.  As in count Model 12, the F-test was significant (F(6,1000)= 3.49, p= 
0.0020), indicating that at least one of these variables significantly contributed to the 
model.  Both Autocracy and Death Penalty were significant contributors to the model 
(F(2,1000)= 4.95, p= 0.0072); Anocracy, Interstate War, Regional Terrorism and 
Population Density were not (F(4,1000)= 2.04, p= 0.0873) and were excluded from 
the model.  So, this parsimonious model differs from the final parsimonious Tobit 
Model 16.  No substantive changes emerge from Models 14 or 15, similar to the Tobit 
analyses.  Never Protest remains the only significant legitimacy indicator in the 
                                                 
117 Without Gini Index, the sign of the Mean State Confidence coefficient becomes negative (although 
it still is not significant) and Population Density approaches significance.  (Autocracy would be 
significant in a two-tailed test, as its sign remains negative.)  Without Homicide, the only substantive 
difference is that the coefficient of Mean State Confidence switches signs (and Never Protest becomes 
marginally significant).  Without Civil War, Foreign Military Presence is not significant and Autocracy 




predicted direction ( β̂ = -0.0468, t= -2.04, p= 0.0205).  (Against Tax Fraud would 
approach significance in a two-tailed test: β̂ = 0.0423, t= 1.76, p(one-tailed)= 0.0395.)  
The magnitude of the coefficient decreases and its standard error increases, so 
Societal Schism only approaches significance ( β̂ = 0.2873, t= 1.64, p= 0.0505).  
Foreign Military Presence is no longer marginally significant ( β̂ = 0.07871, t= 1.16, 
p= 0.1235).  (Recall in the Tobit Model 16 that both Societal Schism and Foreign 
Military Presence were significant at p< 0.05.)  Relative deprivation (as measured by 
the Gini Index) is significant ( β̂ = 0.0931, t= 1.77, p= 0.0380), as is Not Corrupt ( β̂ = 
-0.8230, t= -4.49, p= 0.0000) – similar to the Tobit results – although Civil War is not 
( β̂ = 0.6525, t= 0.087, p= 0.1920), which is one point where this model diverges with 
the Tobit analysis.  Additionally, Non-Police Targeted Terrorism continues to be an 
important predictor of fatal terrorist attacks targeting police.  (As in the previous 
count models, Homicide and Death Penalty would approach significance in two-tailed 
tests, as would Autocracy, which was not included in the Tobit Model 16.)118 
INSERT TABLE 27 ABOUT HERE. 
Summary 
The results of the count models using fatal terrorist attacks on police echoed 
the count models using the number of all and only fatal attacks on police and, taken 
                                                 
118 Without Gini Index, Societal Schism becomes significant, while Never Protest becomes marginally 
significant; additionally, the sign of the Mean State Confidence coefficient switches direction to that 
predicted (although it still is insignificant).  Without Homicide, the coefficient of Mean State 
Confidence also becomes negative and Societal Schism becomes significant.  Removing Civil War 




together, the results of the count models resembled those of the Tobit models.119  In 
both the Tobit analyses and the count analyses, police legitimacy played a minor – if 
any – role, reaching significance in only one (Model 9) of the eight Tobit models in 
which it was included.  Confidence in Police never reached significance in the count 
models and its coefficient was positive in every model that included the control 
variables.  Among the state legitimacy indicators, Mean State Confidence was 
significant in only one count model (Model 5) using the number of terrorist attacks on 
police and in only one Tobit model (Model 9) using the proportion of fatal terrorist 
attacks on police.  The sign of its coefficient reversed direction in some models.  
Refugees and Against Tax Fraud often were in the direction opposite of that 
predicted.  Never Protest reached significance in both the Tobit and count models 
where control variables were included.  Societal Schism and Foreign Military 
Presence were at least marginally significant in all (but one count) models in which 
they were included.  Not Corrupt usually was significant or marginally significant.  
While relative deprivation (as measured by the Gini Index) was a consistent predictor 
in the Tobit analyses, it was significant or approached significance in only some 
count models.  Regime type seemed important in some of the count models, but not 
the Tobit models.  Not surprisingly, the number of terrorist attacks against any target 
other than the police emerged as a significant predictor of the number of attacks 
directed against the police in the count models.  The final chapter discusses the 
theoretical and policy relevance of these results. 
                                                 
119 The CLAD models, which have fewer assumptions than Tobit, had divergent results; however, 
given that the sample size was greatly reduced in the CLAD analyses, the CLAD results may not be 




Chapter 7:  Discussion and Conclusion 
While the study of terrorism and policing terrorism has greatly increased since 
the September 2001 attacks in the United States, we know relatively little about 
police as targets of terrorist groups because, with few exceptions (e.g., Deflem, 2011; 
Deflem & Sutphin, 2006), this is an understudied but important topic.  This project 
partially fills this gap in the literature by examining the influence of legitimacy and 
other factors on terrorist attacks on police. 
Does legitimacy impact terrorist attacks on police?  Contrary to expectations, 
analyses suggest little, if any, relationship between police legitimacy (measured as 
Confidence in Police) and both the proportion of terrorist attacks on police and the 
proportion of fatal attacks on police.  This held true when looking at the count of all 
and only fatal terrorist attacks directed toward the police.  Perhaps police legitimacy 
really has nothing to do with why terrorists target police; terrorists may target police 
for only instrumental reasons.  For example, terrorists may target police as a means to 
prohibit these first responders from arriving at the scene of an attack, making it seem 
more catastrophic, not because citizens have no confidence in the police. 
The state legitimacy indicators, for the most part, also did not seem to be 
related to the proportion of terrorist attacks on police – at least not as expected.  The 
one variable that consistently emerged as a predictor of both the proportion and 
number of all and only fatal attacks on police was the percent of people who reported 
they would never lawfully protest.  However, this finding could be tautological, as 
terrorism may be an extreme form of protesting.  The average state confidence 




was in the opposite direction than that predicted.  The other two state legitimacy 
indicators (the number of refugees fleeing a country and the percentage of people 
who are against tax fraud) would have reached significance in several models given a 
two-tailed test, suggesting indicators of higher state legitimacy are related to a higher 
proportion of and more terrorist attacks on police.  While police legitimacy may not 
be related to police victimization, state legitimacy may play a role.  This suggests that 
terrorists attack police for symbolic reasons – because they represent a government 
perceived as illegitimate (as indicated by the average state confidence variable) or to 
show the populace their confidence in the government is misplaced (as indicated by 
the Refugees and Against Tax Fraud variables). 
The presence of a foreign military seemed to be the most consistent predictor 
of attacks on police.  This is similar to Pape’s (2006) findings, that presence of a 
foreign military (especially one with a different religion) significantly increased 
suicide attacks (against any target, not specifically the police).  Pape (2006) 
concluded that suicide campaigns were designed to remove the foreign presence from 
the state; here, countries may experience a higher proportion of terrorist attacks on 
police to send a message to the government – or the police, who may be cooperating 
with foreign forces – that the state needs to remove its foreign influence.  Perhaps in 
these countries, attacks on police are seen as a fight for liberation against an enemy 
state – and those who aid it.  This was seen in the Iraq example described in Chapter 
3.  Specifically, the goal of al-Qaeda in Iraq is to remove foreign military presence. 
Societal schism and relative deprivation also were important throughout the 




other variables were included in the model).  “Without a grievance, there would be no 
terrorism” (Rosenfeld, 2004, p. 23).  Societal schism and economic inequality provide 
such grievances.  Recall the societal schism measure is drawn from the Minorities at 
Risk project, which includes groups suffering from discriminatory treatment leading 
to political mobilization or collective action (Asal & Pate, 2005, p. 29).  Groups 
experiencing discrimination or relative deprivation have a grievance, which may 
spawn terrorism – specifically against those symbols of the government (i.e., the 
police) who allow such discrimination and inequality to continue or who may even 
participate in it. 
While two of the alternative explanations were consistently significant 
predictors of terrorist attacks on police, disregarding legitimacy as an important 
influence of such attacks is premature, especially because it reached significance in 
some models, like Model 10 excluding the corruption variable.  Given the small 
sample size and low statistical power, only large effects are detected.  It could be the 
case that legitimacy has a small to medium effect on terrorist attacks on police that is 
not picked up here.  Future research should further explore the empirical relationship 
between legitimacy and terrorism. 
Violence also may spill over into terrorist attacks targeting police, although 
how and when it is related to attacks on police is not consistent in these results.  Some 
violence measures sometimes reached significance, depending on the variables 
included in the model.  Involvement in civil war led to a higher proportion of fatal 
terrorist attacks on police, as expected.  Terrorism – especially terrorism against 




tool to use in the fight against the state.  Homicide frequently would have reached 
significance had these been two-tailed tests, as the sign of its coefficient was 
negative.  More homicides led to a lower proportion of fatal attacks on police – 
contrary to expectations.  Perhaps all citizens recognize that police are needed to 
investigate these murders and, accordingly, terrorist groups do not target the police.  
Or, maybe random homicides disperse police resources into the community, where 
terrorist attacks would cause innocent casualties – homicides encourage civil 
interaction between police and citizens while terrorist attacks on police can lead to 
oppressive police actions.  Another explanation may be that more homicides lead to a 
greater distaste for violence, decreasing the motivation for terrorism. 
Surprisingly, opportunity to attack police (as measured by Police Per Capita) 
is unrelated to such terrorist attacks, although in count Model 11, Police Per Capita 
would have reached significance in a two-tailed test which indicates fatal attacks 
targeting the police were higher in states with fewer police per capita.  In fact, the 
sign of the coefficient of this variable was negative in all count models, even though 
it was significant in only one.  Perhaps terrorist attacks on police are instrumental, 
removing the few vulnerable obstacles in the way of terrorists’ goals.  This would 
also explain why police legitimacy was not an important determinant of terrorist 
attacks on police.  However, the sign of the coefficient of Police Per Capita was 
positive in all Tobit models, suggesting the lone significant finding in Model 11 was 
an artifact of the data.  Perhaps simply having the opportunity to attack is 
meaningless without a grievance (like presence of a foreign military, societal schism, 




Other factors, like interstate war, regime type, gross domestic product (results 
not shown), regional terrorism, having the death penalty, and population density were 
not related to attacks on police in any models.  Common sense suggests that terrorism 
may be one tool in the fight against the state, which is why civil war may have been 
significant while interstate war was not.  State involvement in war with another state 
does not necessitate violence against one’s own state; instead, violence would be 
directed at the foreigners (except in instances of an unpopular war) – especially when 
there is a foreign presence on a state’s soil. 
Similarly, the null finding of regional terrorism makes sense.  Drakos and 
Gofas (2006) point out that the internet dilutes the importance of regional terrorism, 
as communication networks can now span much further and terrorists are not limited 
to physically close terrorist networks. 
The terrorism literature offers mixed evidence on the importance of regime 
type, absolute economic factors (like GDP) and population; no support was found 
here with respect to terrorist attacks on police.  Taken together, the violence measures 
suggest that a “culture of violence” does not influence terrorist attacks against police: 
death penalty and interstate war were not significant; homicide was significant but in 
the opposite direction; and only civil war was significant in one set of models, but 
alone these variables may not indicate a “culture of violence”. 
While the presence of a foreign military, societal schism, and relative 
deprivation are important in terrorist attacks on police, legitimacy deserves further 





There are several limitations inherent in this study.  First, the legitimacy 
measures may not be valid.  Police legitimacy may be distinct from confidence in 
police.  Rigorous studies of police legitimacy at the micro level suggest that it is 
comprised of trust in police (Reisig et al., 2007).  While trust in police was 
unavailable for the majority of the countries included in this sample, perhaps true 
police legitimacy is not measured by confidence in police.120  Future research should 
conceptualize police legitimacy in other ways (e.g., trust in police), perhaps more 
closely reflecting the procedural justice literature. 
Similarly, I was unable to use the composite measure of state legitimacy; 
instead I used direct measures.  This is problematic because these indicators, like the 
percentage of people who hold certain beliefs and the number of refugees, could be 
confounded with other things.  Having said this, Gilley (2006, 2009) used some of 
these variables (i.e., confidence in the government and confidence in civil services) in 
his composite measure of state legitimacy.  Nevertheless, scholars should continue to 
empirically study the meaning and measure of state legitimacy, considering the 
legitimacy indicators failed validity tests and especially considering that countries 
known for abuse of citizens (e.g., Nigeria, Uganda) ranked higher in citizens’ 
                                                 
120 The Global Barometer surveys ask respondents about their trust in police.  However, these data 
were available only for a proportion of the countries included in this study, so this measure could not 
be incorporated here.  Only 21 countries are represented in both the World Values Survey and the 
Global Barometer Survey: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Jordan, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Uruguay, 
Vietnam and Zambia.  For these 21 overlapping countries, the correlation between the percentage of 
the population who have quite a lot or a great deal of confidence in police (from the fifth wave of the 
World Values Survey, covering the years 2005-2008) and the percentage of the population who have 
quite a lot or a great deal of trust in the police (from Round 1 of the Global Barometer Survey, 




subjective confidence in the government and its agencies than democratic states 
where citizens have many civil liberties. 
A further issue surrounding legitimacy is that these measures may apply only 
to domestic, not international, terrorist attacks (see, e.g., Gaibulloev & Sandler, 
2011).  Recall that in many models the police and state legitimacy measures had the 
opposite sign than predicted (and in several models would have reached significance 
had the sign been in the predicted direction).  The state and police may, in fact, be 
legitimate in the eyes of citizens and foreigners alike – and attacks on police may be 
driven by foreign powers, who might strike at the most legitimate of governments in 
an effort to delegitimize them.  Disaggregating attacks on police into domestic and 
international attacks may lead to results consistent with expectations. 
To assess whether attacks are domestic or international, the terrorist group 
must be known.  While we may assume that most attacks against police are 
committed by domestic groups, unfortunately, this information is missing in a large 
proportion of cases.  As an alternative, Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev (2011) recently 
proposed a method for determining whether GTD incidents are domestic, 
international or unknown – a tool that may benefit future research.  However, this tool 
only distinguishes international and domestic terrorist attacks by country-year instead 
of at the incident level.  Differentiating target types (i.e., the police) is not possible 
with this tool.  Further, Enders and colleagues (2011) base their tool on several 
assumptions which may or may not be unrealistic.  Nevertheless, future research 




Even a domestic categorization may be too broad to identify possible effects 
of legitimacy.  Countries may have several terrorist groups, each of which may have 
different reasons to attack specific targets.  For some organizations or individual 
terrorists, illegitimacy may be relevant, while for others it may not be important.  For 
example, Benmelech and Berrebi (2007) found that age and education were 
significant predictors of target type in Israel: older and more educated Palestinian 
suicide bombers focused on more “important”, prestigious targets.  While younger 
and less educated terrorists targeted military targets, older and more educated 
terrorists directed their attacks toward civilian targets in larger cities – attacks that 
would lead to more casualties.  Perhaps this is because attacking the military in Israel 
is considered less prestigious than attacking civilians because attacks on the military 
are considered part of a terrorist’s duty while attacking civilians is considered more 
sophisticated. 
On a related note, even if legitimacy is important to some groups, the 
legitimacy measures used here may not tap into terrorists’ attitudes of police or state 
legitimacy – or the attitudes of the terrorists’ constituency.  Recall the legitimacy 
variables are based primarily on survey responses from the World Values Survey.  
Not only do perceptions of legitimacy vary across culture, such perceptions of 
fairness vary across group membership and social status (e.g., Clay-Warner, 2001) 
within a culture.  While the survey measures gauge the attitudes of the broader 
populace, they may not tap into grievances of particular subgroups.  In particular, 
members of terrorist groups are unlikely survey participants, but their constituency 




finding of the schism measure and the nonsignificant findings of the legitimacy 
variables.  Specifically, in divided countries, survey measures may not assess both or 
all sides of the schism, disproportionately representing the attitudes of the dominant 
group members and overlooking those of minority group members. 
Survey measures of legitimacy not only may fail to capture the attitudes of 
terrorists or their constituents, but survey measures also may fail to assess citizens’ 
true attitudes of their government.  For example, in repressive regimes, citizens may 
fear reprisal from honestly reporting a negative opinion about the state or the police.  
This could be the reason countries like Vietnam and China unexpectedly were ranked 
at the top of the confidence measures.  Interestingly, while the police and state 
legitimacy measures drawn from attitudinal surveys did not yield consistent results in 
the empirical analyses, the objective corruption measure reached significance in 
several models, providing further evidence that the confidence in governance 
variables are invalid measures of legitimacy.  Future researchers studying legitimacy 
should avoid such attitudinal measures and, instead, use objective measures. 
Another limitation of this research is that it is cross-sectional in nature.  Cross-
sectional analyses are vulnerable to simultaneity issues and suffer particularly from 
omitted variable bias.  First, legitimacy is not a static concept – it changes over time 
with regimes and with people’s opinions about governmental policies and events 
(such as police misconduct or corruption).  Although the analyses presented in 
Appendix A suggest some state legitimacy indicators are relatively stable (i.e., the 
change was not significantly different between survey waves), change in perceptions 




included here may not be as stable.  Importantly, according to the results presented in 
Appendix A, confidence in police has grown between 1999 and 2008.  Cross-
sectional analyses do not offer insight to how changes in police legitimacy over time 
impact terrorist attacks on police. 
Looking at only one point in time raises a second disadvantage of cross-
sectional analyses: simultaneity bias.  Recall from the discussion in Chapter 3 the 
complex relationship between police legitimacy and terrorism.  Police legitimacy may 
impact terrorist attacks on police in several ways (i.e., terrorists retaliate against 
police illegitimacy, terrorists want to de-stabilize the legitimacy of police, or both 
processes may be at play).  And, terrorism may impact police legitimacy.  High 
policing or over policing in the aftermath of a terrorist incident may create a 
repressive police state (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Brodeur, 2007; Kane, 2005) and 
police may use excessive force instead of procedurally just tactics to suppress further 
dissent (Crenshaw, 1981), reducing legitimacy (see Jonathan & Weisburd, 2010) and 
potentially increasing terrorist attacks on police.  That is, terrorist attacks on police 
are affected by police legitimacy and police legitimacy is impacted by terrorist 
attacks.  This simultaneity makes disentangling the direction of causality difficult.  
Longitudinal analyses are preferred for addressing direction of causality, as 
longitudinal analyses incorporate temporal ordering. 
A third drawback of cross-sectional analyses is the risk of omitted variable 
bias.  Establishing a causal relationship is difficult if another variable potentially 
relevant to the prediction of the dependent variable and related to the independent 




legitimacy and terrorist attacks on police is excluded).  Of course, omitted variables 
are an issue in any analysis; however, fixed-effects longitudinal analyses would be 
able to control for between-country variation, limiting the impact of omitted variable 
bias to only time varying omitted variables – something this cross-sectional sample 
was not able to do. 
Finally, the reader is reminded that this is not a random sample.  The countries 
in this sample were included based on data available.  Notably, Iraq was missing from 
the analyses, and Iraq had a great deal of terrorist attacks against the police.  Again, 
these results should not be generalized beyond the sample. 
Policy Implications 
Despite these limitations, the results of this study suggest policies that may be 
beneficial in reducing terrorism.  Combating terrorism is expensive – in terms of both 
monetary expenditures and human capital – and considering the significance of 
presence of foreign military, perhaps many of the military and law enforcement 
counterterrorism measures used actually aid in terrorist recruitment, furthering the 
problem. 
Even with the null findings of police and state legitimacy, these results do not 
give the police license mistreat the public or suggest that the government rule without 
care to reduce terrorism.  On the contrary, while police and state legitimacy may not 
have consistently influenced terrorist attacks on police in this study, they may affect 
terrorist attacks against other targets.  Similarly, the null findings of opportunity 
suggest how police operate is more important than mere presence.  Accordingly, 




Perhaps if we can find a way to “drain the swamp” – or remove the conditions 
that underlie terrorism itself (Lai, 2007) – we will have found an effective strategy 
that reduces the need for counterterrorism.  Finding a way to work with foreign 
militaries without inviting them into the country may reduce terrorist attacks on 
police, as would reducing discrimination and relative deprivation.  Pape (2006) points 
out that removing US military presence, for example, from protecting oil-producing 
countries is unrealistic, so we must prevent a future generation of terrorists from 
forming.  Additionally, police can be proactive to reduce their risk.  Working with 
communities to build cohesion among all members – including those who may look, 
act or believe differently – may reduce discrimination.  Decreasing relative 
deprivation – maybe by providing programs to those who think they have less than 
others – would be beneficial, as well.  Helping the protectors develop programs to 




Appendix A: Stability of Legitimacy 
Several proxy measures of legitimacy are used in this research.  First, police 
legitimacy is represented by citizens’ confidence in police.  State legitimacy is 
comprised of citizens’ confidence in the government, in the civil services and in the 
justice system; citizens’ belief that cheating on taxes is never justifiable; and citizens’ 
reported abstention from legal protests (and the number of refugees fleeing a country, 
which is a behavioral measure).  These measures (except Refugees) are drawn from 
World Values Survey responses from two waves spanning a ten year period.  Because 
this research is cross-sectional, these data must be stable over time to avoid 
simultaneity bias.  This section assesses whether this assumption holds true. 
State legitimacy would be expected to be relatively stable over time because it 
is a form of world view.  Golec de Zavala and Van Bergh (2007) explain the concept 
of the world view as a: 
discrete cognitive meta structure, made up of two types of beliefs: (1) 
epistemological assertions regarding the nature of truth, cognition (i.e., 
method of discovering the truth), and reality (i.e., whether it is 
objective or subjective); and (2) axiological assertions about professed 
values (i.e., whether values are absolute or relative) that define 
individual identity. Worldviews consist of concepts, explanative 
categories, and values through which individuals perceive reality, 
define life experiences, and construct identities. (p. 589-590)121 
                                                 
121 Golec de Zavala and Van Bergh (2007) list three broad categories of worldviews: “traditional (i.e., 
premodern or religious), modern (i.e., scientific or rational), and postmodern (i.e., existential or 




Similar to religious convictions or core political predispositions, a person’s world 
view or beliefs about the state – whether the national government, the civil service or 
the justice system – are likely solidified over time through political socialization and 
are unlikely to drastically change in the short term in the absence of a major event.  In 
fact, Markus (1979) found that in spite of an increase in cynicism toward the US 
government surrounding the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Movement, political 
trust remained remarkably stable among a panel of adolescents and their parents 
between 1965 and 1973 (see also Searing et al., 1976).  Below, I test whether this 
holds true at the country level. 
While it is partially drawn from state legitimacy, police legitimacy may be 
less stable than the broader concept of government legitimacy.  Police legitimacy also 
derives from police behavior and one incident of injustice has deleterious effects on 
public perception of police.  Unlike the government, where a despised individual 
politician is replaceable (at least in democracies), confidence in police stems from 
their ability to uphold the moral order (Jackson & Bradford, 2009) and the actions of 
one unjust officer can quickly generalize to all other officers wearing the uniform.  
The stability of confidence in police also is addressed below. 
To test whether legitimacy indicators are stable over time, data were 
compared at two time periods – during the two most recent waves when responses 
were available – for each country.  Ideally, the 1999-2004 wave and the 2005-2008 
wave of the WVS would be used to correspond with the data used in the present 
research.  Unfortunately, the legitimacy indicators were not included in every wave of 




the government during the 1999-2004 and 2005-2008 survey waves; however, by 
including any of the two most recent waves (e.g., 1994-1999 wave and 1999-2004 
wave or 1989-1993 wave and 1994-1999 wave) during which the confidence in 
government question was asked, 47 countries have data – a sample large enough to 
run statistical tests.  (The countries and waves used are presented in Table 28.)  
Because each legitimacy indicator variable is continuous and data from two time 
periods is being compared, dependent samples t-tests were conducted using PASW 









DD µ  (Bachman & Paternoster, 2004, p. 391), where 
laterwaveeearlierwavD xxx −=  and µD= 0.  Positive t-test statistics indicate a decreasing 
trend over time, while negative t-test statistics indicate an increasing trend over time.  
Significant (p< 0.05) t-tests indicate a difference in reported attitudes and behaviors 
over time; non-significant (p≥ 0.05) results, on the other hand, confirm the stability of 
these legitimacy indicators over time. 
INSERT TABLE 28 ABOUT HERE. 
Beginning with Confidence in Police, 65 countries that had Confidence in 
Police data on more than one wave were compared.  A dependent samples t-test 
found a marginally significant difference between the earlier and later wave (t=  
-1.740, df= 64, p= 0.087), offering some evidence of a trend.122  This is 
understandable, as public perceptions of police fluctuate more with police actions 
than public perceptions of the state. 
                                                 
122 Looking at the difference between waves for each country, this finding does not seem to be driven 
by one or two countries.  Restricting the sample to only the waves used in the present research (1999-
2004 and 2005-2008), the results are the same (t= -1.810, df= 29, p= 0.081) for the 30 countries on the 




Turning now to confidence in the government, 49 countries had information 
on more than one wave for this measure.  A dependent samples t-test found no 
significant difference between an earlier and later wave (t= -0.513, df= 48, p= 
0.611).123  Data were available for confidence in civil services during multiple time 
periods for 68 countries.  Again, a dependent samples t-test found no significant 
differences between the earlier and later waves (t= 0.367, df= 67, p= 0.715).124  
Similarly, a dependent samples t-test found no significant difference between survey 
waves for the 53 countries with multiple data points of confidence in the justice 
system (t= 0.650, df= 52, p= 0.518).125  The results of these three tests confirm there 
is no significant difference in citizens’ confidence in the government and its agencies 
over time. 
Turning to citizens’ reported consent to governmental authority, denouncing 
tax fraud was available in 67 countries over multiple time periods.  A dependent 
samples t-test confirmed that these attitudes are stable over time, as there was not a 
significant difference between earlier and later survey waves (t= -1.058, df= 66, p= 
0.294).126  Likewise, in a sample of 65 countries with data available during two 
waves, the percentage of people who report they would never engage in a legal 
protest did not change over time (t= -0.140, df= 64, p= 0.889).127  There is no 
                                                 
123 No significant differences were found in the 20 countries with data in the latest two waves (1999-
2004 and 2005-2008): t= -1.170, df= 19, p= 0.257). 
124 Confidence in civil services was stable in the 33 countries where this question was asked in the 
1999-2004 and 2005-2008 survey waves (t= -0.587, df= 32, p= 0.567). 
125 In the very small sample of 14 countries with data on confidence in the justice system measured in 
the 1999-2004 and 2005-2008 waves, no significant difference was found between survey waves (t=  
-1.191, df= 13, p= 0.255). 
126 This nonsignificant results remained true in the smaller sample of 32 countries where data were 
available in both the 1999-2004 and 2005-2008 survey waves (t= 1.507, df= 31, p= 0.142). 
127 No significant differences were found in the smaller sample including only data from the 1999-2004 




significant difference over time in citizens’ reports of their attitudes toward legal 
obedience. 
Taken together, these results suggest the legitimacy indicators are stable over 
time.  Accordingly, drawing a cross-sectional sample from a ten-year period of 
legitimacy data is reasonable, although the Confidence in Police measure should be 






Appendix B: Addressing Missing Data 
There are several ways to handle missing data.  Most popular are complete 
case analysis (also called listwise deletion) and mean substitution (also referred to as 
single or mean imputation).  Multiple imputation has become more popular with the 
computational ease offered by advanced statistical software.128  Each method has its 
drawbacks, as discussed in Chapter 5.  To account for these drawbacks, this appendix 
compares the results of three samples of data: (1) the original sample with missing 
data, analyzed using complete case analysis; (2) a sample with missing data imputed 
with the mean of the observed values for that variable; and (3) the results from the 
multiple imputation dataset shown in the results section. 
However, each of these methods assumes data are missing at random (MAR).  
As indicated in Chapter 5, Mullins and Young (forthcoming) find that comparative 
data are not MAR, as missingness can be predicted by GDP and terrorism.  To find 
whether the MAR assumption is violated with these data, a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether a country had any missing data on any of the variables used in the 
model was created (1=missing values on at least one variable; 0=no missing values).  
The results of several logit analyses using different combinations of predictor 
variables indicate that none of the other variables described in Chapter 5 predicted 
whether a country had missing values on any variable.  Specifically, GDP and Total 
Terrorism (against any target) were insignificant (p’s> 0.05) – contrary to the findings 
of Mullins and Young (forthcoming) – as were regime type and Population Density.  
                                                 
128 Maximum likelihood estimation also has desirable properties – but is generally reserved for 




Accordingly, MAR may be a valid assumption for the data still missing here and the 
three approaches listed above may be appropriate. 
The sample using multiple imputation to account for missing data was used 
for analyses described in Chapter 6.  Specifically, multiple imputation by chained 
equations (MICE) was applied using Stata’s (version 10) ice command.  MICE 
allows a series of multiple regression equations, using all of the other data in the 
dataset (i.e., all other predictor variables described in Chapter 5).  A convenient 
feature of this method is that the type of regression equation can be specified for each 
variable.  For example, recall that the Not Corrupt variable ranged from 0 through 10.  
Treating this variable as ordinal-level, Stata’s ice command allows an ordered logit 
to be computed (instead of ordinary least squares regression, used with continuous 
variables), creating estimates from the appropriate regression model. 
Stata’s ice command also allows for the specification of the number of 
imputations or datasets to be created.  Schafer and Olsen (1998) suggest that only 
three to five imputations are necessary for efficient estimates.  However, Graham and 
colleagues (2007) found that standard errors of estimates increase and power 
decreases with fewer imputations; they recommend the number of datasets should 
reflect the proportion of missingness in the data.  Table 29 summarizes the number of 
missing values. Most (80%) countries with missing values are missing data on only 
one variable, but five countries (20%) are missing data on two variables.  Based on 
the findings of Graham and colleagues (2007) and given the missingness here, 40 
imputations were run to ensure adequate estimates. 




Data were checked to ensure that all missing data were imputed and that the 
non-missing values remained constant across the 40 imputed datasets using Stata’s 
mim: check command; the data “passed” this test.  However, some values in the 
imputed data were nonsensical.  For example, GDP had negative values, as did Police 
Per Capita.  The five negative values for GDP and the 42 negative values for Police 
Per Capita were censored to 0.  Similarly, the percentage of citizens who were against 
tax fraud included imputed values above 100.  This variable also was censored at 100 
for the three values higher than 100.129 
The other two approaches to handle missing data are relatively 
straightforward.  Complete case analysis drops any country that has a missing value 
on any variable.  Mean substitution, as it sounds, replaces missing values with the 
mean of the observed values.  Table 30 compares the descriptive statistics for each 
sample: (1) complete case analysis; (2) mean substitution; and (3) multiple imputation 
(the results of which also are described throughout Chapter 6).  As expected, the 
mean and range are identical between the complete case analysis and the mean 
substitution; because the mean of the observed values replaces the missing values in 
the second sample, the standard deviation is smaller than that of the complete case 
analysis.  The mean, standard deviation and range differ in the multiple imputation 
sample, although these differences are small. 
INSERT TABLE 30 ABOUT HERE. 
The full Tobit models (Models 3, 7, 11, 15) were run in all three samples.  
Table 31 shows the results of Model 3, which includes Confidence in Police as the 
                                                 
129 All models were run in the imputed data that were and were not censored.  No substantive 




measure of police legitimacy, the alternative explanations (i.e., societal schism, 
presence of a foreign military and opportunity, measured by Police Per Capita), and 
all control variables, using the proportion of terrorist attacks targeting police as the 
dependent variable.  The substantive results are the same: Confidence in Police does 
not reach significance, and Societal Schism, Foreign Military Presence, and relative 
deprivation (as measured by the Gini Index) emerge as important predictors.  
However, each sample has subtle differences in the coefficient and standard error of 
each variable.  For example, the coefficient of the police legitimacy measure is higher 
in the complete case analysis (the coefficient in the mean substitution sample is equal 
to that in the multiple imputation sample), but the standard error is one-ten thousandth 
of a point lower in the multiple imputation sample than in the complete case analysis 
and mean substitution samples.  Across the board, the standard errors are higher in the 
complete case analysis than in the other two samples. 
INSERT TABLE 31 ABOUT HERE. 
The same is true when computing Model 7 across the three samples, as shown 
in Table 32.  (Recall that Model 7 includes the state legitimacy indicators, the 
alternative explanations and all control variables, using the proportion of terrorist 
attacks on police as the dependent variable.)  Again, the standard errors are largest in 
the sample using complete case analysis and the coefficients are different across 
samples, which, in turn, affect the t-ratios and the significance tests.  For example, 
while Never Protest is significant at p< 0.05 in both the mean substitution ( β̂ =  
-0.0029, s x = 0.0015, t= -1.93, p= 0.029) and multiple imputation ( β̂ = -0.0033,  




deletion sample ( β̂ = -0.0043, s x = 0.0018, t= -2.40, p= 0.010).  In some instances, 
the sign of the coefficient switches direction across samples.  Although not 
significant, Anocracy is positive in the complete case analysis but negative in the 
other two samples; Interstate War and Regional Terrorism are negative in the 
complete case analysis but positive in the other two samples; and Not Corrupt is 
positive in the mean substitution sample but negative in both the complete case 
analysis and the multiple imputation sample.  Nevertheless, the significant findings 
remain the same, with Never Protest, Societal Schism, Foreign Military Presence, 
relative deprivation (as measured by the Gini Index) and Civil War emerging as 
important predictors of the proportion of terrorist attacks directed toward police.  The 
models using the proportion of fatal terrorist attacks against the police show similar 
patterns (see Tables 28 and 29). 
INSERT TABLE 32 ABOUT HERE. 
INSERT TABLE 33 ABOUT HERE. 
INSERT TABLE 34 ABOUT HERE. 
While there certainly are minor differences across the three samples, the 
substantive results are relatively the same.  As such, the results using the multiply 






Appendix C: Examining Rates 
Using proportions to assess the problem of terrorist attacks against police is 
preferred over counts of attacks on police, as proportions control for attacks on police 
that may be artificially high or low in countries with extremely high or extremely low 
amounts of terrorism in general.  The drawback of using proportions is that they may 
be artificially high or low when the denominator is small; for this reason, count 
models were analyzed.  Another way to study the problem of terrorist attacks on 
police is to examine rates of terrorist attacks on police per the number of police in a 
country.  Using these rates and the rate of terrorist attacks on police per population 
help assess the fifth hypothesis, focusing on opportunity to attack the police.  
Accordingly, this appendix will further explore terrorist attacks on police using these 
two rates as the outcome variables. 
The rate of terrorist attacks on police per one million police officers was 
computed by dividing the number of terrorist attacks targeting police by the total 
number of police per country, multiplied by one million.  Eight observations were 
missing, as some countries were missing information on the number of police.130  On 
average, the countries in this sample experienced terrorist attacks on police at a rate 
of 0.0016 per one million officers (median= 0.00004, s= 0.0048).  Similarly, the rate 
of terrorist attacks on police per 100,000 population was computed by dividing the 
number of terrorist attacks targeting police by the population, multiplied by 100,000.  
On average, the sampled countries had 0.0463 terrorist attacks on police per 100,000 
population (median= 0.0002, s= 0.1943).  The rankings of the rate of terrorist attacks 
                                                 
130 The countries missing information on the number of police officers include Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 




on police per one million police officers and the rate of terrorist attacks on police per 
100,000 population are presented in Table 35.  Macedonia remains at the top of both 
lists (recall Macedonia also had the highest proportion of terrorist attacks against 
police).  Colombia, Georgia and Algeria also rank in the top four, while western 
countries like the United States, France and Nordic countries fall near the bottom of 
both rankings.  
INSERT TABLE 35 ABOUT HERE. 
To explore what might be driving these rankings, models are computed with 
similar predictor variables to the Tobit and count models above.  Because the 
dependent variables are rates, Tobit regression analysis again is most appropriate.131  
Significant Breusch-Hagan tests indicate heteroskedasticity in models using the rates 
of terrorist attacks on police per one million officers ( 2χ = 284.10, p< 0.0001) and 
the rates of attacks on police per 100,000 population ( 2χ = 288.88, p< 0.0001).  The 
distributions of the error terms are mound shaped, with a few outliers to the right.  
Accordingly, CLAD models are run to confirm the findings from the Tobit models.132   
For each dependent variable, four models are analyzed, using the similar 
predictor variables as the count models.  To avoid overlap between the independent 
and dependent variables, police officers per capita is excluded in the models using the 
rate of attacks on police per one million officers and population density is excluded 
from the models using the rate of attacks on police per 100,000 population. 
                                                 
131 Multiple imputation was used to assign scores to the missing observations on the rate of terrorist 
attacks on police per one million officers, producing 14 negative values across the 40 samples.  These 
14 negative scores were replaced with 0. 





The first set of models uses the rate of attacks on police per one million 
officers as the outcome variable, with the results of the Tobit regression analysis 
presented in Table 36.  Model 1 includes only the police legitimacy measure, 
Confidence in Police.  The sign is in the expected direction, but the coefficient fails to 
reach significance.  CLAD analyses confirm this finding.  Model 2 adds the control 
variables.  The police legitimacy measure changes sign, to that opposite of expected.  
(Had the sign remained negative, this measure would have been marginally 
significant).  Non-Police Targeted Terrorism, relative deprivation (as measured by the 
Gini Index), and Not Corrupt all are significant in the expected direction.  (Homicide 
and Death Penalty would have been marginally significant had their signs been in the 
opposite direction.)  CLAD would not converge. 
The alternative explanations are added in Model 3 and, like the earlier 
analyses, Societal Schism and Foreign Military are marginally significant and 
significant predictors of the rate of terrorist attacks on police per one million officers.  
Again, the sign of the police legitimacy measure remains positive (and would have 
reached significance had the sign been negative).  Interestingly, Non-Police Targeted 
Terrorism did not reach significance, while relative deprivation and Not Corrupt 
continue to be significant predictors.  In this model, Civil War reaches significance.  
Again, CLAD fails to converge. 
The results of an F-test indicate that the regime type variables (Autocratic and 
Anocratic), Interstate War, Regional Terrorism and Population Density do not 
significantly contribute to the model (F(5, 1000)= 0.79, p= 0.56); accordingly, these 




again remains positive (although it would not have been significant even if the sign 
was in the opposite direction).  Societal Schism and Presence of a Foreign Military 
continue to be significant predictors, as are relative deprivation and Civil War.  As in 
the previous model, Non-Police Targeted Terrorism does not reach significance in 
this model.  However, Not Corrupt fails to reach significance here.  (Had its sign been 
in the predicted direction, Death Penalty would have been marginally significant.)  
Results of the CLAD analyses indicate that the Gini Index is significant in the 
expected direction, but the sample size was reduced from 82 to 31; the CLAD results 
should be interpreted with caution.  Overall, the results of these analyses with rates 
seem to mirror those measuring the dependent variable as proportions and counts. 
INSERT TABLE 36 ABOUT HERE. 
Next, I use the rate of terrorist attacks on police per 100,000 population as the 
outcome variable.  The results of these analyses are presented in Table 37.  Similar to 
the analyses above, Model 1 includes only the police legitimacy measure, which is in 
the expected direction but fails to reach significance.  CLAD confirms this (n= 79).  
Again, Confidence in Police switches sign when control variables are added to Model 
2.  Non-Police Targeted Terrorism, relative deprivation (measured by the Gini Index) 
and Not Corrupt are marginally significant or significant in the expected direction.  
(Homicide would be significant if its sign was in the predicted direction.)  CLAD 
would not converge. 
When the alternative explanations are added in Model 3, the sign of 
Confidence in Police remains negative (although it would have reached significance, 




Foreign Military Presence are significant predictors of the rate of terrorist attacks on 
police per 100,000 population.  The sign of Police per Capita is in the expected 
direction and just fails to marginal significance (p= 0.1125).  Relative deprivation, as 
measured by the Gini Index, and Not Corrupt also are marginally significant, while 
Non-Police Targeted Terrorism is not.  (Homicide would have been marginally 
significant, had its sign been in the expected direction.)  Again, CLAD fails to 
converge. 
Finally, the results of an F-test indicated that Non-Police Targeted Terrorism, 
regime type variables (Autocratic and Anocratic), the war variables (Civil War and 
Interstate War), and Regional Terrorism did not contribute to the model (F(6, 1000)= 
1.36, p= 0.23); these variables were excluded from parsimonious Model 4.  Without 
these variables, the story remains the same.  Confidence in Police is not significant 
and its sign is opposite of that expected (but would be significant had its sign been 
negative).  Societal Schism and Foreign Military Presence again reach significance in 
the expected direction.  Relative deprivation is marginally significant, as expected, 
but Not Corrupt is not.  CLAD again fails to converge.  These results are similar to 
those using the rate of terrorist attacks per one million officers and to both the Tobit 
and count models discussed earlier. 
INSERT TABLE 37 ABOUT HERE. 
One purpose of examining rates of terrorist attacks on police per officers and 
per population was to examine the second hypothesis.  Taken together, though, the 
models – using rates, proportions or counts – do not provide support for opportunity 




results of the models using rates as the dependent variables mirror the analyses 
discussed earlier, lending further support for societal schism, presence of a foreign 
military, relative deprivation and low corruption as explanations for terrorist attacks 




Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Number of terrorist attacks against police, total terrorist attacks against all 












Iraq 746 4021 0.19 
India 361 1862 0.19 
Afghanistan 315 1426 0.22 
Russia 207 825 0.25 
Pakistan 135 1283 0.11 
Thailand 126 919 0.14 
Colombia 99 822 0.12 
Algeria 86 436 0.20 
Nepal 77 435 0.18 
Philippines 66 781 0.08 
Sri Lanka 52 409 0.13 
Somalia 49 365 0.13 
Spain 47 398 0.12 
Indonesia 44 317 0.14 
United Kingdom 44 321 0.137 
Great Britain 2 69 0.03 
Northern Ireland 42 252 0.17 
Turkey 43 337 0.13 
Macedonia 34 87 0.39 
West Bank and Gaza 
Strip 
29 496 0.06 
Corsica 21 164 0.13 
Nigeria 19 230 0.08 
Georgia 17 65 0.26 
Kosovo 14 135 0.10 
Yugoslavia 13 47 0.28 
Bangladesh 11 135 0.08 
Israel 11 505 0.02 
Mexico 11 34 0.32 
Yemen 11 84 0.13 













Greece 9 197 0.05 
Peru 8 21 0.38 
Iran 7 65 0.11 
Saudi Arabia 7 40 0.18 
Sudan 7 109 0.06 
China 6 44 0.14 
France 5 80 0.06 
Kenya 5 33 0.15 
Burundi 4 111 0.04 
Haiti 4 20 0.20 
Lebanon 4 170 0.02 
Serbia-Montenegro 4 17 0.24 
South Africa 4 38 0.11 
Angola 3 93 0.03 
Brazil 3 8 0.38 
Uganda 3 132 0.02 
Australia 2 8 0.25 
Azerbaijan 2 8 0.25 
Belgium 2 15 0.13 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2 23 0.09 
Ethiopia 2 35 0.06 
Guyana 2 6 0.33 
Morocco 2 11 0.18 
Sweden 2 9 0.22 
Tajikistan 2 13 0.15 
Tunisia 2 4 0.50 
Uzbekistan 2 15 0.13 
Zimbabwe 2 14 0.143 
Albania 1 7 0.14 
Bahrain 1 3 0.33 
Burma (Myanmar) 1 52 0.02 
Chile 1 22 0.05 
Congo, Republic of 
(Brazzaville) 




1 58 0.02 













Germany 1 38 0.03 
Kazakhstan 1 2 0.50 
Kyrgyzstan 1 16 0.06 
Malaysia 1 4 0.25 
Mauritania 1 4 0.25 
Namibia 1 26 0.04 
Niger 1 14 0.07 
Papua New Guinea 1 2 0.50 
Serbia 1 4 0.25 
Solomon Islands 1 4 0.25 
South Korea 1 3 0.33 
Swaziland 1 6 0.17 
Timor-Leste 1 32 0.03 
United States 1 196 0.005 
Western Sahara 1 1 1 
Argentina 0 5 0 
Armenia 0 4 0 
Austria 0 9 0 
Belarus 0 4 0 
Benin 0 2 0 
Bhutan 0 4 0 
Bolivia 0 6 0 
Bulgaria 0 5 0 
Burkina Faso 0 0 0 
Cambodia 0 15 0 
Cameroon 0 2 0 
Canada 0 16 0 
Central African 
Republic 
0 5 0 
Chad 0 27 0 
Croatia 0 5 0 
Cuba 0 1 0 
Cyprus 0 4 0 
Czech Republic 0 5 0 
Denmark 0 3 0 
Djibouti 0 1 0 
Dominican Republic 0 0 0 













Eritrea 0 4 0 
Estonia 0 2 0 
Fiji 0 4 0 
Finland 0 2 0 
Gambia 0 1 0 
Ghana 0 0 0 
Guatemala 0 9 0 
Guinea 0 5 0 
Guinea-Bissau 0 7 0 
Honduras 0 1 0 
Hong Kong 0 3 0 
Hungary 0 2 0 
Iceland 0 1 0 
Ireland 0 14 0 
Ivory Coast 0 24 0 
Jamaica 0 1 0 
Japan 0 24 0 
Jordan 0 11 0 
Kashmir 0 2 0 
Kuwait 0 7 0 
Laos 0 8 0 
Latvia 0 5 0 
Lesotho 0 1 0 
Liberia 0 8 0 
Libya 0 2 0 
Lithuania 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 0 1 0 
Madagascar 0 6 0 
Malawi 0 1 0 
Maldives 0 3 0 
Mali 0 12 0 
Moldova 0 2 0 
Montenegro 0 1 0 
Mozambique 0 3 0 
Netherlands 0 9 0 
New Zealand 0 9 0 
Nicaragua 0 1 0 













Panama 0 1 0 
Paraguay 0 3 0 
Poland 0 1 0 
Portugal 0 0 0 
Puerto Rico 0 1 0 
Qatar 0 3 0 
Romania 0 2 0 
Rwanda 0 4 0 
Senegal 0 18 0 
Sierra Leone 0 24 0 
Slovak Republic 0 2 0 
Slovenia 0 1 0 
Switzerland 0 11 0 
Syria 0 4 0 
Taiwan 0 5 0 
Tanzania 0 3 0 
Togo 0 1 0 
Trinidad and Tobago 0 2 0 
Ukraine 0 12 0 
Uruguay 0 1 0 
Venezuela 0 24 0 
Vietnam 0 4 0 






Table 2. Snapshot of details surrounding terrorist attacks against police in heavily-hit 
countries 
 






































































25,713 69,700 17,098,242 652,230 2,381,741 
Population of 
country* 
2,077,328 4,585,874 138,739,892 29,835,392 34,994,937 






Table 3. Police per capita (for the year 2003) and proportion of terrorist attacks 
















b 1,100,000 761.11 1:131 0.25 
Greece 52,000 487.53 1:205 0.05 
Macedonia 10,000 484.70 1:206 0.39 
Georgia 22,229 450.49 1:222 0.26 
Israel 27,500 420.17 1:238 0.02 
Lebanon 14,000 375.57 1:266 0.02 




129,603 247.21 1:405 0.03 
Algeria 76,000 231.58 1:432 0.20 
Nepal 60,000 226.68 1:441 0.18 
Sri Lanka 38,472 194.87 1:513 0.13 
Canada 60,000 186.29 1:537 0 
Pakistan 268,166 177.95 1:562 0.11 
Afghanistan




Bhutan 3,417 159.71 1:626 0 
Bangladesh 109,000 78.73 1:1270 0.08 
Uganda 20,000 78.03 1:1282 0.02 
Burundi N/A N/A N/A 0.04 
Angola N/A N/A N/A 0.03 
Burma N/A N/A N/A 0.02 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 
N/A N/A N/A 0.02 
Notes: 
a Police personnel is the sum of all policing bodies in the country. 
b Countries in bold are the “top five” countries.  The “bottom ten” countries include 
Angola, Burma, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Great Britain, 
Greece, Israel, Lebanon, Uganda, and United States 
Sources: Police personnel data from Das (2006); population data from Central 
Intelligence Agency (2003); proportion of terrorist attacks against police from the 











3. United States 
 
Central America & 
Caribbean: 
4. Guatemala 

















































































































Table 5. Number of respondents per country and wave of the latest three waves of the 
World Values Survey 
 
Country 1994-1999 1999-2004 2005-2007 
Albania 999 1000 0 
Algeria 0 1282 0 
Andorra 0 0 1003 
Argentina 1079 1280 1002 
Armenia 2000 0 0 
Australia 2048 0 1421 
Austria 0 1522 0 
Azerbaijan 2002 0 0 
Bangladesh 1525 1500 0 
Belarus 2092 1000 0 
Belgium 0 1912 0 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1200 1200 0 
Brazil 1149 0 1500 
Bulgaria 1072 1000 1001 
Burkina Faso 0 0 1534 
Canada 0 1931 2164 
Chile 1000 1200 1000 
China 1500 1000 2015 
Colombia 6025 0 3025 
Croatia 1196 1003 0 
Cyprus 0 0 1050 
Czech Republic 1147 1908 0 
Denmark 0 1023 0 
Dominican Republic 417 0 0 
Egypt 0 3000 3051 
El Salvador 1254 0 0 
Estonia 1021 1005 0 
Ethiopia 0 0 1500 
Finland 987 1038 1014 
France 0 1615 1001 
Georgia 2008 0 1500 
Germany 2026 2036 2064 
Germany West 0 0 0 
Ghana 0 0 1534 
Great Britain 1093 1000 1041 
Greece 0 1142 0 
Guatemala 0 0 1000 
Hong Kong 0 0 1252 
Hungary 650 1000 0 
Iceland 0 968 0 




Country 1994-1999 1999-2004 2005-2007 
Indonesia 0 1004 2015 
Iran 0 2532 2667 
Iraq 0 2325 2701 
Ireland 0 1012 0 
Israel 0 1199 0 
Italy 0 2000 1012 
Japan 1054 1362 1096 
Jordan 0 1223 1200 
Kyrgyzstan 0 1043 0 
Latvia 1200 1013 0 
Lithuania 1009 1018 0 
Luxembourg 0 1211 0 
Macedonia 995 1055 0 
Malaysia 0 0 1201 
Mali 0 0 1534 
Malta 0 1002 0 
Mexico 2364 1535 1560 
Moldova 984 1008 1046 
Morocco 0 2264 1200 
Netherlands 0 1003 1050 
New Zealand 1201 0 954 
Nigeria 1996 2022 0 
Northern Ireland 0 1000 0 
Norway 1127 0 1025 
Pakistan 733 2000 0 
Peru 1211 1501 1500 
Philippines 1200 1200 0 
Poland 1153 1095 1000 
Portugal 0 1000 0 
Puerto Rico 1164 720 0 
Romania 1239 1146 1776 
Russian Federation 2040 2500 2033 
Rwanda 0 0 1507 
Saudi Arabia 0 1502 0 
Serbia 0 0 1220 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
1520 2260 0 
Singapore 0 1512 0 
Slovakia 1095 1331 0 
Slovenia 1007 1006 1037 
South Africa 2935 3000 2988 
South Korea 1249 1200 1200 
Spain 1211 2409 1200 
Sweden 1009 1015 1003 




Country 1994-1999 1999-2004 2005-2007 
Taiwan 780 0 1227 
Tanzania 0 1171 0 
Thailand 0 0 1534 
Trinidad and Tobago 0 0 1002 
Turkey 1907 4607 1346 
Uganda 0 1002 0 
Ukraine 2811 1195 1000 
United States 1542 1200 1249 
Uruguay 1000 0 1000 
Venezuela 1200 1200 0 
Vietnam 0 1000 1495 
Zambia 0 0 1500 










Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic 
2000 Belarus, Egypt, Nigeria, Venezuela 
2001 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Pakistan, Philippines, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zimbabwe 
2002 Albania, Algeria, Bangladesh 
2003 Kyrgyzstan 
2004 New Zealand 
2005 
Australia, Chile, Colombia, Finland, Guatemala, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia, South Korea 
2006 
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, France, Germany, Great 
Britain,* India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Moldova, Netherlands, Russia, Serbia, 
Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Vietnam 
2007 
Burkina Faso, China, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, Jordan, Mali, Morocco, Rwanda, 
South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Zambia 
2008 Georgia, Norway, Peru 
*While survey data come from Great Britain, these data represent the United 
Kingdom, as other data sources do not differentiate the countries included in the UK. 
Note: The fourth wave of the World Values Survey was collected between 1999 and 













(lawful, according to 
law) 
Views of legality 
• Confidence in civil service 
• Confidence in national 
government 
• Confidence in the justice 
system 
Medieval legitimus 
(conforming to ancient 
custom & customary 
procedure) 
Views of justification 
• Forcibly displaced 
populations/Refugees 
Popular consent added 
in 1338 
Acts of consent 
• Never okay to cheat on taxes 






Table 8.  Summary of variables used 
 





Proportion of all terrorist 





Proportion of all fatal 








respondents who had at 









respondents who had at 








respondents who had at 
least some confidence in 
the national government 
World Values 
Survey 




respondents who had at 
least some confidence in 




See Table 6 
Refugees Number of refugees (in 
millions) 









See Table 6 
Never Protest Percentage of 
respondents who 
indicated they never 









Variable Description Source Years measured 
Other independent variables 




Whether a foreign 











Number of police 







Regime type Three dichotomous 
variables: democracy, 
autocracy, anocracy 
Polity IV See Table 6 
GDP per capita Gross domestic product 
per capita in 2000 US 
dollars 
World Bank See Table 6 
Gini Index Level of inequality 




See Table 6 
War Two dichotomous 
variables assessing intra- 
and inter-state war 
COW 1999-2008 







Number of terrorist 
incidents in region 
minus current country 
GTD 1999-2008 
Death penalty Whether death penalty 
has been abolished in 








See Table 6 
Population Population and 
population density 





Table 9.  Sample size, effect size and significance level minimizing error 
 Effect Size 
Significance Level Small Effect Medium Effect Large Effect 
P< 0.10 450 68 27 
p < 0.05 600 88 34 
p < 0.01 800 140 50 
Note: Minimum sample sizes are in the body of the table, where the significance level 













Proportion of terrorist 
attacks on police 
0 No missing data 
Proportion of fatal attacks 0 No missing data 
Police legitimacy 
Confidence in Police 0 No missing data 
State legitimacy 
Confidence in civil service 0 No missing data 
Confidence in government 9 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Rwanda 
Confidence in justice 
system 
7 
Algeria, Egypt, Guatemala, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe 
Refugees 0 No missing data 
Against Tax Fraud 1 Ghana 
Never Protest 2 China, Iran 
Other independent variables 
Societal Schism 0 No missing data 
Foreign Military Presence 0 No missing data 
Police Per Capita 8 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Iran, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Control variables 
Regime type 0 No missing data 
GDP per capita 1 Estonia 
Gini Index 1 Trinidad and Tobago 
War 0 No missing data 
Homicide 0 No missing data 
Regional Terrorism 0 No missing data 
Death Penalty 0 No missing data 
Not Corrupt 1 Bosnia-Herzegovina 





Table 11.  Descriptive statistics of terrorist incidents targeting police (with imputed 
data) 
 
 Mean Median s Min Max 
Proportion of attacks 
on police 
0.078 0.003 0.106 0 0.391 
Proportion of fatal 
attacks on police 
0.077 0.000 0.135 0 0.667 
Confidence in Police 56.815 56.778 19.961 15.680 91.990 
Confidence in civil 
services 
45.807 46.216 18.417 5.821 95.960 
Confidence in 
national gov. 
46.768 44.945 18.160 4.027 100.000 
Confidence in justice 
system 
52.479 51.629 19.503 8.156 100.000 
Refugees (in 
millions) 
19.965 0 60.397 0 340 
Against Tax Fraud 71.911 74.745 13.550 37.240 100.000 
Never Protest 45.958 42.952 17.620 13.748 90.186 
Societal Schism 3.085 3.000 2.205 0 8 
Foreign Military 
Presence 
     
1=presence 24%     
0=absence 76%     
Police Per Capita 294.675 289.15 177.005 0 834.781 
Regime type      
Autocracy 9%     
Anocracy 18%     
Democracy 73%     
GDP (in thousands) 9.696 3.716 11.937 0.175 43.420 
Gini Index 36.883 35.300 9.127 14.381 65.000 
Civil war      
1=war 17%     
0=no war 83%     
Interstate war      
1=war 15%     
0=no war 85%     
Homicide 9.055 3.650 11.969 0.200 69.000 
Regional terrorism 1455.990 1175 1660.178 18 6213 
Death penalty      
1=use 30%     
0=abolished 70%     
Not Corrupt 4.686 3.700 2.382 1.200 10.000 





Table 12.  Principal axis factor analysis results for state legitimacy measure 
(unrotated) 
 
State legitimacy indicator Factor 1 Factor 2 
Confidence in civil services 0.882 -0.049 
Confidence in government 0.771 0.196 
Confidence in justice system 0.807 -0.113 
Refugees -0.009 0.688 
Against tax fraud 0.189 0.154 
Never protest 0.195 0.100 
Initial eigenvalue 2.563 1.043 






Table 13. Bivariate correlations between state legitimacy indicators, population 
density and corruption  
 
Variable A B C D E F 
A. Population density 1.0      
B. Not Corrupt -0.090 1.0     
C. views of legality factor 0.267* 0.044 1.0    
D. Refugees 0.035 -0.233* 0.186 1.0   
E. Against tax fraud 0.177 -0.024 0.212 0.154 1.0  
F. Never protest 0.132 -0.354* 0.197 0.100 0.116 1.0 














1 Vietnam 2.56 
2 Bangladesh 2.41 
3 China 2.28 
4 Jordan 1.57 
5 Malaysia 1.47 
6 Tanzania 1.35 
7 Switzerland 1.30 
8 Uganda 1.18 
9 Finland 1.05 
10 Ghana 1.00 
10 Mali 1.00 
10 Philippines 1.00 
13 Norway 0.95 
14 Turkey 0.80 
15 Sweden 0.76 
16 Egypt 0.75 
17 Cyprus 0.72 
18 Nigeria 0.70 
19 South Africa 0.64 
20 India 0.58 
21 Rwanda 0.56 
22 Denmark 0.53 
23 Iceland 0.52 
23 Ireland 0.52 
25 Algeria 0.48 
25 South Korea 0.48 
27 Zimbabwe 0.47 
28 Indonesia 0.46 
29 Morocco 0.43 
30 Luxembourg 0.42 
31 Burkina Faso 0.36 
32 Canada 0.32 
33 Portugal 0.18 










35 Albania 0.08 
36 Austria 0.05 
37 Russia 0.03 
37 Thailand 0.03 
39 Pakistan -0.02 
40 Hungary -0.04 
41 United Kingdom -0.10 
42 Latvia -0.12 
43 Spain -0.13 
44 Belgium -0.15 
45 United States -0.16 
46 France -0.19 
47 New Zealand -0.20 
48 Kyrgyzstan -0.23 
49 Venezuela -0.24 
50 Zambia -0.25 
51 Australia -0.26 
52 Japan -0.32 
53 Estonia -0.33 
54 Ukraine -0.37 
54 Uruguay -0.37 
56 Bulgaria -0.46 
57 Italy -0.48 
57 Slovak Republic -0.48 
59 Colombia -0.50 
60 Chile -0.51 




63 Croatia -0.58 
64 Georgia -0.67 
65 Belarus -0.70 
66 Germany -0.75 
67 Mexico -0.80 
68 Netherlands -0.86 











70 Ethiopia -0.99 
71 Greece -1.02 
72 Romania -1.05 
73 Guatemala -1.08 
74 Czech Republic -1.27 
75 Serbia -1.28 
76 Lithuania -1.32 
77 Moldova -1.41 
78 Slovenia -1.44 
79 Poland -1.49 
80 Argentina -1.66 
81 Macedonia -1.74 





Table 15.  Percent of the population who reported at least some confidence in civil 
services, confidence in the national government and confidence in the justice system 
ranked by country 
 
Rank Country Civil 
serv. 
Country Gov. Country Justice 
Sys. 
1 Bangladesh 95.96 Vietnam 98.28 Vietnam 90.31 
2 Vietnam 89.27 China 92.73 Jordan 89.60 
3 China 85.78 Bangladesh 87.28 Norway 85.95 
4 Tanzania 71.30 Jordan 87.09 China 82.49 
5 Philippines 70.70 Tanzania 83.03 Japan 81.96 
6 Nigeria 70.51 Uganda 77.48 Finland 81.76 
7 Malaysia 69.83 Malaysia 75.44 Rwanda 78.62 
8 Uganda 68.48 Ghana 71.29 Malaysia 77.69 
9 Switzerland 67.86 Mali 70.57 Switzerland 76.76 
10 Sweden 65.77 Switzerland 69.33 Denmark 75.69 
11 Egypt 63.37 South Africa 66.72 Bangladesh 75.02 
12 South Korea 63.11 Finland 64.48 Turkey 74.98 
13 Jordan 62.20 Turkey 62.73 Sweden 74.16 
14 Ireland 62.12 Uruguay 61.38 Cyprus 73.95 
15 Mali 61.96 Egypt 60.74 Iceland 72.02 
16 Ghana 61.64 Albania 58.05 Thailand 71.75 
17 Norway 61.32 Cyprus 57.77 Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
70.53 
18 Finland 60.14 Venezuela 56.09 India 68.94 
19 Zimbabwe 59.44 Indonesia 56.00 Philippines 66.44 
20 Burkina 
Faso 
58.48 India 54.92 Canada 65.60 
21 Luxembourg 58.10 Morocco 54.69 Austria 65.06 
22 Algeria 58.04 Norway 54.08 Morocco 63.85 
23 Indonesia 56.35 Algeria 53.97 South Africa 63.51 
24 Canada 56.34 Philippines 53.00 Mali 63.39 
25 Iceland 55.93 Croatia 52.11 Ghana 63.25 
26 Portugal 55.90 Belarus 51.20 United 
Kingdom 
60.64 
27 Cyprus 55.86 Colombia 51.04 Albania 58.48 
28 Turkey 55.47 Zimbabwe 51.02 United 
States 
58.16 
29 Denmark 54.91 Estonia 50.15 Luxembourg 56.49 
30 Rwanda 54.78 Burkina Faso 49.08 Germany 56.42 
31 India 54.33 Iran 48.73 Uruguay 56.16 
32 France 53.75 Chile 48.22 Spain 55.57 
33 Russia 52.92 Nigeria 48.18 Ireland 54.76 
34 Brazil 52.61 Brazil 46.33 Australia 53.75 




Rank Country Civil 
serv. 
Country Gov. Country Justice 
Sys. 
36 Morocco 51.33 Russia 45.15 Italy 51.63 
37 Pakistan 49.80 Spain 44.94 Pakistan 51.16 
38 Hungary 49.32 Mexico 44.74 Zambia 50.17 
39 Latvia 49.17 Hungary 43.74 South Korea 50.17 
40 Ukraine 48.84 Slovak 
Republic 
43.25 Brazil 49.57 





46.15 Zambia 42.29 New 
Zealand 
46.95 
43 Kyrgyzstan 44.55 New Zealand 41.01 Nigeria 46.62 
44 New 
Zealand 
43.91 Australia 40.11 Latvia 44.33 
45 Thailand 43.86 Pakistan 39.04 Netherlands 44.11 
46 United 
States 
42.73 Thailand 38.58 Greece 43.26 
47 Bulgaria 42.63 United States 38.58 Iran 43.14 
48 Austria 42.51 Canada 38.39 Hungary 43.10 
49 Spain 40.94 Latvia 38.34 Belarus 42.93 
50 Italy 40.90 Argentina 36.45 Portugal 40.58 
51 Zambia 40.58 Lithuania 36.29 France 40.20 
52 Estonia 40.57 Guatemala 36.28 Russia 38.05 
53 Georgia 40.54 Kyrgyzstan 35.14 Mexico 37.73 
54 Australia 40.09 Bulgaria 34.39 Venezuela 37.43 
55 Albania 39.77 United 
Kingdom 
34.33 Bulgaria 37.01 
56 Slovak 
Republic 
38.80 Georgia 33.16 Colombia 36.94 
57 Venezuela 37.67 Moldova 32.72 Belgium 36.26 
58 Chile 35.83 Ukraine 31.19 Ukraine 33.22 
59 Trinidad and 
Tobago 
34.70 Japan 31.03 Slovenia 32.89 
60 Ethiopia 32.98 Czech 
Republic 
30.62 Trinidad and 
Tobago 
32.89 
61 Japan 32.74 Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
29.53 Poland 32.87 
62 Colombia 31.85 France 28.97 Slovak 
Republic 
32.46 
63 Germany 31.50 Trinidad and 
Tobago 
27.28 Estonia 30.61 
64 Croatia 31.28 Netherlands 26.72 Croatia 30.13 
65 Netherlands 30.67 Romania 26.59 Chile 29.96 




Rank Country Civil 
serv. 
Country Gov. Country Justice 
Sys. 
67 Romania 30.01 Ethiopia 26.40 Romania 29.31 
68 Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
29.94 Serbia 25.59 Serbia 28.45 
69 Mexico 25.02 Slovenia 23.97 Ethiopia 27.14 
70 Uruguay 23.52 Germany 23.93 Georgia 25.08 
71 Serbia 23.05 Poland 18.23 Macedonia 24.38 





22.73 Macedonia 10.96 Argentina 19.47 
74 Lithuania 20.37 Rwanda Missing Lithuania 15.18 
75 Poland 18.43 Denmark Missing Peru 8.16 
76 Macedonia 16.96 Iceland Missing Tanzania Missing 
77 Slovenia 16.74 Austria Missing Uganda Missing 
78 Guatemala 15.29 Luxembourg Missing Zimbabwe Missing 
79 Greece 14.35 Ireland Missing Guatemala Missing 
80 Moldova 14.10 Greece Missing Kyrgyzstan Missing 
81 Argentina 7.40 Portugal Missing Algeria Missing 





Table 16.  Mean State Confidence ranked by country 
 
Rank Country Mean State 
Confidence 
1 Vietnam 92.62 
2 China 87.00 
3 Bangladesh 86.09 
4 Jordan 79.63 
5 Tanzania 77.17 
6 Malaysia 74.32 
7 Uganda 72.98 
8 Switzerland 71.32 
9 Finland 68.79 
10 Norway 67.12 
11 Rwanda 66.70 
12 Ghana 65.39 
13 Mali 65.30 
14 Denmark 65.30 
15 Turkey 64.39 
16 Iceland 63.98 
17 Philippines 63.38 
18 Cyprus 62.53 
19 Egypt 62.06 
20 Sweden 60.76 
21 South Africa 60.74 
22 India 59.40 
23 Ireland 58.44 
24 Luxembourg 57.30 
25 Morocco 56.62 
26 Algeria 56.00 
27 Zimbabwe 55.23 
28 Nigeria 55.10 
29 Indonesia 54.66 
30 Austria 53.79 
31 Canada 53.44 
32 South Korea 53.07 
33 Albania 52.10 
34 Burkina Faso 51.55 




Rank Country Mean State 
Confidence 
36 Brazil 49.50 
37 Japan 48.58 
38 Portugal 48.24 
39 Spain 47.15 
40 United Kingdom 47.04 
41 Uruguay 47.02 
42 Pakistan 46.66 
43 United States 46.49 
44 Hungary 45.39 
45 Russia 45.37 
46 Australia 44.65 
47 Zambia 44.35 
48 New Zealand 43.96 
49 Latvia 43.95 
50 Venezuela 43.73 
51 Bosnia-Herzegovina 43.33 
52 Belgium 41.27 
53 France 40.97 
54 Iran 40.78 
55 Estonia 40.45 
56 Colombia 39.94 
57 Kyrgyzstan 39.84 
58 Italy 39.66 
59 Belarus 39.03 
60 Slovak Republic 38.17 
61 Bulgaria 38.01 
62 Chile 38.00 
63 Croatia 37.84 
64 Ukraine 37.75 
65 Germany 37.28 
66 Mexico 35.83 
67 Netherlands 33.83 
68 Georgia 32.93 
69 Trinidad and Tobago 31.62 
70 Ethiopia 28.84 
71 Greece 28.80 




Rank Country Mean State 
Confidence 
73 Guatemala 25.79 
74 Serbia 25.70 
75 Moldova 25.55 
76 Czech Republic 25.28 
77 Slovenia 24.53 
78 Lithuania 23.95 
79 Poland 23.18 
80 Argentina 21.11 
81 Macedonia 17.43 





Table 17.  Refugees ranked by country (including only those countries in the sample 




Country name Refugees 
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina 210 
2 Ukraine 3000 
3 Mali 4000 
3 Mexico 4000 
5 Ghana 5000 
5 Guatemala 5000 
7 Nigeria 7000 
8 Albania 10000 
8 Algeria 10000 
8 Pakistan 10000 
11 India 11000 
12 Turkey 16000 
13 Iran 19000 
13 Serbia 19000 
15 Uganda 20000 
16 Macedonia 23000 
17 Russia 26000 
18 Indonesia 39000 
19 Georgia 44000 
20 Philippines 57000 
21 Ethiopia 62000 
22 Rwanda 71000 
23 Morocco 116000 
24 China 150000 
25 Colombia 258000 
26 Vietnam 308000 





Table 18.  Against Tax Fraud and Never Protest ranked by country 
 




Rank Country name 
Never 
Protest 
1 Bangladesh 98.80 1 Guatemala 89.334 
2 Pakistan 95.15 2 Jordan 88.44 
3 Turkey 93.21 3 Pakistan 86.52 
4 Ethiopia 90.88 4 Thailand 84.83 
5 Indonesia 89.37 5 Egypt 82.50 
6 Japan 88.93 6 Vietnam 79.69 
7 Tanzania 88.53 7 Philippines 78.56 
8 Zimbabwe 88.18 8 Malaysia 71.86 
9 Colombia 87.78 9 Rwanda 68.45 
10 Argentina 87.56 10 Romania 64.77 
11 Jordan 87.47 11 Turkey 63.49 
12 Egypt 86.93 12 Hungary 62.80 
13 Georgia 85.43 13 Chile 60.18 
14 Vietnam 84.88 14 Uruguay 59.64 
15 Morocco 84.78 15 Poland 58.46 
16 South Korea 83.97 16 Japan 58.15 
17 Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
83.79 17 Ukraine 58.13 
18 Venezuela 83.33 18 Venezuela 57.75 
19 Canada 81.44 19 Zimbabwe 57.72 
20 China 81.17 20 Georgia 55.96 
21 Algeria 80.99 21 Russia 55.88 
22 Iran 79.11 22 India 53.59 
23 Cyprus 78.78 23 Morocco 53.34 
24 United States 77.98 24 Bulgaria 53.13 
25 Nigeria 77.89 25 Bangladesh 52.54 
26 Albania 77.67 26 Kyrgyzstan 51.93 
27 Uruguay 77.33 27 Indonesia 51.89 
28 Trinidad and 
Tobago 
76.55 28 Belarus 51.70 
29 Chile 76.50 29 Estonia 51.64 
30 Finland 76.48 30 Finland 51.13 
30 Switzerland 76.48 31 South Africa 49.69 
32 Australia 76.18 32 Algeria 49.62 
33 Czech Republic 75.81 33 Moldova 48.93 
34 Romania 75.78 34 Ghana 48.11 
35 Slovak Republic 75.76 35 Austria 47.63 
36 Macedonia 75.68 35 Colombia 47.63 
37 Austria 75.62 37 Nigeria 47.43 








Rank Country name 
Never 
Protest 
39 Hungary 75.00 39 Netherlands 43.93 
40 Denmark 74.83 40 South Korea 42.95 
41 Peru 74.75 41 Bosnia-Herzegovina 42.26 
42 New Zealand 74.42 42 Portugal 42.20 
43 Netherlands 72.85 43 Serbia 42.02 
44 Latvia 71.99 44 Brazil 41.92 
45 Italy 71.66 45 Argentina 41.30 
46 Rwanda 71.58 46 Mexico 40.68 
47 Norway 71.39 47 Macedonia 39.19 
48 Bulgaria 71.09 48 United Kingdom 38.92 
49 Guatemala 71.07 49 Slovak Republic 38.54 
50 Iceland 70.97 50 Slovenia 38.28 
51 United Kingdom 70.75 51 Cyprus 37.08 
52 Sweden 70.38 52 Peru 36.29 
53 Germany 70.37 53 Latvia 35.93 
54 Slovenia 70.21 54 Zambia 35.91 
55 Ireland 70.05 55 Canada 33.86 
56 Mexico 69.97 56 Ireland 33.40 
57 South Africa 69.11 57 Mali 33.11 
58 Portugal 68.38 58 Switzerland 32.98 
59 Poland 66.91 59 Germany 32.04 
60 Burkina Faso 66.47 60 Australia 31.88 
61 Croatia 66.20 61 Italy 30.98 
62 Kyrgyzstan 65.19 62 Lithuania 30.84 
63 India 63.21 63 United States 30.52 
64 France 62.76 64 Denmark 30.40 
65 Mali 62.55 65 France 30.34 
66 Uganda 61.82 66 Ethiopia 29.83 
67 Russia 58.56 67 New Zealand 29.08 
68 Philippines 53.97 68 Belgium 28.97 
69 Greece 53.75 69 Czech Republic 28.88 
70 Luxembourg 52.66 70 Burkina Faso 27.27 
71 Estonia 52.62 71 Trinidad and 
Tobago 
27.13 
72 Thailand 52.45 72 Norway 25.64 
73 Brazil 50.54 73 Spain 24.48 
74 Lithuania 49.07 74 Luxembourg 23.86 
75 Ukraine 48.83 75 Albania 23.54 
76 Moldova 48.64 76 Croatia 22.93 
77 Belgium 48.07 77 Sweden 20.91 
78 Zambia 46.70 78 Iceland 19.73 








Rank Country name 
Never 
Protest 
80 Serbia 39.61 80 Greece 13.75 
81 Belarus 37.24 81 China [Missing] 







Table 19. Correlation matrix among variables 
 
Variable A B C D E F G 
A. Proportion 
of attacks on 
police 




0.730 1.0      
C. Confidence 
in police 
-0.118 -0.232 1.0     
D. Mean State 
Confidence 
-0.127 -0.202 0.706 1.0    
E. Refugees 0.002 0.042 0.075 0.173 1.0   
F. Against Tax 
Fraud 
-0.041 0.008 0.222 0.221 0.147 1.0  
G. Never 
Protest 
0.033 -0.030 -0.033 0.196 0.117 0.134 1.0 
H. Schism 0.343 0.501 -0.247 -0.024 0.161 0.049 0.190 
I. Presence of 
Foreign 
Military 
0.262 0.251 -0.336 -0.266 0.270 -0.081 0.138 
J. Police per 
capita 
0.032 0.061 -0.315 -0.382 -0.148 -0.270 -0.051 
K. Autocratic 0.023 0.001 0.100 0.221 0.333 0.144 0.380 
L. Anocratic -0.045 -0.095 -0.016 0.200 0.109 -0.033 0.094 
M. Democratic 0.024 0.082 -0.050 -0.314 -0.306 -0.062 -0.322 
N. GDP -0.176 -0.225 0.512 0.110 -0.212 -0.003 -0.439 
O. Gini Index 0.248 0.314 -0.217 0.018 0.126 0.087 0.405 
P. Civil War 0.140 0.227 -0.049 0.120 0.156 0.203 0.233 
Q. Interstate 
War 
0.060 0.070 0.185 -0.082 -0.082 0.157 -0.088 
R. Homicide 0.048 0.080 -0.241 0.072 0.106 -0.049 0.180 
S. Regional 
Terrorism 
0.035 0.033 0.276 0.420 -0.008 0.304 0.330 
T. Death 
Penalty 
0.153 0.158 -0.125 0.176 0.067 0.116 0.443 
U. Not Corrupt -0.191 -0.289 0.571 0.101 -0.228 -0.026 -0.361 
V. Population 
Density 






Variable H I J K L M N 
H. Schism 1.0       
I. Presence of 
Foreign 
Military 
0.159 1.0      
J. Police per 
capita 
0.008 -0.043 1.0     
K. Autocratic 0.144 0.129 -0.145 1.0    
L. Anocratic -0.060 0.170 -0.162 -0.146 1.0   
M. Democratic -0.039 -0.230 0.233 -0.504 -0.781 1.0  
N. GDP -0.348 -0.343 -0.049 -0.215 -0.332 0.426 1.0 
O. Gini Index 0.363 0.124 -0.145 0.013 0.174 -0.160 -0.401 
P. Civil War 0.189 0.119 -0.138 -0.023 0.202 -0.161 -0.259 
Q. Interstate 
War 
0.203 0.003 -0.178 -0.004 -0.109 0.098 0.286 
R. Homicide 0.224 0.064 -0.173 -0.140 0.262 -0.140 -0.394 
S. Regional 
Terrorism 
0.036 0.011 -0.145 0.413 0.102 -0.350 -0.168 
T. Death 
Penalty 
0.348 -0.011 -0.189 0.364 0.165 -0.374 -0.257 
U. Not Corrupt -0.350 -0.378 -0.008 -0.204 -0.368 0.450 0.866 
V. Population 
Density 
-0.015 0.017 -0.235 -0.006 -0.101 0.092 0.046 
 
Variable O P Q R S T U 
O. Gini Index 1.0       
P. Civil War 0.262 1.0      
Q. Interstate 
War 
-0.112 0.270 1.0     
R. Homicide 0.687 0.295 -0.181 1.0    
S. Regional 
Terrorism 
0.043 0.212 0.087 -0.114 1.0   
T. Death 
Penalty 
0.337 0.190 0.023 0.157 0.208 1.0  
U. Not Corrupt -0.379 -0.285 0.265 -0.399 -0.165 -0.336 1.0 
V. Population 
Density 











Table 20. Tobit models with proportion of terrorist attacks on police as dependent 
variable (n=82) 
 


















































































































Sigma  0.1826** 0.1655** 0.1537** 0.1558** 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients are presented, with standard errors in parentheses 
below. 
† p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; all tests are one-tailed. 
To keep the results table simple, directional hypotheses were assigned to control 





Table 21. Tobit models with proportion of terrorist attacks on police as dependent 
variable (n=82) 
 













































































































































Sigma  0.1821** 0.1616** 0.1506** 0.1519** 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients are presented, with standard errors in parentheses 
below. 





Table 22. Tobit models with proportion of fatal terrorist attacks directed against 
police as dependent variable (n=82) 
 




















































































































Sigma  0.2913** 0.2216** 0.1793** 0.1973** 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients are presented, with standard errors in parentheses 
below. 




Table 23. Tobit models with proportion of fatal terrorist attacks directed against 
police as dependent variable (n=82) 
 














































































































































Sigma  0.2944** 0.2038** -0.1608** 0.1673** 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients are presented, with standard errors in parentheses 
below. 




Table 24. Negative binomial regression models with total number of terrorist attacks 
directed against police, 1999-2008 as dependent variable (n=82); total number of 
police per country used as exposure variable 
 





























































































































Note: Unstandardized coefficients are presented, with standard errors in parentheses 
below. 





Table 25. Negative binomial regression models with total number of terrorist attacks 
directed against police, 1999-2008 as dependent variable (n=82) 
 























































































































































Note: Unstandardized coefficients are presented, with standard errors in parentheses below. 




Table 26. Negative binomial regression models with total number of fatal terrorist 
attacks directed against police, 1999-2008 as dependent variable (n=82) 
 































































































































Note: Unstandardized coefficients are presented, with standard errors in parentheses 
below. 





Table 27. Negative binomial regression models with total number of fatal terrorist 
attacks directed against police, 1999-2008 as dependent variable (n=82) 
 


























































































































































Note: Unstandardized coefficients are presented, with standard errors in parentheses below. 












the civil services 
Country Waves Country Waves Country Waves 
Albania 1994, 1999 Albania 1994, 1999 Albania 1994, 1999 
Argentina 1999, 2005 Argentina 1999, 2005 Argentina 1999, 2005 
Australia 1994, 2005 Australia 1994, 2005 Australia 1994, 2005 
Austria 1989, 1999 Bangladesh 1994, 1999 Austria 1989, 1999 
Bangladesh 1994, 1999 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1994, 1999 Bangladesh 1994, 1999 
Belarus 1994, 1999 Brazil 1994, 2005 Belarus 1994, 1999 
Belgium 1989, 1999 Bulgaria 1994, 2005 Belgium 1989, 1999 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 




Brazil 1994, 2005 Chile 1999, 2005 Brazil 1994, 2005 
Bulgaria 1999, 2005 China 1999, 2005 Bulgaria 1999, 2005 
Canada 1999, 2005 Taiwan 1994, 2005 Canada 1999, 2005 
Chile 1999, 2005 Colombia 1994, 2005 Chile 1999, 2005 
China 1999, 2005 
Czech 
Republic 
1989, 1994 China 1999, 2005 
Colombia 1994, 2005 Finland 1994, 2005 Colombia 1994, 2005 
Croatia 1994, 1999 Georgia 1994, 2005 Croatia 1994, 1999 
Czech 
Republic 




Denmark 1981, 1999 India 1999, 2005 Denmark 1989, 1999 
Estonia 1994, 1999 Indonesia 1999, 2005 Egypt 1999, 2005 
Finland 1999, 2005 Iran 1999, 2005 Estonia 1994, 1999 
France 1999, 2005 Iraq 1999, 2005 Finland 1999, 2005 
Georgia 1994, 2005 Japan 1999, 2005 France 1999, 2005 
Germany 1999, 2005 Jordan 1999, 2005 Georgia 1994, 2005 
Great 
Britain 
1999, 2005 South Korea 1999, 2005 Germany 1999, 2005 




Iceland 1989, 1999 Moldova 1999, 2005 Hungary 1994, 1999 
India 1999, 2005 Morocco 1999, 2005 Iceland 1989, 1999 
Indonesia 1999, 2005 
New 
Zealand 
1994, 2005 India 1999, 2005 
Iran 1999, 2005 Nigeria 1994, 1999 Indonesia 1999, 2005 
Ireland 1989, 1999 Norway 1994, 2005 Iran 1999, 2005 
Italy 1999, 2005 Peru 1999, 2005 Ireland 1989, 1999 
Japan 1999, 2005 Philippines 1994, 1999 Italy 1999, 2005 









the civil services 
Latvia 1994, 1999 Puerto Rico 1994, 1999 Jordan 1999, 2005 
Lithuania 1994, 1999 Romania 1994, 2005 Latvia 1994, 1999 
Macedonia 1994, 1999 
Russian 
Federation 
1994, 2005 Lithuania 1994, 1999 
Malta 1989, 1999 Slovakia 1989, 1994 Macedonia 1994, 1999 
Mexico 1999, 2005 Viet Nam 1999, 2005 Malta 1989, 1999 






1999, 2005 Moldova 1999, 2005 
Nigeria 1994, 1999 Spain 1999, 2005 Morocco 1999, 2005 
Northern 
Ireland 
1989, 1999 Sweden 1994, 2005 Netherlands 1999, 2005 




Pakistan 1994, 1999 Turkey 1999, 2005 Nigeria 1994, 1999 




Philippines 1994, 1999 Macedonia 1994, 1999 Norway 1994, 2005 
Poland 1999, 2005 
United 
States 
1999, 2005 Pakistan 1994, 1999 
Portugal 1989, 1999 Uruguay 1994, 2005 Peru 1999, 2005 
Puerto Rico 1994, 1999 Venezuela 1994, 1999 Philippines 1994, 1999 
Romania 1999, 2005 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
1994, 1999 Poland 1999, 2005 
Russian 
Federation 
1999, 2005   Portugal 1989, 1999 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
1994, 1999   Puerto Rico 1994, 1999 
Slovakia 1994, 1999   Romania 1999, 2005 












1999, 2005   Slovakia 1994, 1999 
Spain 1999, 2005   Slovenia 1999, 2005 




Switzerland 1994, 2005   South Korea 1999, 2005 
Taiwan 1994, 2005   Spain 1999, 2005 
Turkey 1999, 2005   Sweden 1999, 2005 
Ukraine 1999, 2005   Switzerland 1994, 2005 









the civil services 
States 
Uruguay 1994, 2005   Turkey 1999, 2005 
Venezuela 1994, 1999   Ukraine 1999, 2005 




    Uruguay 1994, 2005 
    Venezuela 1994, 1999 
    Viet Nam 1999, 2005 
 
 
Confidence in the 
justice system 
Never okay to 
cheat on taxes 
Would never participate 
in legal protest 
Country Waves Country Waves Country Waves 
Argentina 1994, 2005 Albania 1994, 1999 Albania 1994, 1999 
Australia 1994, 2005 Argentina 1999, 2005 Argentina 1999, 2005 
Austria 1989, 1999 Australia 1994, 2005 Australia 1994, 2005 
Belarus 1994, 1999 Austria 1989, 1999 Austria 1989, 1999 
Belgium 1989, 1999 Bangladesh 1994, 1999 Bangladesh 1994, 1999 
Brazil 1994, 2005 Belarus 1994, 1999 Belarus 1994, 1999 
Bulgaria 1999, 2005 Belgium 1989, 1999 Belgium 1989, 1999 







Chile 1994, 2005 Brazil 1994, 2005 Brazil 1994, 2005 
China 1989, 2005 Bulgaria 1999, 2005 Bulgaria 1999, 2005 
Colombia 1994, 2005 Canada 1999, 2005 Canada 1999, 2005 
Croatia 1994, 1999 Chile 1999, 2005 Chile 1999, 2005 
Czech 
Republic 
1994, 1999 China 1999, 2005 Colombia 1994, 2005 
Denmark 1989, 1999 Colombia 1994, 2005 Croatia 1994, 1999 




Finland 1999, 2005 
Czech 
Republic 
1994, 1999 Denmark 1989, 1999 
France 1999, 2005 Denmark 1989, 1999 Egypt 1999, 2005 
Georgia 1994, 2005 Egypt 1999, 2005 Estonia 1994, 1999 
Germany 1999, 2005 Estonia 1994, 1999 Finland 1999, 2005 
Great 
Britain 
1999, 2005 Finland 1999, 2005 France 1999, 2005 
Hungary 1994, 1999 France 1999, 2005 Georgia 1994, 2005 
Iceland 1989, 1999 Georgia 1994, 2005 Germany 1999, 2005 








Confidence in the 
justice system 
Never okay to 
cheat on taxes 
Would never participate 
in legal protest 
Britain 
Italy 1999, 2005 Hungary 1994, 1999 Iceland 1989, 1999 
Japan 1994, 2005 Iceland 1989, 1999 India 1999, 2005 
Latvia 1994, 1999 India 1999, 2005 Indonesia 1999, 2005 
Lithuania 1994, 1999 Indonesia 1999, 2005 Ireland 1989, 1999 
Malta 1989, 1999 Iran 1999, 2005 Italy 1999, 2005 
Mexico 1994, 2005 Ireland 1989, 1999 Japan 1999, 2005 
Moldova 1994, 2005 Italy 1999, 2005 Jordan 1999, 2005 
Netherlands 1999, 2005 Japan 1999, 2005 Latvia 1994, 1999 
New 
Zealand 
1994, 2005 Jordan 1999, 2005 Lithuania 1994, 1999 
Nigeria 1989, 1994 Latvia 1994, 1999 Macedonia 1994, 1999 
Northern 
Ireland 
1989, 1999 Lithuania 1994, 1999 Malta 1989, 1999 
Norway 1994, 2005 Macedonia 1994, 1999 Mexico 1999, 2005 
Peru 1994, 2005 Malta 1989, 1999 Moldova 1999, 2005 
Poland 1999, 2005 Mexico 1999, 2005 Morocco 1999, 2005 
Portugal 1989, 1999 Moldova 1999, 2005 Netherlands 1999, 2005 






1999, 2005 Netherlands 1999, 2005 Nigeria 1994, 1999 













1989, 1999 Peru 1999, 2005 
South 
Korea 
1994, 2005 Norway 1994, 2005 Philippines 1994, 1999 
Spain 1999, 2005 Peru 1994, 1999 Poland 1999, 2005 
Sweden 1994, 2005 Philippines 1994, 1999 Portugal 1989, 1999 
Switzerland 1994, 2005 Poland 1999, 2005 Puerto Rico 1994, 1999 
Taiwan 1994, 2005 Portugal 1989, 1999 Romania 1999, 2005 













1999, 2005 Slovakia 1994, 1999 
Uruguay 1994, 2005 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
1994, 1999 Slovenia 1999, 2005 







Confidence in the 
justice system 
Never okay to 
cheat on taxes 
Would never participate 
in legal protest 




1999, 2005 Spain 1999, 2005 
  South Korea 1999, 2005 Sweden 1999, 2005 
  Spain 1999, 2005 Switzerland 1994, 2005 
  Sweden 1999, 2005 Taiwan 1994, 2005 
  Switzerland 1994, 2005 Turkey 1999, 2005 
  Taiwan 1994, 2005 Ukraine 1999, 2005 








1999, 2005 Venezuela 1994, 1999 
  Uruguay 1994, 2005 Viet Nam 1999, 2005 
  Venezuela 1994, 2005   






Table 29.  Summary of missingness 
 
Number of missing 
values per country 
Number of countries Percent of countries 
0 57 69.51 
1 20 24.39 
2 5 6.10 








































































































































































82       
1=presence  24%  24%  24%  
















Regime type 82       
Autocracy  9%  9%  9%  


















































Civil war 82       
1=war  17%  17%  17%  
0=no war  83%  83%  83%  
Interstate war 82       
1=war  15%  15%  15%  


























Death penalty 82       
1=use  30%  30%  30%  
0=abolished  70%  70%  70%  





























Table 31. Tobit Model 3 with proportion of terrorist attacks on police as dependent 





























































































































Sigma  0.1555 0.1539 0.1537 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients are presented, with standard errors in 
parentheses below. 





Table 32. Tobit Model 7 with proportion of terrorist attacks on police as dependent 



























































































































































Sigma  0.1520 0.1513 0.1506 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients are presented, with standard errors in parentheses 




Table 33. Tobit Model 11 with proportion of fatal terrorist attacks on police as 





























































































































Sigma  0.1781 0.1779 0.1793** 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients are presented, with standard errors in 
parentheses below. 






Table 34. Tobit Model 15 with proportion of fatal terrorist attacks on police as 



























































































































































Sigma  0.1571 0.1612 -0.1608** 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients are presented, with standard errors in parentheses 




Table 35. Rankings of the rate of terrorist attacks on police per one million officers 
and the rate of terrorist attacks targeting police per 100,000 population 
 
Rank Country name 
Per 
officers 
Rank Country name Per pop. 
1 Macedonia 0.0348 1 Macedonia 1.6866 
2 Colombia 0.0175 2 Georgia 0.3895 
3 Algeria 0.0018 3 Algeria 0.2738 
4 Georgia 0.0086 4 Colombia 0.2308 
5 Philippines 0.0056 5 Thailand 0.1181 
6 Pakistan 0.0054 6 Russia 0.1453 
7 Thailand 0.0052 7 Spain 0.1047 
8 Spain 0.0036 8 Pakistan 0.0954 
9 United Kingdom 0.0029 9 Philippines 0.0833 
10 Indonesia 0.0024 10 Greece 0.0827 
11 India 0.0024 11 United Kingdom 0.0726 
12 Turkey 0.0020 12 Turkey 0.0589 
13 Russia 0.0019 13 Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.0534 
14 Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
0.0019 14 India 0.0325 
15 Ethiopia 0.0019 15 Albania 0.0325 
16 Greece 0.0017 16 Peru 0.0277 
17 Uganda 0.0015 17 Sweden 0.0220 
18 Sweden 0.0012 18 Kyrgyzstan 0.0198 
19 Bangladesh 0.0010 19 Indonesia 0.0197 
20 Albania 0.0009 20 Belgium 0.0196 
21 Zimbabwe 0.0009 21 Italy 0.0171 
22 Italy 0.0009 22 Zimbabwe 0.0160 
23 Peru 0.0009 23 Nigeria 0.0152 
24 Belgium 0.0005 24 Serbia 0.0135 
25 Morocco 0.0005 25 Uganda 0.0119 
26 Kyrgyzstan 0.0004 26 Mexico 0.0107 
27 Mexico 0.0003 27 Iran 0.0099 
28 Australia 0.0003 28 Australia 0.0098 
29 Serbia 0.0003 29 South Africa 0.0084 
30 South Africa 0.0003 30 France 0.0081 
30 Germany 0.0003 31 Bangladesh 0.0075 
32 Chile 0.0002 32 Morocco 0.0065 
33 France 0.0002 33 Chile 0.0061 
34 Malaysia 0.0001 34 Malaysia 0.0038 
35 South Korea 0.0001 35 Ethiopia 0.0025 
36 China 0.0001 35 South Korea 0.0021 
37 Brazil 0.0001 37 Brazil 0.0016 
38 Egypt 0.00003 38 Egypt 0.0014 




Rank Country name 
Per 
officers 
Rank Country name Per pop. 
40 Argentina 0 40 China 0.0005 
41 Austria 0 41 United States 0.0003 
42 Belarus 0 42 Argentina 0 
43 Canada 0 43 Austria 0 
44 Croatia 0 44 Belarus 0 
45 Cyprus 0 45 Bulgaria 0 
46 Czech Republic 0 46 Burkina Faso 0 
47 Denmark 0 47 Canada 0 
48 Estonia 0 48 Croatia 0 
49 Finland 0 49 Cyprus 0 
50 Guatemala 0 50 Czech Republic 0 
51 Hungary 0 51 Denmark 0 
52 Iceland 0 52 Estonia 0 
53 Ireland 0 53 Finland 0 
54 Japan 0 54 Ghana 0 
55 Jordan 0 55 Guatemala 0 
56 Latvia 0 56 Hungary 0 
57 Lithuania 0 57 Iceland 0 
58 Luxembourg 0 58 Ireland 0 
59 Mali 0 59 Japan 0 
60 Moldova 0 60 Jordan 0 
61 Netherlands 0 61 Latvia 0 
62 New Zealand 0 62 Lithuania 0 
63 Norway 0 63 Luxembourg 0 
64 Poland 0 64 Mali 0 
65 Portugal 0 65 Moldova 0 
66 Romania 0 66 Netherlands 0 
67 Slovak Republic 0 67 New Zealand 0 
68 Slovenia 0 68 Norway 0 
69 Switzerland 0 69 Poland 0 
70 Ukraine 0 70 Portugal 0 
71 Uruguay 0 71 Romania 0 
72 Venezuela 0 72 Rwanda 0 
73 Vietnam 0 73 Slovak Republic 0 
74 Zambia 0 74 Slovenia 0 
75 Bulgaria [Missing] 75 Switzerland 0 
76 Burkina Faso [Missing] 76 Tanzania 0 
77 Ghana [Missing] 77 Trinidad and 
Tobago 
0 
78 Iran [Missing] 78 Ukraine 0 
79 Nigeria [Missing] 79 Uruguay 0 
80 Rwanda [Missing] 80 Venezuela 0 




Rank Country name 
Per 
officers 
Rank Country name Per pop. 
82 Trinidad and 
Tobago 





Table 36. Tobit regression models with rate of terrorist attacks on police per one 
million officers, 1999-2008 as dependent variable (n=82) 
 





























































































































Note: Unstandardized coefficients are presented, with standard errors in parentheses 
below. 





Table 37. Tobit regression models with rate of terrorist attacks on police per 100,000 
population, 1999-2008 as dependent variable (n=82) 
 


























































































































Note: Unstandardized coefficients are presented, with standard errors in parentheses 
below. 































Figure 3. Distribution of the number of terrorist attacks against the police per country, 








Figure 4. Distribution of the proportion of terrorist attacks against the police per 
















Figure 6. Comparing the proportion of terrorist attacks against police in countries 







Figure 7. Comparison of the number of countries per region included and not 















Figure 9.  Distribution of terrorist attacks against any target, 1999-2008, for countries 







Figure 10.  Distribution of fatal terrorist attacks against any target, 1999-2008, for 
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